Group Belief

Author(s):  
Jennifer Lackey

The received view in collective epistemology is that group belief must be understood in inflationary terms, with the most popular version being the joint acceptance account. Very roughly, group belief is the result of members jointly agreeing to accept a proposition as the group’s, even if no member believes it herself. In this chapter, this orthodoxy is challenged by showing that joint acceptance accounts lack the resources to explain how groups can lie and bullshit, and, more generally, it is argued that group belief cannot be determined by processes that are under the direct voluntary control of the members. A new view, the Group Agent Account, is then defended, according to which group belief is determined in part by relations among the bases of the beliefs of members, where these relations arise only at the collective level, but is also partly constituted by the individual beliefs of members.

KÜLÖNBSÉG ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Erzsébet Lamár

Nietzsche criticized the tradition of Western metaphysics (based on the principle of representation, the duality of subject and object of representation, the metaphysics of presence as Derrida puts it) and its language use. In place of this he presents a world view he calls Dionysian: it is a possibility of cognition in which the individual disappears and the tragic subject is merged with archaic substance in an experience that eliminates the dualism of appearance and reality. Nietzsche claims there is a basic tension between life and cognition in Western metaphysics, but this is a symptom of the ascetic ideal which manifests itself in illness and in wanting nothing. Instead the ascetic ideal a new kind of sensibility is necessary which affirms life and gives rise to a new view of the world and to new values. Deleuze claims Nietzsche’s philosophy has three basic tenets: evaluation, affirmation, and the superman as a new way of life. He adds that “Nietzsche attributes such importance to art because art has already achieved the whole program.” The paper shows that Nietzsche’s aesthetics is a creative aesthetic, a selective ontology based on the principle of double affirmation. The paper argues that Dionysus is the one who returns to Nietzsche eternally, and together with him haunts the idea of creative aesthetics, a key element of the idea of eternal return.


2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 82-93
Author(s):  
Domingos Faria ◽  

Beliefs are commonly attributed to groups or collective entities. But what is the nature of group belief? Summativism and nonsummativism are two main rival views regarding the nature of group belief. On the one hand, summativism holds that, necessarily, a group g has a belief B only if at least one individual i is both a member of g and has B. On the other hand, non-summativism holds that it is possible for a group g to have a belief B even if no member of g has B. My aim in this paper is to consider whether divergence arguments for non-summativism and against summativism about group belief are sound. Such divergence arguments aim to show that there can be a divergence between belief at the group level and the corresponding belief at the individual level. I will argue that these divergence arguments do not decisively defeat a minimal version of summativism. In order to accomplish this goal, I have the following plan: In section 2, I will analyze the structure of two important counterexamples against the summativist view, which are based on divergence arguments. Such counterexamples are based on the idea that a group decides to adopt a particular group belief, even if none of its members holds the belief in question. However, in section 3, I will show that these counterexamples fail, because they can be explained without the need to posit group beliefs. More specifically, I argue that in these apparent counterexamples, we have only a ‘group acceptance’ phenomenon and not a ‘group belief’ phenomenon. For this conclusion, I advance two arguments: in subsection 3.1, I formulate an argument from doxastic involuntarism, and in subsection 3.2, I develop an argument from truth connection. Thus, summativism is not defeated by divergence arguments. Lastly, in section 4, I will conclude with some advantages of summativism.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Keith (Keith Raymond) Harris

[ACCESS RESTRICTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI AT AUTHOR'S REQUEST.] "The ultimate foci of this dissertation are group belief and justified group belief. As we will see, many models of both concepts have been proposed, and it is clear in many cases that these models are not intended to capture the same phenomena. Pluralism about group belief and justified group belief, understood generally, may thus be appropriate. My aim in this dissertation is to develop accounts of the beliefs and justified beliefs of group agents, rather than diffuse collections of individuals. Ultimately, we will find that no existing models of group belief or justified group belief correctly model the attitudes held by group agents. There is much work to be done before arguing for these points. Understanding what it is for a group agent to hold a belief requires a greater understanding of group agents and their relations to their members. In this chapter, I review a series of proposals for understanding this relation. I argue that existing accounts of the relationship between group agents and their members are either incorrect or incomplete. Insights from existing approaches point toward a fuller account of the relationship between group agents and their members."--Introduction


1992 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-96
Author(s):  
Kaj Thaning

