Challenges in Nuclear Posture and Deterrence from Pakistan’s Perspective

India and Pakistan are engaged in a nuclear arms competition with new technologies and systems that have a direct bearing on their respective doctrines and nuclear postures. The statements by senior Indian leadership over the past few years throw into question the viability of India’s no-first-use posture and have placed further stress on the deterrence relationship between these two regional adversaries. India’s efforts to explore space for a limited war in a nuclearised environment have encouraged Pakistan to introduce remedial measures in the form of short-range ballistic missiles. These are part of its full spectrum deterrence, which aims to deter an entire spectrum of conventional and nuclear threats. India’s work to operationalise its second-strike capability, acquisition of ballistic missile defences and development of hypersonic weapons could undermine regional strategic stability. These efforts require countermeasures on the part of Pakistan to ensure deterrence stability between the two nuclear armed neighbours.

The Role of the Cyprus Issue in the Greek-Soviet Relations (1956-1960)

The article examines the role of the Cyprus issue in the bilateral relations between Greece and the USSR in 1956-1960. It is based on primal archival research realised at the Constantine Karamanlis Archive (AKK) and at the Diplomatic and Historical Archive of the Greek Foreign Ministry (DIAYE) in Athens. The analysis of the recently declassified documents relate to the events which took place in 1954, when the Soviet Union supported the Greek claims for self-determination of the Cypriot people in the United Nations on the basis of the anti-colonial principles. This contributed to the impressive increase in trade between Greece and the USSR, especially after the unofficial visit of the Soviet Foreign Minister D.T. Shepilov to Athens in 1956. Against the backdrop of the deterioration of the international situation in 1957, Kremlin heavily criticized NATOs decision to deploy the US Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) in Europe and applied diplomatic pressures to NATO member-states including Greece. The shift from tensions to a peaceful offensive strategy, characteristic of the Soviet diplomacy towards Greece, proved to be a double-edged sword for Moscow in the long term. The author concludes that both countries exploited the Cyprus issue for their benefit. Thus, Moscow managed to take advantage of the Greek discontent with the NATO allies as a means of increasing its own prestige in the region, while the Greek governments capitalized on the Soviet tactics in order to increase its political leverage in confronting NATO on Cyprus.

Does Canada have anything in the way of a strategic warning intelligence culture (and does it need one)?

During the Cold War, Strategic Warning Intelligence (SWI) was a necessary and recognized function within the intelligence community given the threats posed by conventional Warsaw Pact forces in Western Europe and Soviet ballistic missiles. With the end of the Cold War, the focus of intelligence shifted to tactical or operational issues against known threats, and the SWI function and expertise atrophied as a result. With today’s expanding and more complex threat environment, this article examines whether SWI capacities should be reintroduced in order to apprise decision makers of trending threats to national security, albeit based on faint signals, so the necessary policy decisions can be made and prioritized to mitigate said threats in a timely manner.

THE TWOFOLD MEANING OF BRINKMANSHIP: EXPLAINING STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY IN RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR POLICY

Discussions and debates about whether or not the role of Russia’s Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons underpins a so-called “Escalation to De-Escalation” strategy culminated in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, which declared the need for deploying a new low-yield nuclear warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles in order to prevent Russia from escalating to the limited nuclear level and successfully terminate the conflict. While unofficial evidence barely suggests that Russia may exhort to its NSNWs in order to stave off the adversary in crisis situations, common Western discussions on Escalation to De-Escalation revolve around the alleged existence of an “offensive” Escalation to De-Escalation strategy. Thereby, Moscow would pre-emptively escalate to the limited nuclear level over NATO's Eastern flank in order to take over it while leaving Western countries without no escalation options, given the doubts surrounding the ability of B61s’ delivery systems at going beyond Russian air-defence. However, while Western countries are often busy with self-deterrence, thus perceiving immediate threats at each deployment by the adversary, they tend to overlook strategic manipulation of deployed capabilities. That is why analysis of ambiguity surrounding Russian NSNWs have been less popular in Western contexts. Based upon critical analysis of Escalation to De-Escalation and classic deterrence and escalation studies, this paper argues that ambiguity surrounding Russia’s NSNWs is part of a brinkmanship strategy, which inadvertently triggered destabilizing dynamics in US-Russia relations. The article proceeds as follows. First, an introduction sets the scene and the aim of the article, as well as the methodology, including the scope and background of facts. Second, the Escalation to De-escalation debate is broken down in the attempt of shedding light on the ambiguity it builds on. Third, it is argued that ambiguity surrounding NSNWs is strategically exploited according to Schelling’s concept of brinkmanship, though exacerbating the risk of inadvertent escalation with Western countries. Finally, a conclusion wraps up the argument and indicates its implications.

