Nuclear Policy Re(V)iew from the Periscope: SLBM and SLCM Policy Options for the 2022 Biden White House

Advances in nuclear weapon technologies from – and the corresponding evolution in the threat landscape posed by – non-allied nations over the past four years underscores the exigency of the United States (U.S) in updating its stated national security policies. Here we review and suggest options for the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) regarding the low-yield submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) programs. The 2018 NPR called for programmatic changes to counteract the evolving threat environment and allow for greater deterrence flexibility. These programs include modernization of existing technologies and creation of novel weapons systems. Of these changes, two new programs were started to develop low-yield, sea-based, non-strategic weapons. These options are designed to counter any perceived gaps in U.S. regional deterrence capabilities. We enumerate several policy options likely to be considered by the Biden White House. Our proposed solution calls for maintenance of the W76-2 program and the continuance of the low-yield SLCM-N program; we present our argument along the axes of technical and cost considerations, service system preferences, tailored response capabilities, ensured support and defense of our allies, and prevention of escalation to war.

Nuclear Newcomer Countries—The Path of the United Arab Emirates

Embarking on nuclear power requires high-level political decisions and commitments, considerable planning efforts, financial investments and commercial considerations, long-term sustainability for safety; as well as international and legal framework for a nuclear power programme. There are numerous challenges surrounding government decisions to introduce nuclear power into the energy mix of a country. This chapter highlights the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) experience and accomplishments in the development and regulation of its nuclear power programme. In particular, it focuses on the milestones of the UAE path, which might be of interest to nuclear newcomer countries and to a broader international community. This chapter outlines the development of the UAE comprehensive national nuclear law and regulatory framework, which started with the so-called “nuclear policy”. It also includes an overview of a strategy that was developed and set the early path for the UAE peaceful nuclear programme, including timelines for specific targets. The international conventions and UAE’s nuclear cooperation agreements, as well as the cooperation with the IAEA are also mentioned. Particular attention has been paid to the role of the UAE nuclear regulator and its mandate and the development of the UAE regulations and regulatory guides. The licensing of the nuclear power programme, as well as the licensing of other activities and practices involving radiation sources have been also described in the publication. In conclusion, the publication shares some lessons the UAE learnt and on which it will base its efforts towards the continuous enhancement of its legal framework.

Casting the atomic canon: (R)evolving nuclear strategy

Looming decisions on arms control and strategic weapon procurements in a range of nuclear-armed states are set to shape the international security environment for decades to come. In this context, it is crucial to understand the concepts, theories, and debates that condition nuclear policymaking. This review essay dissects the four editions of The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, the authoritative intellectual history of its subject. Using this widely acclaimed work as a looking glass into the broader field of nuclear security studies, we interrogate the field's underlying assumptions and question the correspondence between theory and practice in the realm of nuclear policy. The study of nuclear strategy, we maintain, remains largely committed to an interpretive approach that invites analysts to search for universal axioms and to abstract strategic arguments from the precise circumstances of their occurrence. While this approach is useful for analysing the locutionary dimension of strategic debates, it risks obscuring the power structures, vested interests, and illocutionary forces shaping nuclear discourse. In the conclusion, we lay out avenues for future scholarship.

How Can Realism be Utilised in an Understanding of the United States/New Zealand Relationship over Nuclear Policy?

<p>This thesis examines the decision making process of the United States and New Zealand on the nuclear policy issue through the lens of realism and analyses the effect of realism on the ANZUS alliance. Broader questions associated with alliances, national interest, changing priorities and limits on the use of power are also treated. A single case study of the United States/New Zealand security relationship as embodied in the ANZUS treaty will be used to evaluate the utility of realism in understanding the decision making process that led to the declaration by the United States that the treaty was in abeyance. Five significant findings emerged: firstly both New Zealand and the United States used realism in the decision making process based on national interest, Secondly; diverging national interests over the nuclear issue made the ANZUS treaty untenable. Thirdly, ethical and cultural aspects of the relationship between the two states limited the application of classical realism to understanding the bond. Fourthly, normative theory accommodates realist theory on the behaviour of states in the international environment. Finally, continued engagement between the United States and New Zealand and evolved circumstances provided the means to revitalise a changed security relationship.</p>

How Can Realism be Utilised in an Understanding of the United States/New Zealand Relationship over Nuclear Policy?

