THE TWOFOLD MEANING OF BRINKMANSHIP: EXPLAINING STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY IN RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR POLICY

Discussions and debates about whether or not the role of Russia’s Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons underpins a so-called “Escalation to De-Escalation” strategy culminated in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, which declared the need for deploying a new low-yield nuclear warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles in order to prevent Russia from escalating to the limited nuclear level and successfully terminate the conflict. While unofficial evidence barely suggests that Russia may exhort to its NSNWs in order to stave off the adversary in crisis situations, common Western discussions on Escalation to De-Escalation revolve around the alleged existence of an “offensive” Escalation to De-Escalation strategy. Thereby, Moscow would pre-emptively escalate to the limited nuclear level over NATO's Eastern flank in order to take over it while leaving Western countries without no escalation options, given the doubts surrounding the ability of B61s’ delivery systems at going beyond Russian air-defence. However, while Western countries are often busy with self-deterrence, thus perceiving immediate threats at each deployment by the adversary, they tend to overlook strategic manipulation of deployed capabilities. That is why analysis of ambiguity surrounding Russian NSNWs have been less popular in Western contexts. Based upon critical analysis of Escalation to De-Escalation and classic deterrence and escalation studies, this paper argues that ambiguity surrounding Russia’s NSNWs is part of a brinkmanship strategy, which inadvertently triggered destabilizing dynamics in US-Russia relations. The article proceeds as follows. First, an introduction sets the scene and the aim of the article, as well as the methodology, including the scope and background of facts. Second, the Escalation to De-escalation debate is broken down in the attempt of shedding light on the ambiguity it builds on. Third, it is argued that ambiguity surrounding NSNWs is strategically exploited according to Schelling’s concept of brinkmanship, though exacerbating the risk of inadvertent escalation with Western countries. Finally, a conclusion wraps up the argument and indicates its implications.

Nuclear war and public health: preparedness, protection and the case for prevention

Background According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the year 2018 saw a continuing ‘drift into global instability’ in which ‘both the USA and Russia are on a path of strategic nuclear (weapons) renewal’ with 3750 nuclear bombs globally deployed ‘ready to fire’. Treaties are being abrogated with increasingly aggressive language exchanged, and discredited tactics such as ‘limited use’ revived. These developments risk an amplifying cascade of nuclear weapon fire, whether started by intent, miscalculation or unintentionally. Results A nuclear war would cause immediate and massive loss of human life, unprecedented damage to societal infrastructures and climatic disruption resulting in a ‘nuclear winter’ or ‘nuclear famine’. Conclusions The systems defending national territory against nuclear warhead missiles do not guarantee protection, and neither would hastily erected domestic shelters. Any post-survival world would be utterly different and severely challenging. The only effective preventative measures require nuclear disarmament through treaty.