Searching for a universal constraint on the possible denotations of clause-embedding predicates

We propose a new universal constraint on the relationship between the meaning of a clause-embedding predicate when it takes an interrogative complement and its meaning when it takes a declarative complement. According to this proposal, every clause-embedding predicate V satisfies a constraint that we refer to as P-to-Q Entailment. That is, for any exhaustivity-neutral interrogative complement Q, if there is an answer p to Q such that "x Vs p" is true, then it follows that "x Vs Q" is true as well. We discuss empirical advantages of this proposal over existing proposals and explore potential counterexamples to P-to-Q Entailment.

Phyllotaxis as geometric canalization during plant development

ABSTRACTWhy living forms develop in a relatively robust manner, despite various sources of internal or external variability, is a fundamental question in developmental biology. Part of the answer relies on the notion of developmental constraints: at any stage of ontogenesis, morphogenetic processes are constrained to operate within the context of the current organism being built. One such universal constraint is the shape of the organism itself, which progressively channels the development of the organism toward its final shape. Here, we illustrate this notion with plants, where strikingly symmetric patterns (phyllotaxis) are formed by lateral organs. This Hypothesis article aims first to provide an accessible overview of phyllotaxis, and second to argue that the spiral patterns in plants are progressively canalized from local interactions of nascent organs. The relative uniformity of the organogenesis process across all plants then explains the prevalence of certain patterns in plants, i.e. Fibonacci phyllotaxis.

The Structure of Thresholds for Options

Most of us accept that, even if morality requires us to promote the good, we do not have to live up to its demands all the time. Sometimes we can favor our own interests, or provide special benefit to our friends and family. This paper assumes that these options can be overridden if we pass a certain threshold and asks if there is a common structure between these thresholds for options and the thresholds for rights. This moderate deontological account allows for aggregation in considering the total amount at stake, but also requires that the good be structured in a certain way. In the case of rights, there are two relevant structural constraints: an existential constraint (some individual must have as much at stake as the right bearer), and a universal constraint (everyone being considered must have some minimum amount at stake). Both of these constraints also apply to thresholds for options.