Revolt in the Suburbs

This chapter examines some of the forces that led to the decline of mainline Protestant religious authority in the 1960s and 1970s. In addition, it argues that the waning of religious authority during these decades liberated upwardly mobile white Americans to follow their own inclinations and interests, not only in their personal lives but also in their thinking about politics and society. And it was at precisely this point that many of them developed a sudden affinity for the extreme libertarian view that the use of state power to correct systemic injustice or redirect resources to the less fortunate was fundamentally illegitimate. The chapter concludes with an account of mainline Protestant leaders’ failed campaign to defeat Proposition 14, a 1964 ballot measure that repealed California’s fair housing law.

THE LIBERAL AND LIBERTARIAN VIEW OF THE WELLFARE STATE

The reduction of the state of well-being is a current topic both in the general and in the professional public. There is debate in the professional public about the reasons that caused the welfare state to decline. An important part of the researchers point out that the collapse of communism, among other things, has resulted in a reduction of welfare states around the world. However, the number of analysts who consider that the idolatical movements and the debates between the Liberals and the Libertarian have also influenced the practices associated with the reduction of the welfare state. In order to understand the differences between these two ideological doctrines, in this text we will consider the basic positions of the most prominent liberal author John Rawls and the most notable libertarian author Robert Noizick.

Arbitrary Decisions and the Problem of Present Luck

This chapter focuses on a positive element of a typical libertarian view: namely, the thesis (LFT) that there are indeterministic agents who sometimes act freely when their actions—and decisions in particular—are not deterministically caused by proximal causes. LFT is the target of the problem of present luck—indeterministic luck at the time of decision. The bearing of such luck on LFT is explored, and two control-featuring arguments against event-causal libertarianism are rebutted: the same-control argument and the more-control argument. In addition, the freedom of some arbitrary decisions is explored, a mistaken reading of Alfred Mele’s work on luck is corrected, and skepticism about agent causation is discussed.

Two Libertarian Theories

This chapter explores the relative merits of two different event-causal libertarian views. One is Robert Kane’s well-known view, and the other is the “daring libertarian” view floated in Alfred Mele’s 2006 book, Free Will and Luck. It is argued that event-causal libertarians should prefer the latter view to Kane’s view. Special attention is paid to a problem that luck poses for libertarian theories—a problem that the two views at issue attempt to solve in different ways. The problem is applied both to the decisions of adults and to the decisions of young children. A suggestion about how human beings come to be in a position to perform their earliest free actions is developed.

Two Libertarian Theories: or Why Event-causal Libertarians Should Prefer My Daring Libertarian View to Robert Kane's View

Libertarianism about free will is the conjunction of two theses: the existence of free will is incompatible with the truth of determinism, and at least some human beings sometimes exercise free will (or act freely, for short).1 Some libertarian views feature agent causation, others maintain that free actions are uncaused, and yet others – event-causal libertarian views – reject all views of these two kinds and appeal to indeterministic causation by events and states.2 This article explores the relative merits of two different views of this third kind. One is Robert Kane's prominent view, and the other is the ‘daring libertarian’ view that I floated in Free Will and Luck.3 (I labeled the view ‘daring’ to distinguish it from a more modest libertarian view that I floated a decade earlier.)4 I say ‘floated’ because I am not a libertarian. I do not endorse incompatibilism; instead, I am agnostic about it. But if I were a libertarian, I would embrace my daring libertarian view (or DLV, for short). This article's thesis is that event-causal libertarians should prefer DLV to Kane's ‘dual or multiple efforts’ view.5