PATENTS AND GROWTH IN OLG ECONOMY WITH PHYSICAL CAPITAL

We study the implications of patents in an overlapping generations model with horizontal innovation of differentiated physical capital. We show that within this demographic structure of finitely lived agents, weakening patent protection generates two contradicting effects on innovation and growth. Weakening patent protection lowers the (average) price of patented machines, thereby increasing machine utilization, output, aggregate saving, and investment. However, a higher demand for machines shifts investment away from the R&D activity aimed at inventing new machine varieties toward the formation of physical capital. The growth-maximizing level of patent protection is incomplete. Shortening patent length is more effective than loosening patent breadth in spurring growth, due to an additional positive effect on growth, that is decreasing investment in old patents. Welfare can be improved by weakening patent protection beyond the growth-maximizing level.

Using the patent term changes in assessing the evolution of patent valuation from filing to maturity

Purpose The authors argue that the patent term change introduced in Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in the USA inadvertently offered a metric of self-valuation of patents at the time of filing, affirming the ability of Drugs and Chemical patents to offer greater R&D incentives than other technology fields. As renewals also offer a metric of self-valuation, the authors find that upon renewal Computer patents are found to offer greater R&D incentives than Drugs and Chemicals. The purpose of this paper is to inquire as to why Computer patents are considered as more valuable in the post grant period, even though they were not considered as valuable upon filing. The authors advance the idea that patents can increase in value if encompassed in a patent portfolio. Design/methodology/approach The authors employ the introduction of the TRIPS agreement in the USA. In order to facilitate the move to TRIPS, the USPTO (unexpectedly) allowed applicants who filed prior to June 8, 1995 a patent length that was equal to the maximum of two regimes. Therefore, applicants that filed before the deadline were given a possible small extension of their patent’s time length. The authors use this change and renewal data to infer firms’ self-valuation of patents. For this reason, the authors acquire information for all utility patents that were filed around June 8, 1995 data project. Findings The authors offer an additional explanation that is related to the increasingly commonplace build up of patent portfolios: patents can increase in value if encompassed in a portfolio. Such portfolios are bundles of patents whose means to an end lays in their strength in numbers. As Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) note, when a patent is added to a portfolio the cost of defending a technology against infringement allegations decreases. To rephrase, a patent is regarded as the additional foot-soldier who aids the firm, arm-in-arm, in defending its technological territory and in fulfilling its strategic goal. Originality/value The originality stemming from the paper is that policy makers that aim to tackle patent proliferation should not focus their attention to individual patents. Instead, they should target policies toward patent portfolios, because they provide the means of endowing patents with the extra weight that makes filing and renewing irrelevant patents worthwhile.

PATENT LENGTH AND PRICE REGULATION IN AN R&D GROWTH MODEL WITH MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION

This paper considers the effects of patent length and price regulation in an R&D growth model with variety expansion. Innovation requires lower bounds on patent length and price. Increasing patent duration promotes growth; increasing the cap on the price of patented products promotes growth below the monopoly-pricing level. Each policy instrument can raise welfare unless excessively used, and their welfare ranking depends on parameterizations. It is desirable, on welfare grounds, to limit patent protection along both dimensions, namely by limiting patent length and capping the price of patented products. Such limits raise welfare despite reducing the growth rate.

OPTIMAL PATENT LENGTH IN A NORTH-SOUTH FRAMEWORK: A COMMENT

We show that under some conditions, it is optimal for the non-innovating south to give patent protection for a longer period than the innovating north. However, a cooperative patent agreement involves a larger protection by each country compared to the non-cooperative situation.

Competition, Imitation, and R&D Productivity in a Growth Model with Industry-Specific Patent Protection

Recent empirical studies suggest a need for a flexible patent regime responding to industry differences. In practice, industry-specific modifications of patent length already exist but lack theoretical foundation. This paper intends to make up for this neglect by scrutinizing in what direction industry characteristics influence optimal patent length. It is found that patents ought to be shorter, the more intense competition, the higher R&D productivity, and the more intricate reverse engineering in an industry are. Unlike similar Schumpeterian growth models, this model assumes Cournot competition and introduces an empirically substantiated measure of industry differences in the ability to catch up with a technological leader. It is found that for most empirically plausible cases the familiar inverted-U relation between patent length and growth carries over to the Cournot set-up.