epistemic voluntarism
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Synthese ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Kuby

AbstractIn this paper I defend the claim that Paul Feyerabend held a robust metaphilosophical position for most of his philosophical career. This position I call Decision-Based Epistemology and reconstruct it in terms of three key components: (1) a form of epistemic voluntarism concerning the justification of philosophical positions and (2) a behaviorist account of philosophical beliefs, which allows him (3) to cast normative arguments concerning philosophical beliefs in scientific methodology, such as realism, in terms of means-ends relations. I then introduce non-naturalist and naturalist variants of his conception of normativity, which I trace back to his mentors Viktor Kraft and Karl Popper, respectively. This distinction, introduced on the metaphilosophical level, can can be put to use to explain key changes in Feyerabend’s philosophical proposals, such as the viability of his methodological argument for realism. I conclude that this Decision-Based Epistemology should be further explored by historically embedding Feyerabend’s metaphilosophy in a voluntarist tradition of scientific philosophy.



Author(s):  
Anjan Chakravartty

The second of two forms of ontological uncertainty, previously introduced, is explored in detail. This form of uncertainty concerns the contention that not only is ontological commitment something that varies between individuals with different, prior, philosophical commitments in the form of different epistemic stances, but some such differences are irresolvable in principle. The deflationary stance and the two stances most relevant to disputes about this form of uncertainty—the empiricist and metaphysical stances—are considered. The view that the stance one adopts is subject to a kind of choice, thus constituting a form of epistemic voluntarism, is elaborated. Crucial to this view is a description and defense of “permissive” norms of rationality for ontological belief, according to which more than one but not all possible stances are rationally acceptable.



2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 168-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anjan Chakravartty

Epistemological disputes in the philosophy of science often focus on the question of how restrained or expansive one should be in interpreting our best scientific theories and models. For example, some empiricist philosophers countenance only belief in their observable content, while realists of different sorts extend belief (in incompatible ways, reflecting their different versions of realism) to strictly unobservable entities, structures, events, and processes. I analyze these disputes in terms of differences regarding where to draw a line between domains in which one has warrant for belief and those in which one should suspend belief and thus remain sceptical. I consider and defend the idea that the precise location of this line is subject to a form of epistemic voluntarism, and argue that a Pyrrhonian reading of the basis of such voluntaristic choice is both natural and transformative of our understanding of these debates.



2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (9) ◽  
pp. 653-661 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathleen Okruhlik






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