Motywacja metamorfozy a potworność cielesna i duchowa w wybranych realizacjach wątku „Pięknej i Bestii”

The article discusses the motivations of the monstrous metamorphosis in some Beauty and the Beast retellings, chiefly those by Gabrielle-Suzanne de Villeneuve (1740), Jeanne-Marie Leprince de Beaumont (1756), Alex Flinn (2007), and Małgorzata Musierowicz (1996). Other versions are mentioned as a broader context. The aim of the article is to observe a correlation between transmotivation and a retelling’s structure and message. While folk versions usually omit the motivation altogether, literary and film retellings often provide in-depth explanations of the transformation. In the 18th-century fairy tales, the metamorphosis is a villainy inflicted on an innocent victim, and Beauty has to see through the monstrous appearance in order to realize the true, internal beauty of the Beast. Retellings from the 20th and 21st centuries, on the other hand, often present the metamorphosis as a comeuppance for some emotional and moral fault. Physical deformity reflects spiritual monstrosity, and the Beast’s struggle with the latter helps him become free of the former. As a consequence, transmotivation implies a shift in the narrative from Beauty’s experience to the Beast’s internal change. This may be due to the didactic tradition of the fairy tale for children, in which the hero is tested and disciplined, as well as the influence of the modern novel, focused on individual characters’ psychology

Hell and Fault

This chapter addresses issues concerning agential freedom, moral fault, and punishment. It argues that David Lewis is right that there is an especially virulent non-standard argument from evil, which can be seen more clearly by an expansion of his argument. What Lewis calls “the neglected argument” is an argument concerning the rationality of belief in an eternal hell on the part of theists. It is an argument for the incoherence of what Lewis calls the orthodox story concerning God and hell. The argument is not on its own an argument for atheism, since it leaves intact a variety of metaphysical positions, including universalist theism and forms of religiosity other than those involving an affirmation of the existence of a being who is essentially omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good. It stands, nonetheless, as a powerful argument from evil demanding attention from any perfect being theist who endorses the existence of a non-empty eternal hell.

7. Madness

Foucault felt outrage towards a perception of madness that admits no meaningful alternatives to standards of normality, one which rejects any beliefs or behaviours that deviate from these standards. ‘Madness’ examines Foucault’s ideas about insanity and how madness has come to be perceived by culture. Madness, stated Foucault, suffers from both a conceptual exclusion and a physical exclusion and this reflects a moral condemnation. His History of Madness sustains this argument. The moral fault occurs because madness corresponds to a radical choice to reject humanity and the human community in favour of animality. Despite the voice of madness being silenced, Foucault was particularly fascinated by the idea that probing the limits of reason will reveal truths.

The Unconscionability Principle

Chapter 7 concerns one of the most important developments in modern contract law: the emergence of the principle that an unconscionable contract is unenforceable. Two elements should figure in the determination whether a contract is unconscionable. The first element is the nature of the market on which the contract was made: contracts made on competitive markets are seldom unconscionable, but when contracts are made off-market or on noncompetitive markets the stage is set for unconscionability. The second element is whether the contract involved moral fault: regardless of the nature of the market on which a contract is made, a contract is not unconscionable without that element.

Innocent Attackers and Rights of Self-Defense

Imagine that a neighboring state drafts an army of ignorant soldiers, makes them falsely believe that your state poses an imminent threat to their survival or political independence, and then launches them across your border. As a soldier, would you have a right to kill such attackers in self-defense or in defense of your country? In this brief comment, I will focus primarily on the question of whether one may kill “innocent attackers,” that is, individuals who pose a lethal threat through no moral fault of their own, but because they are acting under a combination of duress and nonculpable ignorance.

État, Islam et Tribus Face aux Organisations Internationales

État, islam et tribus en Afghanistan entretiennent des relations étroites que la littérature anthropologique a souvent décrites, soit sous l'angle du « Confiict of Tribe and State », pour reprendre le titre d'un ouvrage édité par Richard Tapper (1983), soit sous celui des relations historiques de la monarchie durrani avec les tribus (Noëlle 1997) ou avec les minorités non pachtounes (Shahrani 1998), pour ne citer que quelques titres.Dans un ouvrage récent, Heroes of the Age. Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan Frontier (1996), David B. Edwards voit dans l'incompatibilité des systèmes de valeurs de ces trois entités, l'État, l'islam et les tribus, l'origine même des déchirures qui sont à la base de la culture politique afghane. L'opposition semble irréductible entre les normes de l'État, particulièrement celles de l'État-nation empruntées à l'Europe, celles universalistes de l'islam, et celles des tribus avec leur exaltation de l'honneur et de l'autonomie de l'individu. On trouverait là, selon l'auteur, les causes mêmes du conflit afghan, conflit sans solution dans la mesure où « the fault lines dividing the Afghan nation cannot finally be mended » (Edwards 1996 : 234).