Research on influencing factors of financial performance of listed companies based on multiple linear regression and fuzzy logic system

The ultimate goal of listed companies is to maximize shareholders’ wealth. With the increasingly fierce market competition, enterprise managers are constantly exploring the key indicators that have an important impact on the financial performance (FP) of enterprises, and achieve the expected FP of shareholders by improving these key indicators. On the basis of the existing enterprise performance measurement system and index research, through expert scoring to determine the secondary indicators, this paper selects 87 small and medium-sized board listed companies which officially announced the implementation of equity incentive from 2009 to 2012 as the sample, takes the financial information disclosed in 2013 as the empirical data, and analyzes the traditional multiple linear regression analysis (MLR) When dealing with big data, especially the data with hierarchical structure, this paper proposes a partial regression coefficient calculation model based on hierarchical data, constructs a multiple nonlinear regression model, and concludes through empirical analysis that there is a nonlinear correlation between equity incentive ratio and corporate performance, and that there is an interval effect between equity incentive ratio and corporate performance. We also present Fuzzy based financial performance prediction of listed companies. Finally, we demonstrate Comparative analysis for financial prediction in term of accuracy between multiple regression model and fuzzy logic system and result deduce that fuzzy logic gives better accuracy than regression model.

Corporate Diversification, Manager's Incentive, And Shareholder Wealth

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 37.8pt 0pt 0.5in; mso-pagination: widow-orphan; tab-stops: -4.5pt .5in 1.0in 1.5in 2.0in 2.5in 3.0in 3.5in 4.0in 4.5in 5.0in 5.5in 6.0in;"><span style="font-family: Batang; font-size: x-small;">This study examines the impact of managers' incentives and corporate diversification on the returns to shareholders of acquiring firms in acquisition activities. Managers' incentives are measured by creating an incentive ratio (IR). The IR is constructed by dividing the market value of the equity holdings of the three managers with the largest equity shareholding within the firm by their annual compensation. We hypothesize that managers with a high IR are more likely to undertake acquisitions that benefit the shareholders of the acquiring firm than are managers with a low IR. We further hypothesize that the acquisition of a firm that is a focused acquisition (i.e., same industry) will produce greater returns to the acquiring firm's shareholders than will diversified acquisitions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Results indicate significant positive returns to acquiring firms whose managers have high IRs. While diversified acquisitions produce insignificant negative stock returns, focused acquisitions, on average, generate significant positive stock returns for acquiring firms. Results also suggest that managers with a low IR consistently undertake more diversified acquisitions than focused acquisitions, that the group with the combination of high IRs and focused acquisitions produces the highest returns among four groups, and that the group with the opposite combination produces the lowest returns.</span></p>