Some Issues in Berkeley’s Account of Sense Perception

This paper engages with the debate of how Berkeley reconciles restricting the objects of sense perception to what is immediately perceived with allowing that ordinary physical objects are amongst the objects of perception. Pitcher’s (1986) argument that Berkeley did not take the claim that we perceive ordinary physical objects to be ‘strictly true’ is rejected before we move to the debate between Pappas (2000) and Dicker (2006) about whether Berkeley equivocates about the definition of ‘immediate perception’ in a way which undermines his position. They agree that Hylas must accept indirect realism, but disagree about how this affects the cogency of his argument. However, Stoneham (2002) gave a different account of the dialectic in the First Dialogue that shows both Pappas and Dicker to be mistaken. This allows us to resolve Berkeley’s problem by appeal to the ordinary idea that we can perceive an object by perceiving part of it.

A Historical Objection

A final objection to the treatment of secondary qualities as objective, causally relevant, physical properties says that perceived physical properties must resemble the ideas they cause in the perceiver. This approach assumes Indirect Realism (and therefore the falsity of Direct Realism), but it was ubiquitous in Reid’s day. This chapter traces Reid’s rejection of the Way of Ideas as it bears on his defense of Direct Realism and theory of secondary qualities. Although this objection would not be likely to get traction among contemporary philosophers, this chapter presents Reid’s case for historical interest and consistency.

Why Direct Realism?

As the common sense view of perception, Direct Realism rightly stands in a privileged position in relation to rival perceptual theories, Idealism and Indirect Realism. For most thinkers, rejecting Direct Realism would require extensive and unwelcome revisions to many other views. Furthermore, Indirect Realism and Idealism fall short of accomplishing their oft-assigned task of solving the Problem of Illusion.

The Argument from Pain: A New Argument for Indirect Realism

The author puts forward and defends a new argument for indirect realism called the argument from pain. The argument is akin to a well-known traditional argument to the same end, the argument from hallucination. Like the latter, it contains one premise stating an analogy between veridical perceptions and certain other states and one premise stating that those states are states of acquaintance with sense-data. The crucial difference is that the states that are said to be analogous to veridical perceptions are pain-states instead of hallucinations. This difference makes the argument from pain immune to the standard objections against the argument from hallucination.

Epicurus and sense data

Epicurean epistemology, which gives perception full credibility as a key factor and an infallible source of receiving information regarding the external word, is completely dependable on materialist-atomistic view of natural science. As such, it is fundamental for a clear understanding of Epicurus' ethical ideas. This paper seeks to reconstruct his position and subsume it under one of the contemporary theories of perception, as an apologetic view on Epicurus and his, at first glance, rigid standpoints. Insistence on the truth of all perceptions is attempted to be alleviated and understood by modern perspective. Thus, classifying Epicurean views of perception as a certain form of indirect realism provides to the seemingly unacceptable Epicurus' theory of perception a shape which may be plausible and acceptable.