A ReplyBy Kaj ThaningIn this article the writer protests against what he calls »two attacks on his thesis »Man First - «« (1963). First, against Regin Prenter’s review of this book, which is quoted in J.H. Schjørring’s obituary of Prenter, then against W.Michelsen’s article »The Way from Force to Freedom in Grundtvig’s Life and Works«, both printed in Grundtvig Studier 1991. Thaning claims that the word .conversion. can be used both about turning to God and about turning to His Creation, which Grundtvig did in »Norse Mythology«, 1832. According to Thaning, Prenter has not rendered it probable that this conversion was provoked in Grundtvig by »the unshakable fact of the Church«.In his article, W. Michelsen refers to »Handbook on World History« I (1833), in which Grundtvig states that for »school use« he now prefers the Greek view of human life and history to the mosaic-Christian, because the Greek view lends itself more easily to being »practised scientifically«, but that he still considers the Mosaic-Christian view »the only divine, true, and eternal one«. Thaning claims, however, that from 1832 the word .view. denotes a contrast to the Christian »faith«. The Biblical view was of no avail on Greek soil, Thaning claims. In 1833 Grundtvig went over to »Polybius’s heathen view of history«, which built on the contrast between the truth and the lie. As he could not employ simultaneously the three concepts, a Greek view of history, a Biblical view, and the Christian faith, »the Biblical view now slips over to the side of the Church and becomes identical with faith (divine, true, and eternal)«. In 1832, it is true, it was called divine because of its historical effects, but not eternal. It became so, however, in 1833. According to Thaning it was on this background that Grundtvig spoke about the contrast between church and school, faith and science, the temporal and the eternal.In 1833 - unlike in 1832 - the Mosaic-Christian view has moved on to the side of the Church, faith and eternity, and is thus not entitled to impose ecclesiastical forms on state and school. Here, according to Thaning’s understanding of Grundtvig, the Greek view must prevail, and it thus becomes clear that Grundtvig now »has a changed view of life«, which further appears from his enthusiastic outbursts at »thus escaping from the chaos of the thought-world that we have found ourselves in through many centuries«. It is this constant consideration for life which is the need of the time, Grundtvig says. And this is what Thaning calls a »conversion«.Thaning also finds that Michelsen’s reference to the small pamphlet .On the Clausen Libel Case. is misunderstood, as is also his conjecture about the influence of Clara Bolton on Grundtvig’s view of freedom. According to Thaning, it was in the pamphlet .On the Baptismal Covenant. that the idea arose that it would be possible for Grundtvig and his opponents to be in the state church together, if only it was made legal for the individual churchgoer to frequent a church of his own choice. Later this thought leads to the church being renamed, in Grundtvig’s usage, »a social institution« (1834).There should be a generous competition, not a struggle in the church, Thaning writes, »....the thought of the Biblical view as common to people of spirit, among them the naturalists (H.N. Clausen) means that Grundtvig can offer them reconciliation and cultural cooperation«, he says. »It is a manifestation of a new view in Grundtvig,« he claims, »and of the new view of freedom which is proclaimed in the dedicatory poem of Norse Mythology which ... is a far cry from the small pamphlet against Clausen from 1831«.


1971 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-322
Author(s):  
Henry M. Levin ◽  
James W. Guthrie ◽  
George B. Kleindorfer ◽  
Robert T. Stout

It is generally conceded by knowledgeable educators that compensatory education programs have exhibited dramatic success in only rare instances. The reasons for this condition are varied, and we do not wish to offer either a definitive analysis or a complete remedial prescription. However, it appears that this failure is due in substantial measure to an unwillingness to acknowledge the depth of deprivation to which the individual child has been subjected and an inability to focus upon him the massive resources necessary to make up the difference.


Author(s):  
Jennifer Lackey

In this Introduction, a central debate in the literature on the epistemology of groups is discussed. On the one hand, deflationary theorists hold that group phenomena, such as group beliefs, can be understood entirely in terms of individual members and their states. On the other hand, inflationary theorists, maintain that group phenomena are importantly over and above, or otherwise distinct from, individual members and their states. It is argued that settling some of the issues in this debate lies at the heart of making sense of collective responsibility. It is also emphasized that a central aim of this book is to make progress in understanding crucial notions in collective epistemology—group belief, justified group belief, group knowledge, group assertion, and group lies—so as to shed light on whether it is groups, their individual members, or both who ought to be held responsible for collective actions. Finally, overviews of each chapter are provided.


