Group Belief

The received view in collective epistemology is that group belief must be understood in inflationary terms, with the most popular version being the joint acceptance account. Very roughly, group belief is the result of members jointly agreeing to accept a proposition as the group’s, even if no member believes it herself. In this chapter, this orthodoxy is challenged by showing that joint acceptance accounts lack the resources to explain how groups can lie and bullshit, and, more generally, it is argued that group belief cannot be determined by processes that are under the direct voluntary control of the members. A new view, the Group Agent Account, is then defended, according to which group belief is determined in part by relations among the bases of the beliefs of members, where these relations arise only at the collective level, but is also partly constituted by the individual beliefs of members.

Introduction

In this Introduction, a central debate in the literature on the epistemology of groups is discussed. On the one hand, deflationary theorists hold that group phenomena, such as group beliefs, can be understood entirely in terms of individual members and their states. On the other hand, inflationary theorists, maintain that group phenomena are importantly over and above, or otherwise distinct from, individual members and their states. It is argued that settling some of the issues in this debate lies at the heart of making sense of collective responsibility. It is also emphasized that a central aim of this book is to make progress in understanding crucial notions in collective epistemology—group belief, justified group belief, group knowledge, group assertion, and group lies—so as to shed light on whether it is groups, their individual members, or both who ought to be held responsible for collective actions. Finally, overviews of each chapter are provided.

Epistemología de virtudes grupal

Resumen De acuerdo con Sosa (2007; 2009; 2011), el conocimiento es creencia apta, donde una creencia es apta cuando es correcta debido a la destreza (competente). Sosa (2010; 2015) añade a su análisis CAD del conocimiento un análisis RFS de la competencia, en donde una competencia completa combina su recinto, su forma y su situación. Una gran parte del in uyente trabajo de Sosa supone que los agentes epistémicos son individuos que adquieren conocimiento cuando dan con la verdad mediante el ejercicio de sus habilidades individuales, de maneras apropiadas y en situaciones apropiadas. Este artículo explora una extensión del modelo de Sosa al escenario social en el que los grupos constituyen agentes epistémicos adicionales a sus miembros individuales. La a rmación es que es posible adscribir conocimiento a los grupos en virtud de que dan con la verdad mediante el ejercicio de sus competencias en formas apropiadas y situaciones apropiadas. Mientras que el conocimiento en el nivel colectivo podría divergir del conocimiento en el nivel individual, las competencias grupales no son nada adicional a las competencias combinadas de sus miembros. La postura resultante tiene, por lo tanto, implicaciones para el debate sobre la reducción y la sobreveniencia en epistemología colectiva. Palabras Clave: epistemología colectiva, competencia grupal, creencia apta, competencia completa. Abstract According to Sosa (2007; 2009; 2011), knowledge is apt belief, where a belief is apt when accurate because adroit (competent). Sosa (2010; 2015) adds to his triple-A analysis of knowledge, a triple-S analysis of competence, where a complete competence combines its seat, shape and situation. Much of Sosa’s in uential work assumes that epistemic agents are individuals who acquire knowledge when they hit the truth through exercising their own individual skills in appropriate shapes and situations. This paper explores an extension of Sosa’s framework to a social setting in which groups constitute epistemic agents over and above their individual members. The claim is that groups can be ascribed knowledge in virtue of hitting the truth through exercising their competences in appropriate shapes and situations. While knowledge at the collective level may diverge from knowledge at the individual level, the competences of groups are nothing over and above the combined competences of their members. The ensuing view thus has implications for the debate over reduction and supervenience in collective epistemology.Keywords: collective epistemology, group competence, apt belief, complete competence.