scholarly journals Moral Explanations, Thick and Thin

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brendan Cline
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Thick Concepts ◽  
Moral Explanations ◽  
Moral Properties ◽  
Cornell Realism ◽  
In Virtue Of

Cornell realists maintain that irreducible moral properties have earned a place in our ontology in virtue of the indispensable role they play in a variety of explanations. These explanations can be divided into two groups: those that employ thin ethical concepts and those that employ thick ethical concepts. Recent work on thick concepts suggests that they are not inherently evaluative in their meaning. If correct, this creates problems for the moral explanations of Cornell realists, since the most persuasive moral explanations are those that employ thick concepts. If thick concepts are not inherently evaluative, then the most plausible explanations on offer cannot support Cornell realism. Moral explanations employing thin concepts, however, are too flimsy to support the view. Unless proponents can develop a compelling story about thick concepts or thin explanations, Cornell realism is in trouble.

scholarly journals Does False Consciousness Necessarily Preclude Moral Blameworthiness?: The Refusal of the Women Antisuffragists

Hypatia ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Lee Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Epistemic Injustice ◽  
Victim Blaming ◽  
False Consciousness ◽  
Group Level ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Knowledge Practices ◽  
Structural Distortions ◽  
In Virtue Of

Abstract Social philosophers often invoke the concept of false consciousness in their analyses, referring to a set of evidence-resistant, ignorant attitudes held by otherwise sound epistemic agents, systematically occurring in virtue of, and motivating them to perpetuate, structural oppression. But there is a worry that appealing to the notion in questions of responsibility for the harm suffered by members of oppressed groups is victim-blaming. Individuals under false consciousness allegedly systematically fail the relevant rationality and epistemic conditions due to structural distortions of reasoning or knowledge practices, undermining their status as responsible moral agents. But attending to the constitutive mechanisms and heterogeneity of false consciousness enables us to see how having it does not in itself render someone an inappropriate target of blame. I focus here on the 1889 antisuffragist manifesto “An Appeal against Female Suffrage,” arguing that its signatories, despite false consciousness, satisfy both conditions for ordinary blameworthiness. I consider three prominent signatories, observing that the irrationality characterization is unsustainable beyond group-level diagnoses, and that their capacity to respond appropriately to reasons was not compromised. Following recent work on epistemic injustice, I also argue that culpable mechanisms constituted their false consciousness, rendering them blameworthy for the Appeal.

What is affirmative action?

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen
Keyword(s):  
Affirmative Action ◽  
Per Se ◽  
Moral Properties ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
In Virtue Of

This chapter (1) offers a definition of affirmative action; (2) presents a typology of affirmative action policies; (3) and distinguishes between different kinds of justifications for affirmative action. These are all three useful points. Often when people seemingly disagree about the justifiability of affirmative action, they define it differently; have different kinds in mind even though they define affirmative action in the same way; or have different kinds of justifications of affirmative action in mind, even though they define it in the same way and have the same kinds in mind. Moreover, if we do not know what affirmative action is, we are not in a position to say which non-moral properties it has. If so, we cannot tell whether it is morally justified per se, since presumably if affirmative action per se is (un)justified, it is (un)justified in virtue of non-moral properties that it has by way of definition. The chapter concludes with a thumbnail sketch of the rest of the book.

scholarly journals The Explanationist Argument For Moral Realism

2011 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Sinclair
Keyword(s):  
Strong Evidence ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Natural Properties ◽  
The World ◽  
Moral Explanations ◽  
Moral Properties

In this paper I argue that the explanationist argument in favour of moral realism fails. According to this argument, the ability of putative moral properties to feature in good explanations provides strong evidence for, or entails, the metaphysical claims of moral realism. Some have rejected this argument by denying that moral explanations are ever good explanations. My criticism is different. I will argue that even if we accept that moral explanations are (sometimes) good explanations the metaphysical claims of realism do not follow.According to moral realists, moral properties such as justice and goodness take their own unique place in nature's ontological roll-call. Although realists disagree about the nature of these moral properties — for example, whether they are reducible or otherwise constituted by non-moral or natural properties — they all agree that such properties are genuine constituents of the world that are sometimes instantiated by objects, events or states of affairs.

scholarly journals II. Electrical conductivity in gases traversed by cathode rays

1901 ◽  
Vol 195 (262-273) ◽  
pp. 49-77 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Electrical Conductivity ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Negative Ions ◽  
In Virtue Of

Though it has been known that a gas becomes a conductor when traversed by cathode rays, yet the laws connecting this electrical conductivity have not hitherto been studied. The theory has been put forward by J. J. Thomson and Rutherford* that when a gas becomes a conductor under a radiation, it does so in virtue of the production of positive and negative ions throughout its mass. This view has been established by their experiments on Röntgenised gases, and confirmed by those of Zeleny on the same subject. The recent work of Rutherford on Uranium Radiation also affords another example of such a process in the gases traversed.

Is It Impossible to Be Moral?