Episteme ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 235-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron Dewitt

AbstractModern epistemic questions have largely been focused around the individual and her ability to acquire knowledge autonomously. More recently epistemologists have begun to look more broadly in providing accounts of knowledge by considering its social context, where the individual depends on others for true beliefs. Hardwig explains the effect of this shift starkly, arguing that to reject epistemic dependency is to deny certain true beliefs widely held throughout society and, more specifically, it is to deny that science and scholarship can provide true belief. Alternatively, Hardwig argues that beliefs could be granted to communities or groups but denied to individuals. This paper approaches these broad assertions using a group agency model from List and Pettit. Through a discussion of the ‘epistemic desideratum’ of group agents, I conclude that List and Pettit give us reason to accept some of Hardwig's concerns, but that attributing beliefs to groups does not require us to deny them to individuals, rather an individual can use a group agent as a source of epistemic dependence.


Utilitas ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
LIZ MCKINNELL

According to Jeremy Bentham's account of happiness, pleasure is understood as homogeneous, without qualitative differences between pleasures, and the relation between pleasure and its objects is understood as morally and psychologically arbitrary. John Stuart Mill's ‘mental crisis’ emerged as he realized the psychological impossibility of living according to this view. His recovery was aided by engagement with the poetry of Wordsworth, through which he developed the notion that the cultivation of character and sentiments is an essential element of a good life. I aim to explore Mill's engagement with Wordsworth, and shed light on how Mill felt able to reconcile hedonic utilitarianism with his new view of the ‘inner life’ of the individual.


2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (1.) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marko Pranjić

Elementary education in ancient Athens was eminently educational in character from the time when a separate more qualified institution provided for it, and when the home was no longer adequate for that purpose, which was at the time when school as an educational institution was starting to appear, and moreover, when polis (city-state) itself was becoming a specific teacher and educator. Unlike the Spartan education, the more recent Athenian education put an educatee’s individuality in the forefront, which in itself shaped a new view of man and his education, moving away from the predominantly militaristic perspective on human beings and from the insistence on blind obedience to authority of any kind. The central influence of polis gave in in favour of democracy, the mythical was supressed in favour of the speculative. Homer’s ideals assumed enlightening awareness and the eternity of ideas increasingly took over the changeable human thought. Instead of giving primacy to power and force, Athens gave it to the law, and thereby also to the individual, which created the basis for the unique culture of spiritual living, originally laid out by Athenian legislator Solon.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 189
Author(s):  
Jesper Kallestrup

Resumen De acuerdo con Sosa (2007; 2009; 2011), el conocimiento es creencia apta, donde una creencia es apta cuando es correcta debido a la destreza (competente). Sosa (2010; 2015) añade a su análisis CAD del conocimiento un análisis RFS de la competencia, en donde una competencia completa combina su recinto, su forma y su situación. Una gran parte del in uyente trabajo de Sosa supone que los agentes epistémicos son individuos que adquieren conocimiento cuando dan con la verdad mediante el ejercicio de sus habilidades individuales, de maneras apropiadas y en situaciones apropiadas. Este artículo explora una extensión del modelo de Sosa al escenario social en el que los grupos constituyen agentes epistémicos adicionales a sus miembros individuales. La a rmación es que es posible adscribir conocimiento a los grupos en virtud de que dan con la verdad mediante el ejercicio de sus competencias en formas apropiadas y situaciones apropiadas. Mientras que el conocimiento en el nivel colectivo podría divergir del conocimiento en el nivel individual, las competencias grupales no son nada adicional a las competencias combinadas de sus miembros. La postura resultante tiene, por lo tanto, implicaciones para el debate sobre la reducción y la sobreveniencia en epistemología colectiva. Palabras Clave: epistemología colectiva, competencia grupal, creencia apta, competencia completa. Abstract According to Sosa (2007; 2009; 2011), knowledge is apt belief, where a belief is apt when accurate because adroit (competent). Sosa (2010; 2015) adds to his triple-A analysis of knowledge, a triple-S analysis of competence, where a complete competence combines its seat, shape and situation. Much of Sosa’s in uential work assumes that epistemic agents are individuals who acquire knowledge when they hit the truth through exercising their own individual skills in appropriate shapes and situations. This paper explores an extension of Sosa’s framework to a social setting in which groups constitute epistemic agents over and above their individual members. The claim is that groups can be ascribed knowledge in virtue of hitting the truth through exercising their competences in appropriate shapes and situations. While knowledge at the collective level may diverge from knowledge at the individual level, the competences of groups are nothing over and above the combined competences of their members. The ensuing view thus has implications for the debate over reduction and supervenience in collective epistemology.Keywords: collective epistemology, group competence, apt belief, complete competence. 


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