The Strategic Obstacles Preventing Israel's Attack on Iran's Nuclear Reactors

The study analyzes the reasons that prevent "Israel" from launching a comprehensive military strike against the nuclear sites and other vital sites of a military nature in Iran, in light of the escalation of the indirect military confrontation between them in many conflicts in the Middle East. The study summarizes the "Israeli" risks to implementing "preventive war" on the Iranian scene in four obstacles, which are: the operational, the legal, the military, and the armed non-state actors. The study concluded that: despite the blockade imposed on Iran, especially with regard to the import of advanced military equipment, Iran was able to build a relative deterrent force consisting of three pillars, which rest on its ability to (1) threaten navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, (2) undertake terrorist attacks on multiple continents, and (3) conduct long-range strikes, primarily by missiles (or with rockets owned by proxies deployed in many countries of the Middle East, and its ability to target "Israel" with short and medium-range ballistic missiles. The Iranian deterrent force, or what has come to be called the Iran’s deterrence triad, was the real obstacle to Israel from launching a preventive war against Iran.

Seoul’s new assertiveness recasts Korean missile race

Significance On September 15, it launched two ballistic missiles from a train for the first time. Hours later, South Korea carried out its first official test of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), becoming the eighth nation to develop this capability, and announced previously undisclosed tests of supersonic cruise missiles. Impacts Testing the SLBM while China's foreign minister was in Seoul signals defiance of Chinese pressure not to side with the United States. The unusually robust riposte to North Korean missiles should boost the ruling Democratic Party by showing it is not soft on Pyongyang. The North Korean tests demonstrate the continued advance of Pyongyang's capabilities, despite sanctions and economic crisis. Seoul's growing capabilities make it a more useful US ally, but also more able to act independently in ways Washington might not want. Further North Korean threats will play into Japan's upcoming prime ministerial election, favouring the more hawkish candidates.

North Korean Cyber Attacks and Policy Responses: An Interdisciplinary Theoretical Framework

Study conducts a qualitative analysis of the objectives, forms, current trends, and characteristics of North Korean cyber terror attacks and suggests a way to ensure further progress towards a successful international policy response. Despite the capricious changes that have recently occurred within the international political atmosphere, North Korea continues to constitute a threat to international stability through its ongoing advancement of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles. The difficulty of attribution and the relatively low costs associated with launching cyber offensives make cyber terrorism an attractive option for North Korea. In an effort to direct attention to these circumstances, this study aims to share explicit experts’ perspectives in the field of cyberterrorism in South Korea. Consequently, the study purports to contribute to existing academic discussion and practices on cyber terror and cybercrime. Furthermore, this study adopts perspectives from criminological theoretical frameworks and the network theory of world politics to substantiate a more comprehensive view of North Korea’s cyberterrorism which considers the multifaceted and asymmetrical nature of cyberterrorism within the context of postmodern international politicsfections.

The role and place of artillery in combating “Anti-Access/Area Denial” A2/AD systems

The modern “Anti-Access/Area Denial” A2/AD systems are defined as a combination of all possible measures that can limit the ability of a potential opponent to enter and occupy a given area (operational theatre). Their action relies, among others, on radio-electronic disruption of digital guidance systems, communication, command and control systems, shooting down long-range maneuvering missiles, drones, and aircraft. The primary assumption of the anti-access concept is to deprive the enemy of the possibility of entering a given operational area (A2 – Anti-Access) through long-range destruction and depriving them of freedom of action in that theatre (AD – Area-Denial) by medium and short-range weapons. The Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM), Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM), and Anti-Ship Manoeuvring Cruise Missile (ASCM) are used to carry out A2/AD tasks. Field artillery has also been used recently, particularly the Long-Range Precision Fires (LRPF). The purpose of the article is to determine the chance of using field artillery against the A2/AD systems. According to the authors, the NATO forces will lose control in the air in the first period of the conventional conflict with an equivalent opponent, and its rapid recovery will be a priority. Field artillery, as a weapon with ever greater possibilities of precise and deep destruction, can become a decisive factor, allowing dominance of A2/AD systems and enabling the implementation of tasks of its air-force and army aviation, as well as ground forces.