<p>This thesis examines the decision making process of the United States and New Zealand on the nuclear policy issue through the lens of realism and analyses the effect of realism on the ANZUS alliance. Broader questions associated with alliances, national interest, changing priorities and limits on the use of power are also treated. A single case study of the United States/New Zealand security relationship as embodied in the ANZUS treaty will be used to evaluate the utility of realism in understanding the decision making process that led to the declaration by the United States that the treaty was in abeyance. Five significant findings emerged: firstly both New Zealand and the United States used realism in the decision making process based on national interest, Secondly; diverging national interests over the nuclear issue made the ANZUS treaty untenable. Thirdly, ethical and cultural aspects of the relationship between the two states limited the application of classical realism to understanding the bond. Fourthly, normative theory accommodates realist theory on the behaviour of states in the international environment. Finally, continued engagement between the United States and New Zealand and evolved circumstances provided the means to revitalise a changed security relationship.</p>

THE TWOFOLD MEANING OF BRINKMANSHIP: EXPLAINING STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY IN RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR POLICY

Discussions and debates about whether or not the role of Russia’s Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons underpins a so-called “Escalation to De-Escalation” strategy culminated in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, which declared the need for deploying a new low-yield nuclear warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles in order to prevent Russia from escalating to the limited nuclear level and successfully terminate the conflict. While unofficial evidence barely suggests that Russia may exhort to its NSNWs in order to stave off the adversary in crisis situations, common Western discussions on Escalation to De-Escalation revolve around the alleged existence of an “offensive” Escalation to De-Escalation strategy. Thereby, Moscow would pre-emptively escalate to the limited nuclear level over NATO's Eastern flank in order to take over it while leaving Western countries without no escalation options, given the doubts surrounding the ability of B61s’ delivery systems at going beyond Russian air-defence. However, while Western countries are often busy with self-deterrence, thus perceiving immediate threats at each deployment by the adversary, they tend to overlook strategic manipulation of deployed capabilities. That is why analysis of ambiguity surrounding Russian NSNWs have been less popular in Western contexts. Based upon critical analysis of Escalation to De-Escalation and classic deterrence and escalation studies, this paper argues that ambiguity surrounding Russia’s NSNWs is part of a brinkmanship strategy, which inadvertently triggered destabilizing dynamics in US-Russia relations. The article proceeds as follows. First, an introduction sets the scene and the aim of the article, as well as the methodology, including the scope and background of facts. Second, the Escalation to De-escalation debate is broken down in the attempt of shedding light on the ambiguity it builds on. Third, it is argued that ambiguity surrounding NSNWs is strategically exploited according to Schelling’s concept of brinkmanship, though exacerbating the risk of inadvertent escalation with Western countries. Finally, a conclusion wraps up the argument and indicates its implications.

Evolution of Pakistans Nuclear Weapon Programme

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the development of Pakistan's nuclear progarmme before and after 1998. Pakistan started its nuclear programme solely for peaceful purpose, and it had no intention to develop nuclear weapons. However, India's objective to acquire nuclear weapons compelled Pakistan to make its own weapon to deter India. After the 1971 war and India's so-called Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (P.N.E.) in 1974, there was no option left for Pakistan but to build its bomb to deter Indian aggression. This paper comprehensively discusses the evolution of Pakistan's nuclear programme, the role of civil-military leadership and furthermore, the development of the command and control system. This paper further elaborates the development of missile technology and the nuclear policy of the country