The Radicalism of Truth-insensitive Epistemology: Truth's Profound Effect on the Evaluation of Belief

Many philosophers claim that interesting forms of epistemic evaluation are insensitive to truth in a very specific way. Suppose that two possible agents believe the same proposition based on the same evidence. Either both are justified or neither is; either both have good evidence for holding the belief or neither does. This does not change if, on this particular occasion, it turns out that only one of the two agents has a true belief. Epitomizing this line of thought are thought experiments about radically deceived “brains in vats.” It is widely and uncritically assumed that such a brain is equally justified as its normally embodied human “twin.” This “parity” intuition is the heart of truth-insensitive theories of core epistemological properties such as justification and rationality. Rejecting the parity intuition is considered radical and revisionist. In this paper, I show that exactly the opposite is true. The parity intuition is idiosyncratic and widely rejected. A brain in a vat is not justified and has worse evidence than its normally embodied counterpart. On nearly every ordinary way of evaluating beliefs, a false belief is significantly inferior to a true belief. Of all the evaluations studied here, only blamelessness is truth-insensitive.

We Don't Know We Have Hands and it's Fine

Based on the brain in a vat thought experiment, skeptics argue that we cannot have certain knowledge. At the same time, we do have the intuition that we know some things with certainty. A way to justify this intuition is given by semantic contextualists who argue that the word “knows” is context sensitive. However, many have objected to the intelligibility of this claim. In response, another approach called “moderate pragmatic contextualism” was invoked, which claims that “knows” itself is not context sensitive, but knowledge assertions are. I show, however, that to refute skepticism, moderate pragmatic contextualism rests on unjustified and implausible assumptions as well. Since no form of contextualism works as a response to skepticism, I argue that we should simply accept skepticism. However, I argue that skepticism is not a problem because skeptic pragmatic contextualism can offer a plausible explanation of why we have the intuition that our ordinary knowledge claims are true, even though they are not. I conclude that skeptic pragmatic contextualism offers the most plausible response to the brain in a vat thought experiment.

A Sellarsian Transcendental Argument against External World Skepticism

This paper investigates the relation between what James Conant has called Kantian and Cartesian varieties of skepticism. It is argued that a solution to the most prominent example of a Kantian variety of skepticism, i.e. Kripkensteinian skepticism about rule-following and meaning, can be found in the works of Wilfrid Sellars. It is then argued that, on the basis of that very same solution to the Kantian problematic of rule-following and meaning, a novel argument against external world skepticism can be formulated. This argument takes the shape of a transcendental argument, which is reminiscent of Hilary Putnam’s infamous argument against the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, but is, as is argued, superior to it in certain respects.

Are Brain Organoids Equivalent to Philosophical Zombies?

Along just over a century of research we moved from learning how to cultivate tissues in a dish to grasping the concepts for creating an entire brain in a vat. As we approach the divisive moment in which we can first detect signs of awareness in such artificially developed organoids, we need to lay foundation for what lays ahead. It is crucial that ethical, legal and moral implications of organoid research are clear and that boundaries are set to separate scientific progress from human life preservation. The largest obstacle may be the definition of consciousness itself, which has arguably been historically neglected by philosophy, psychology and neurosciences at large. One reason may be the difficulties posed by the underlying qualities of awareness, such as its subjective and heterogeneous nature. Another reason may lie on the possibly that consciousness is an overarching emergent property of our brain. For the time being, one can see brain organoids as philosophical zombies, physical analogues of the human brain which mimic sentient human reactions but lack experiential properties of sensation (a.k.a. qualia).

The Non-identical World

There exists a powerful fantasy that the world is not only describable in numbers but is composed of code, in which case the world-as-code can be rewritten. This theme has already emerged in the analyses of Oblivion and Déjà Vu, and is shared by a group of what are here named as ‘irreality’ films made during the global financial crisis. Source Code (Duncan Jones, 2011) dwells on the fate of a protagonist who is the archetypal brain in a vat, another posthumous central character. The analysis draws out the historical formation of subjectivity and the history of the instincts that tie human personality to natural processes, discusses the utopian potential of the performative principles of software, reveals how, in a critical process shot, this utopianism is directed simultaneously towards the construction of community and of the romantic couple, and how these relate to the invisibility, in the repeated shots of the Chicago skyline, of the futures market housed in its downtown area.

Why Should Warrant Persist in Demon Worlds?

In ‘Perceptual Entitlement’ (2003) Burge argues that a perceptual competence that is reliable in normal conditions when functioning normally confers prima facie warrant when functioning normally in any conditions, and so a normal functioning perceptual competence continues to confer warrant even when the individual is unknowingly massively deceived, such as in a brain-in-a-vat or a “demon world” scenario. This chapter critically examines Burge’s explanation. Burge’s explanation does not adequately explain why warrant should persist outside of normal conditions, and so why warrant should persist in demon worlds. The chapter distinguishes between bounded versus non-bounded normal conditions reliabilism to explain why Burge’s account falls short. According to bounded reliabilism, perceptual warrant does not persist outside of normal conditions. According to unbounded reliablism, it does. The chapter distinguishes two grades of warrant in terms of the distinction between bounded and unbounded reliabilism. With these two grades of warrant, one can then explain why warrant should persist in demon worlds.

Pluralist Consequentialist Anti-Scepticism

How could it be warranted and rational to accept anti-sceptical hypotheses (I’m not a brain in a vat, There is an external world, etc.) in the absence of evidence supporting such propositions? Crispin Wright has introduced entitlement of cognitive project—a non-evidential species of warrant—as a response to the sceptic. Critics (Pritchard and Jenkins) have argued that Wright-style entitlement is not an epistemic kind of warrant and does not sustain epistemic rationality. This chapter develops a consequentialist alternative to Wright’s proposal. Acceptance of anti-sceptical hypotheses is epistemically warranted and rational because it maximizes epistemic value. This is argued within an axiological framework that incorporates pluralism about epistemic value or goods. Truth is not the only epistemic good—contra veritic monism, the most widely held view about epistemic value. Furthermore, the chapter argues that the success of the consequentialist approach eliminates the need for Wright-style entitlement.