Introduction and Motivation

This chapter briefly introduces dialetheism—the view that some contradictions may be true. It explains why much of Western philosophy has been hostile to contradiction, and it motivates the idea that East Asian philosophy may be more accommodating of contradiction. It also sets out the program of the book.

Dining on Painted Rice Cakes

This chapter examines the ways that Dōgen employs paradox and contradiction in his philosophical essays. We show that in Shōji, Dōgen reiterates and endorses paradoxes entailed by Indian Madhyamaka thought. We then turn to Gabyō and show that Dōgen endorses the contradiction that reality both is and is not illusory. We then show that in Uji, Dōgen argues for the identity and difference between beings and time. In each case, we show that Dōgen endorses the contradictions he asserts. Finally, in Kattō, we look at Dōgen’s view on the relationship between speech and silence.

Non-dualism of the Two Truths

This chapter addresses the way that paradox is handled in two early Chinese Buddhist exegetical traditions: Sanlun and Tiantai. We show that the Sanlun philosophers Jizang and pseudo-Jizang see paradoxes as arising in a dialectical hierarchy structured by the catuṣkoṭi, and as an artifact of language, but that Tiantai extends this view through the doctrine of the three truths into a full-blown dialetheism regarding reality.

Chan Cases

This chapter focuses on how medieval Chinese Chan exegetes grappled with the paradoxical structure of Buddhist thought. We show how Chan “public cases” (gong’an; Japanese: kōan) probe the nature and import of paradox with philosophical rigor and subtlety. Rather than viewing Chan cases as literary ephemera, or as anti-philosophy, or as incoherent mystical utterances, we see that they are critical and cogent treatments of issues at the very heart of both Mahāyāna thought and contemporary Western philosophy.

Knots in the Dao

This chapter examines the ways that paradox is treated in the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi. We discuss the paradox of ineffability in the Daodejing as well as the Zhuangzi’s paradoxes regarding justification, meaning, immersion, and spontaneity. We conclude that each of these texts is committed to the truth of paradoxes, and to the fact that they illuminate the paradoxical nature of reality and experience.

Silence and Upāya

This chapter examines the paradox developed in the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra regarding the limits of language. The sūtra argues that ultimate reality is ineffable, and that regarding it one must be silent. But that is to say something about it, and the silence one maintains, if it is to express ultimate reality, must also be a kind of speech. Speech and silence, and the expressible and the ineffable, are hence paradoxically related.

Review and Preview

This chapter reviews the journey travelled in previous chapters. In particular, it summarizes the paradoxes unearthed in each chapter. It discusses the various kinds into which they fall and the relationships between the kinds. It then briefly lays the groundwork for the final chapter.

Dialetheism in the Work of Nishida Kitarō

This chapter shows that the 20th-century Kyoto School philosopher Nishida Kitarō was committed to dialetheism. We show that he argues both that the subject must be knowable as an object and that it cannot be known as an object. We also show that he argues that the self both is and is not identical to the world and to itself in the relation he calls “contradictory self-identity.” This chapter demonstrates that East Asian dialetheism persists in the 20th century.

Epilogue

In this final chapter we argue that the paradoxes explored in this volume are not merely analytic, but existential. That is to say, the contradictions are not merely the result of pushing up against the limits of language and thought, but, more fundamentally, they emerge from the fact that we are, inescapably, both subjects and objects to ourselves. In exploring the nature and significance of this conundrum, we draw upon various philosophers from outside the East Asian tradition, including Schopenhauer, Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty, and Nagel.