Moral Theories of Kalām in The Context of Goodness-Evil (Ḥusun-Kubuḥ)

The main research area of kalām science: Existence, knowledge and value. In this context, God-universe, God-human, human-nature and other creatures and human-human connection are important. Establishing the aforementioned contacts depends on resolving the issue of good (ḥusun)-evil (kubuḥ). The Good-evil problem is to investigate the origin and nature of morality. On the basis of morality, there are voluntary and free actions of the subject. Values should be taken into the research field by establishing a close relationship between will and action. Searching for origins in values is to make it functional. In other words, in order to transfer theoretical values to practical values, the origin of the values must be found. As a result of the search of origins in values, we will encounter two theories subjective and objective values. Subjective values theory depends on the subject. The theory of objective values is independent of the subject. It is al-Ashʿarī who adopts the first approach in theological (kalām) thought. The second one is adopted by Muʿtazila. The source of moral values in the Ashʿarīte doctrine is the subject God. In this approach, the right of divine power and divine wisdom are not given the same proportion. However, it is necessary to think separately on the fact that all subject-dependent issues are always variable. The equalization of the Ashʿarī system with the relativity current, which maintains that God, who gives existence and determines existence, also determines morality, should also be questioned.

Sizing Up Free Will: The Scale of Compatibilism

Is human free will compatible with the natural laws of the universe? To ‘compatibilists’ who see free actions as emanating from the wants and reasons of human agents, free will looks perfectly plausible. However, ‘incompatibilists’ claim to see the more ultimate sources of human action. The wants and reasons of agents are said to be caused by physical processes which are themselves mere natural results of the previous state of the world and the natural laws which govern it. This paper argues that the incompatibilists make a mistake in appealing to such non-agent sources of human action. They fail to realize that free will may exist at one scale, but not at the scales where they look. When free will is considered from the correctly scaled perspective, it does seem compatible with determinism and natural laws.

Dynamic asymptotic dimension for actions of virtually cyclic groups

We show that the dynamic asymptotic dimension of an action of an infinite virtually cyclic group on a compact Hausdorff space is always one if the action has the marker property. This in particular covers a well-known result of Guentner, Willett, and Yu for minimal free actions of infinite cyclic groups. As a direct consequence, we substantially extend a famous result by Toms and Winter on the nuclear dimension of $C^{*}$ -algebras arising from minimal free $\mathbb {Z}$ -actions. Moreover, we also prove the marker property for all free actions of countable groups on finite-dimensional compact Hausdorff spaces, generalizing a result of Szabó in the metrisable setting.

Conclusion

This concluding chapter summarizes the central claims of the book. Additionally, it argues that the HPC natural-kind view about free actions has the resources to address various empirical threats to free will. For example, Neil Levy has argued that recent findings about how implicit biases affect actions threatens free will and moral responsibility. However, the natural-kind view defuses this threat, including Levy’s version of it. The chapter also shows how the natural-kind view can shed light on emerging questions about whether artificially intelligent agents might ever act freely or be responsible for their actions, and if so in what sense. Finally, the chapter sketches some findings indicating that folk thinking may actually assume something like the natural-kind view.

Naturally Free Action

Do we have free will? This book argues that the answer to that question is “yes,” by showing how the concept of free will refers to many actual behaviors, and how free actions are a natural kind. Additionally, the book addresses the role of phenomenology in fixing the reference of the concept, and argues that free-agency phenomenology is typically accurate, even if determinism is true. The result is a realist, naturalistic framework for theorizing about free will, according to which free will exists and we act freely. For the most part, this verdict is reached independently of addressing the compatibility question, which asks whether free will is compatible with determinism. Even so, the book weighs in on that question, arguing that the natural-kind view both supports compatibilism and provides compatibilists with an attractive way to be realists about free will. The resulting position is preferable to previous natural-kind accounts as well as to revisionist accounts of free will and moral responsibility. Finally, the view defuses recent empirical threats to free will and is able to address emerging questions about whether an artificially intelligent agent might ever act freely or be responsible for its behaviors.

ACTIVITIES OF THE PERSONNEL OF THE ENTERPRISE TO ENSURE ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY IN TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS

A model of the formation of personnel actions during the operation of equipment in production has been built. As a result, a dependence was obtained that characterizes the probability of a person committing error-free actions when operating the equipment of technological systems.

Free cyclic group actions on highly-connected 2n-manifolds

In this paper we study smooth orientation-preserving free actions of the cyclic group {\mathbb{Z}/m} on a class of {(n-1)}-connected {2n}-manifolds, {\mathbin{\sharp}g(S^{n}\times S^{n})\mathbin{\sharp}\Sigma}, where Σ is a homotopy {2n}-sphere. When {n=2}, we obtain a classification up to topological conjugation. When {n=3}, we obtain a classification up to smooth conjugation. When {n\geq 4}, we obtain a classification up to smooth conjugation when the prime factors of m are larger than a constant {C(n)}.