The Metaphysics of Moral Explanations

This chapter defends the view that general moral principles play an ineliminable role in moral explanations. More specifically, it argues that this view best makes sense of some intuitive data points, including the supervenience of the moral upon the natural. The chapter considers two alternative accounts of the nature and structure of moral principles: (i) “the nomic view,” on which moral principles are laws of metaphysics of the same broad kind as the laws that (plausibly) figure in metaphysical explanations more generally; and (ii) “moral platonism,” on which moral principles are facts about kind-applying (as opposed to particular-applying) moral properties. Along the way, the chapter criticizes the competing view that moral principles are not explanatory in the way just suggested. The chapter also considers a number of related issues, such as the distinction between metaphysical grounding and metaphysical analysis. It concludes by discussing the sense in which moral principles obtain of necessity.

Dead Grass: Foreclosure and the Production of Space in Maricopa County, Arizona

A wide variety of economic, social, political and moral explanations have been given for why the foreclosure crisis of the late 2000s occurred. Yet many of the tensions provoked by the uptick in foreclosure proceedings, their resolution during the foreclosure recovery process, and the insight they provide into the function of American space remain unexplored. This article uses Lefebvre’s <em>The Production of Space</em> as a framework to explore the spatial and ecological contradictions of suburban development in Maricopa County (Phoenix), Arizona, USA, and the ways those contradictions were drawn into relief by the foreclosure crisis of the late 2000s. Analysis through this Lefebvrian lens uncovers symbolic meanings assigned to urban ecologies and their ruliness as a means of drawing legal devices such as nuisance laws and housing codes into a more-than-human frenzy. This article follows a growing tradition of scholarship that employs Lefebvrian insights to identify and explicate urban planning dilemmas.

Moral Explanations, Thick and Thin

Cornell realists maintain that irreducible moral properties have earned a place in our ontology in virtue of the indispensable role they play in a variety of explanations. These explanations can be divided into two groups: those that employ thin ethical concepts and those that employ thick ethical concepts. Recent work on thick concepts suggests that they are not inherently evaluative in their meaning. If correct, this creates problems for the moral explanations of Cornell realists, since the most persuasive moral explanations are those that employ thick concepts. If thick concepts are not inherently evaluative, then the most plausible explanations on offer cannot support Cornell realism. Moral explanations employing thin concepts, however, are too flimsy to support the view. Unless proponents can develop a compelling story about thick concepts or thin explanations, Cornell realism is in trouble.

Cudworth and Normative Explanations

Moral theories usually aspire to be explanatory – to tell us why something is wrong, why it is good, or why you ought to do it. So it is worth knowing how moral explanations differ, if they do, from explanations of other things. This paper uncovers a common unarticulated theory about how normative explanations must work – that they must follow what I call the Standard Model. Though the Standard Model Theory has many implications, in this paper I focus primarily on only one. It plays a crucial role in an argument originally due to Cudworth that has been widely held to conclusively establish that voluntaristic ethical theories are incoherent. But if Cudworth’s argument works, then so would similar arguments against many other moral theories. All of these theories therefore need a different model for how normative explanations can work. So I also motivate and sketch one such alternative model. The result enables us to make progress in evaluating the prospects for a successful reductive view about the normative.

The happy victimizer phenomenon: Not found here

Children?s attribution of emotions to a moral transgressor is an important research topic in the psychology of moral and emotional development. This is especially because of the so-called Happy Victimizer Phenomenon (HVP) where younger children attribute positive emotions to a moral transgressor described in a story. In the two studies that we have conducted (children aged 5, 7 and 9, 20 of each age; 10 of each age in the second study) we have tested the possible influence of the fear of sanctions and the type of transgression (stealing and inflicting body injuries) on the attribution of emotions. Children were presented with stories that described transgressions and they were asked to answer how the transgressor felt. The fear of sanctions did not make a significant difference in attribution but the type of transgression did - more negative emotions were attributed for inflicting body injuries than for stealing. Positive emotions were explained with situational-instrumental explanations in 84% of cases while negative emotions were explained with moral explanations in 63,5%. Girls attributed more positive emotions (61%) than boys (39%). However, our main finding was that, for the aforementioned age groups, we did not find the HVP effect although it has regularly been registered in foreign studies. This finding denies the generalizability of the phenomenon and points to the significance of disciplining styles and, even more so, culture for children?s attribution of emotions to moral transgressors.

Expressivist Explanations

In this paper I argue that the common practice of employing moral predicates as explaining phrases can be accommodated on an expressivist account of moral practice. This account does not treat moral explanations as in any way second-rate or derivative, since it subsumes moral explanations under the general theory of program explanations (as defended by Jackson and Pettit). It follows that the phenomenon of moral explanations cannot be used to adjudicate the debate between expressivism and its rivals.

The Explanationist Argument For Moral Realism

In this paper I argue that the explanationist argument in favour of moral realism fails. According to this argument, the ability of putative moral properties to feature in good explanations provides strong evidence for, or entails, the metaphysical claims of moral realism. Some have rejected this argument by denying that moral explanations are ever good explanations. My criticism is different. I will argue that even if we accept that moral explanations are (sometimes) good explanations the metaphysical claims of realism do not follow.According to moral realists, moral properties such as justice and goodness take their own unique place in nature's ontological roll-call. Although realists disagree about the nature of these moral properties — for example, whether they are reducible or otherwise constituted by non-moral or natural properties — they all agree that such properties are genuine constituents of the world that are sometimes instantiated by objects, events or states of affairs.