Instant Agents, Minutelings, and Radical Reversals

Thought experiments about three kinds of agent—instant agents, minutelings, and radically reversed agents—are used in developing the book’s argument for an externalist view of moral responsibility. Instant agents come into being all at once as adult agents with full psychological profiles. Minutelings are instant agents who live only for a minute and perform a morally significant action. Radically reversed agents come in two general kinds: morally wonderful agents who are given a despicable collection of values overnight by manipulators, and despicable agents who are given a morally wonderful collection of values overnight by manipulators.

Must Compatibilists Be Internalists?

This chapter identifies three lines of thought that build bridges from compatibilism to internalism about moral responsibility and argues that all three are seriously defective. The three lines of thought are due to Richard Double, Harry Frankfurt, and Gary Watson. Thought experiments discussed include radical reversal stories and an original-design story in which a goddess creates a zygote and implants it in a certain woman at a certain time because she wants it to grow into a being who will perform a certain deed thirty years later. Differences between these two kinds of thought experiment are discussed.

Internalism and Externalism

Two general kinds of view about moral responsibility are discussed—internalism and externalism. An agent’s internal condition at a time may be defined as something specified by the collection of all psychological truths about the agent at the time that are silent on how he came to be as he is at that time. Internalists maintain that—at least in the case of direct moral responsibility—all that is needed to determine whether an agent is morally responsible for a pertinent action is to be found in his internal condition. Externalists disagree; they contend that agents’ personal histories can have a special bearing on moral responsibility. This disagreement is described and discussed. Various thought experiments are used to shed light on the disagreement and to start building a case for an externalist view.

Introduction

This chapter introduces the book’s central question: What can we learn about the nature of moral responsibility from thought experiments involving manipulation and related thought experiments featuring designed agents? Various alternative positions on that question are described, and some of the key terms of the discussion are defined, including compatibilism, determinism, incompatibilism, and libertarianism. Guidance is offered on how the author uses some other key terms, including free will, intuition, and moral responsibility. The technical terms internalism and externalism are introduced, and various kinds of internalism and externalism are distinguished. Work by Harry Frankfurt and Robert Kane is discussed to help set the stage for subsequent chapters.

Wrapping Things Up

This chapter addresses a range of issues, including the bearing of manipulation on the project of constructing an incompatibilist analysis of moral responsibility for actions, the difference between direct and indirect moral responsibility, the significance of reversal stories in which the change in an agent’s values is localized, and the author’s methodology in this book. A section that has a question-and-answer format answers questions about such things as the negative nature of the historical constraint on moral responsibility defended in this book, why extreme changes in agents’ values are featured in the book’s main thought experiments, and the author’s response to readers who do not share his intuitions about various thought experiments.

Bullet Biting and Beyond

Compatibilists who reject even the modest externalist theses defended thus far in this book seem to be stuck biting some extremely hard bullets. A question about bullet biting is this chapter’s focus. It is roughly this: When should compatibilists about moral responsibility bite the bullet in responding to stories used in arguments for incompatibilism about moral responsibility or in arguments for theses that typical compatibilists would reject? The question is clarified, and a partial answer is offered. Thought experiments discussed include radical reversal stories and original-design stories. John Fischer’s response to an argument based on an original-design story—the zygote argument—receives close critical attention.