Role of time in binding features in visual working memory

Previous research on feature binding in visual working memory has supported a privileged role for location in binding an object's non-spatial features. However, humans are able to correctly recall feature conjunctions of objects that occupy the same location at different times. In a series of behavioral experiments, we investigated binding errors under these conditions, and specifically tested whether ordinal position can take the role of location in mediating feature binding. We performed two dual-report experiments in which participants had to memorize three colored shapes presented sequentially at the screen center. When participants were cued with the ordinal position of one item and had to report its shape and color, report errors for the two features were largely uncorrelated. In contrast, when participants were cued e.g. with an item's shape and reported an incorrect ordinal position, they had a high chance of making a corresponding error in the color report. This pattern of error correlations closely matched the predictions of a model in which color and shape are bound to each other only indirectly via an item's ordinal position. In a third experiment, we directly compared the roles of location and sequential position in feature binding. Participants viewed a sequence of colored disks displayed at different locations, and were cued either by a disk's location or its ordinal position to report its remaining properties. The pattern of errors supported a mixed strategy with individual variation, suggesting that binding via either time or space could be used for this task.

Multiple Purposes, Multiple Problems: A User Study of Consent Dialogs after GDPR

The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) requires websites to ask for consent to the use of cookies for specific purposes. This enlarges the relevant design space for consent dialogs. Websites could try to maximize click-through rates and positive consent decision, even at the risk of users agreeing to more purposes than intended. We evaluate a practice observed on popular websites by conducting an experiment with one control and two treatment groups (N = 150 university students in two countries). We hypothesize that users’ consent decision is influenced by (1) the number of options, connecting to the theory of choice proliferation, and (2) the presence of a highlighted default button (“select all”), connecting to theories of social norms and deception in consumer research. The results show that participants who see a default button accept cookies for more purposes than the control group, while being less able to correctly recall their choice. After being reminded of their choice, they regret it more often and perceive the consent dialog as more deceptive than the control group. Whether users are presented one or three purposes has no significant effect on their decisions and perceptions. We discuss the results and outline policy implications.

Recallable but not Recognizable: The Influence of Semantic Priming in Recall Paradigms

When people can successfully recall a studied word, they should be able to recognize it as having been studied. In cued recall paradigms, however, participants sometimes correctly recall words in the presence of strong semantic cues but then fail to recognize those words as actually having been studied. Although the conditions necessary to produce this unusual effect are known, the underlying neural correlates have not been investigated. Across two experiments, involving both behavioral and electrophysiological methods (EEG), we investigated the cognitive and neural processes that underlie recognition failures. Experiments 1A and 1B showed that, in cued recall paradigms, presuming that recalled items can be recognized is a flawed assumption: Recognition failures occur in the presence of cues, regardless of whether those failures are measured. Experiment 2 showed that successfully recalled words that are recognized are driven by recollection at recall and by a combination of recollection and familiarity at recognition; in contrast, recognition failures are driven by semantic priming at recall and followed by negative-going ERP effects consistent with implicit processes such as repetition fluency and context familiarity at recognition. These results demonstrate that recall—long-characterized as predominantly reflecting recollection-based processing in episodic memory—can at times also be served by a confluence of implicit cognitive processes.

Let's agree to agree : effects of self-awareness and social identity on online deliberation

This experiment assesses the effects of ingroup versus outgroup communication in an online, one-on-one, anonymous setting on perceptions of deliberation quality in a conversation task pertaining to abortion policy. Additionally, the study examines the effects of different secondary goals during converstion tasks--those of persuasion, and those of other-awareness, or understanding--in concert with trait online disinhibition tendencies in individuals. Finally, outcomes related to perceptions of one's conversation partner (civility, intelligence, rationality, hostility, and others), perceived compromise, feelings of political deliberation cynicism, and accuracy of other awareness (i.e., ability to correctly recall a partner's abortion-related attitudes gleaned through conversation) were also measured. Many similar studies have found that the majority of online hostility will be committed by, accepted by, or even expected by those with higher levels of toxic online disinhibition--but as of yet, there has been relatively little research that inquires how civility can be encouraged in those predisposed to such toxic behaviors online. Notably, this study finds that those with higher levels of toxic, but not benign, online disinhibition prior to the task are capable of engaging amicably in deindividuated, anonymous online settings if their partner demonstrates a commitment to rationality even more than civility or intelligence, and at the same time does not compromise too easily.

Misrecall of Pre-Manipulation Opinion: Repression or Recency Effect?

The misrecall of pre-manipulation opinion is a phenomenon subject to either an explanation based on motivational defensive repression or one of non-motivational self-attribution. A before-after study of persuasive communication was conducted in which all participants completed measures of defensiveness, repression, and self-racing of independence. On the basis of an hypothesis of defensive repression it was predicted that opinion changers who mistakenly report their prior opinion as close to or identical with their final opinion would score significantly higher on measures of defensiveness and repression and would rate themselves as more independent than opinion changers who correctly recall their initial opinion. None of these predicted differences occurred. The results constitute an operational disconfirmation of the defensive repression hypothesis. However, a conceptual disconfirmation of the hypothesis may require a more precise formulation of the “self-esteem theory” set of ideas from which the present hypothesis of defensive repression was derived. It is suggested that the attempt to develop such a formulation and attempts to answer the general question of the importance of ego-defensiveness might appropriately be launched from the perspective of functional theories of attitudes and belief systems.