AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON LENDING PATTERN AND PERCEPTION OF COMMERCIAL BANKS TOWARDS SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES LENDING

Micro, Small and Medium sector (MSME) is the most dynamic sector due to its capacity for innovation, competence for advancements and perseverance to face multiple challenges. Though this sector contributes 8 per cent to GDP, 45 per cent towards manufacturing output and 40 per cent of exports. Still, they lack support to grow exponentially. Understanding the lending pattern of the banks and the perception of commercial banks towards MSME lending is essential not only for academic knowledge but also could necessitate policy changes. The objective of the research is to understand the lending pattern of banks to SMEs and the perception of commercial banks towards SME lending. The researcher used both primary and secondary data. Statistical tools ANOVA and Kruskal Wallis tests are used to analyze the collected data. The results indicate that there is no significant difference in the lending pattern of public sector banks, Private sector banks and foreign banks and the bank staff have a similar level of perception on difficulties in lending to SMEs, perception on the rejection of loan, perception on reluctance to serve SME sector, perception on loan default and factors affecting credit decisions irrespective of the type of the bank and experience in SME lending.

Shadow Banking and the Four Pillars of Traditional Financial Intermediation

Traditional banking is built on four pillars: SME lending, insured deposit taking, access to lender of last resort, and prudential supervision. This paper unveils the logic of the quadrilogy by showing that it emerges naturally as an equilibrium outcome in a game between banks and the government. A key insight is that regulation and public insurance services (LOLR, deposit insurance) are complementary. The model also shows how prudential regulation must adjust to the emergence of shadow banking, and rationalizes structural remedies to counter bogus liquidity hoarding and financial contagion: ring-fencing between regulated and shadow banking and the sharing of liquidity in centralized platforms.

Learning about Competitors: Evidence from SME Lending

We study how small and medium enterprise (SME) lenders react to information about their competitors’ contracting decisions. To isolate this learning from lenders’ common reactions to unobserved shocks to fundamentals, we exploit the staggered entry of lenders into an information-sharing platform. Upon entering, lenders adjust their contract terms toward what others offer. This reaction is mediated by the distribution of market shares: lenders with higher shares or that operate in concentrated markets react less. Thus, contract terms are shaped not only by borrower or lender fundamentals but also by the interaction between information availability and competition.