Dialogue ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-14
Author(s):  
Michael J. Almeida
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Properties

AbstractRecent work in moral theory includes an intriguing new argument that the vagueness of moral properties, together with two well-known and well-received metaethical principles, entails the incredible conclusion that it is impossible to be moral. I show that the argument equivocates between “it is true that A and B are morally indistinguishable” and “it is not false that A and B are morally indistinguishable.” As expected the argument is interesting but unsound. It is therefore not impossible to be moral.

The Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness

2020 ◽  
pp. 207-229
Author(s):  
Farid Masrour
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Recent Literature ◽  
Unity Of Consciousness ◽  
Natural Feature ◽  
Unity Thesis ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Phenomenal Unity

Philosophical interest in unity of consciousness goes back at least to Kant. A recent revival of interest among analytic philosophers of mind focuses on unity of consciousness, construed as phenomenal unity. This chapter will survey some of the issues and questions that have been central to this recent work before sketching an alternative to what may be seen as a dominant, though implicit, tendency in the recent literature on unity: to formulate the idea that phenomenal unity is a natural feature of consciousness in terms of what the chapter will term the Unity Thesis. According to this thesis, all synchronous experiences of a conscious subject at a moment are phenomenally unified with each other. The chapter then rebuts another trend in recent literature: the tendency to understand phenomenal unity as obtaining in virtue of a type of oneness or singularity. The chapter advances an alternative that sees phenomenal unity as obtaining in virtue of connectivity conditions over relations among phenomenal experiences.

Which Moral Properties Are Eligible for Perceptual Awareness?

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 290-319
Author(s):  
Preston J. Werner
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Perception ◽  
Perceptual Awareness ◽  
Moral Properties ◽  
Open Question ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Way

Abstract: Moral perception has made something of a comeback in recent work on moral epistemology. Many traditional objections to the view have been argued to fail upon closer inspection. But it remains an open question just how far moral perception might extend. In this paper, I provide the beginnings of an answer to this question by assessing the relationship between the metaphysical structure of different normative properties and a plausible constraint on which properties are eligible for perceptual awareness which I call the Counterfactual Strengthening Test. Along the way I consider and reject a few other possible constraints on perceptual awareness. I defend the view that moral perception is restricted to the perception of evaluative and pro tanto deontic properties. I conclude with a few gestures toward what this limitation on moral perception may mean for broader moral epistemology.

scholarly journals Primate Social Cognition and the Core Human Knowledge Concept

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Comparative Psychology ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
Core Knowledge ◽  
The Core ◽  
Sensory Modalities ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Folk Epistemology

I review recent work from armchair and cross-cultural epistemology on whether humans possess a knowledge concept as part of a universal “folk epistemology.” The work from armchair epistemology fails because it mischaracterizes ordinary knowledge judgments. The work from cross-cultural epistemology provides some defeasible evidence for a universal folk epistemology. I argue that recent findings from comparative psychology establish that humans possess a species-typical knowledge concept. More specifically, recent work shows that knowledge attributions are a central part of primate social cognition, used to predict others’ behavior and guide decision-making. The core primate knowledge concept is that of truth detection (across different sensory modalities) and retention (through memory) and may also include rudimentary forms of indirect truth discovery through inference. In virtue of their evolutionary heritage, humans inherited the primate social-cognitive system and thus share this core knowledge concept.

scholarly journals Primate Social Cognition and the Core Human Knowledge Concept

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Comparative Psychology ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
Core Knowledge ◽  
The Core ◽  
Sensory Modalities ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Folk Epistemology

The author reviews recent work from armchair and cross-cultural epistemology on whether humans possess a knowledge concept as part of a universal “folk epistemology.” The work from armchair epistemology fails because it mischaracterizes ordinary knowledge judgments. The work from cross-cultural epistemology provides some defeasible evidence for a universal folk epistemology. He argues that recent findings from comparative psychology establish that humans possess a species-typical knowledge concept. More specifically, recent work shows that knowledge attributions are a central part of primate social cognition, used to predict others’ behavior and guide decision-making. The core primate knowledge concept is that of truth detection (across different sensory modalities) and retention (through memory), and may also include rudimentary forms of indirect truth discovery through inference. In virtue of their evolutionary heritage, humans inherited the primate social-cognitive system and thus share this core knowledge concept.

Moral Facts and Best Explanations

2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Leiter
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Explanatory Relevance ◽  
Explanatory Account ◽  
The World ◽  
Moral Explanations ◽  
Moral Properties ◽  
Gilbert Harman ◽  
Moral Facts

Do moral properties figure in the best explanatory account of the world? According to a popular realist argument, if they do, then they earn their ontological rights, for only properties that figure in the best explanation of experience arerealproperties. Although this realist strategy has been widely influential—not just in metaethics, but also in philosophy of mind and philosophy of science—no one has actually made the case that moral realism requires: namely, that moral facts really will figure in the best explanatory picture of the world. This issue may have been neglected in part because the influential dialectic on moral explanations between philosophers Gilbert Harman and Nicholas Sturgeon has focused debate on whether moral facts figure inrelevantexplanations. Yet as others have noted, explanatory relevance isirrelevantwhen it comes to realism: after all, according to the popular realist argument, it is inference to the best explanation of experience that is supposed to confer ontological rights. I propose to ask, then, the relevant question about moral explanations: should we think that moral properties will figure in the best explanatory account of the world?

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