Wealth creation through corporate diversification – the bondholders’ perspective

The influence of corporate diversification on firm value is an important field in strategy research. Studies in strategic management and finance research have analyzed value creation through product and geographic diversification from a shareholder’s perspective. This study completes this picture by analyzing the bondholders’ perspective. It is suggested that product diversification creates value for bondholders, while geographic diversification destroys bondholder value. The hypotheses are tested on a sample of S&P 1,200 firms in 2001–2011 using a fixed-effects panel model. Drawing on prior research, bondholder value creation is measured using the Merton model. The empirical results support the hypothesis that bondholders gain value through product diversification but lose value through geographic diversification. Considering prior research results, these results show that product diversification is preferable for bondholders, while geographic diversification is preferable from a shareholder’s perspective. The opposite effects of both diversification strategies on shareholders, respectively, bondholders offer an important new perspective on corporate diversification. The results show that firms with a high level of corporate debt should struggle to justify a strategy involving geographic dispersion of activities and support a more diversified product portfolio strategy. This study also offers several avenues for investigating the bondholder’s perspective on corporate diversification in more detail.

Performing Agency Theory and the Neoliberalization of the State

According to Streeck and Vogl, the neoliberalization of the state has been the result of political-economic developments that render the state dependent on financial markets. However, they do not explain the discursive shifts that would have been required for demoting the state to the role of an agent to bondholders. I propose to explain this shift via the performative effect of neoliberal agency theory. In 1976, Michael Jensen and William Meckling claimed that corporate managers are agents to shareholding principals, which implied that their main task was the procurement of shareholder value. Agency theory subsequently prescribes a series of measures to ensure the alignment of principal and agent interests in corporations. The diffusion of agency theory, however, moved beyond corporate governance to reconfigure the state. Due to its reliance on capital markets, the state supposedly likewise becomes an agent of the investment public and should procure bondholder value.

Was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Good News for Corporate Bondholders?

SYNOPSIS We investigate the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on corporate bondholder value by examining the bond market reaction to news events leading up to the passage of SOX. The net impact of SOX on bondholder value is difficult to predict, and there are many reasons why it may be viewed as either good or bad news. Our primary analysis reveals a significant decline in average bondholder value around these events. In addition, cross-sectional tests find that the decline is significantly larger among riskier bonds and among bonds held by firms that are expected to experience the greatest changes under SOX. Thus, our findings are consistent with the bond market expecting the exogenously imposed changes under SOX to make bondholders worse off.