cournot games
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Author(s):  
Mengjing Chen ◽  
Haoqiang Huang ◽  
Weiran Shen ◽  
Pingzhong Tang ◽  
Zihe Wang ◽  
...  

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Xin Li ◽  
Zhang Tao ◽  
Nana Feng

In order to realize the sustainable development of the communication industry, many banks have developed some new projects to provide loan to the mobile phone brand companies (MPBCs). This paper studies a perfect information game among three parties: telecom operator (TO), MPBC, and bank. In the first stage, the bank decides an interest rate and shows it to the TO and the competitive MPBC. In the second stage, the TO and MPBC are engaged in Cournot games: a simultaneous subgame, a TO-as-leader sequential subgame, and an MPBC-as-leader sequential subgame. The TO’s and the MPBC’s decisions and the production/sale quantities are investigated. The impacts of the interest rate and the substitute factor on the TO’s and the MPBC’s optimal decisions are analyzed. When the substitute factor is high, at a low interest rate, the total sales in the simultaneous subgame is higher than those in the other two subgames; at a high interest rate, the total sales in the MPBC-as-leader subgame is higher than those in the other two subgames. However, when the substitute factor is low, at a low enough interest rate, the total sales in the simultaneous subgame is higher than those in the other two subgames; at a high enough interest rate, the total sales in the MPBC-as-leader subgame is higher than those in the other two subgames; at a moderate interest rate, the total sales in the TO-as-leader subgame is higher than those in the other two subgames. Besides, the optimal interest rate of the bank is investigated and the impact of the substitute factor on the optimal interest rate is analyzed. The bank sets a higher interest rate in the MPBC-as-leader subgame than those in the other two subgames. Besides, when the substitute factor is low, the bank sets a lower interest rate in the TO-as-leader subgame than that in the simultaneous subgame; however, when the substitute factor is high, the bank sets a higher interest rate in the TO-as-leader subgame than that in the simultaneous subgame.


Author(s):  
Dimitri J. Papageorgiou ◽  
Francisco Trespalacios ◽  
Stuart Harwood
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco De Sinopoli ◽  
Christopher Kunstler ◽  
Claudia Meroni ◽  
Carlos Pimienta
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 884-896
Author(s):  
Baosen Zhang ◽  
Ramesh Johari ◽  
Ram Rajagopal
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-122
Author(s):  
Amr Farahat ◽  
Woonghee Tim Huh ◽  
Hongmin Li

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