Disagreement, Semantics, and Meta-Semantics

Moral Twin Earth thought experiments appear to show that practical language is highly stable, and that many possible users of practical language are capable of having genuine disagreements with each other. This chapter clarifies a tempting generalization of this idea, which is that the members of every pair of possible users of moral language are capable of having a genuine disagreement. This is the Universal Disagreement thesis. It then shows how this thesis can be adapted to a contextualist semantics for ‘ought’ and other practical terms. It concludes by arguing that, for the realist, the central explanatory target is a claim about the stability of practical language.

Failures of Stability

This chapter argues against the Universal Disagreement thesis. Some possible communities use moral language, but do not have substantive disagreements with others who use their moral language differently. These are cases where the parties both use their terms with a moral role, but instead of differing over which substantive theory they follow when applying their moral terms (as in the original Moral Twin Earth cases), they differ in which additional roles they use these terms with. This is consistent with intuitions about Moral Twin Earth cases, but shows that they can lead to overgeneralizations about the semantic effects of a moral role. Instead, what needs to be explained by a meta-semantics for moral language is a more limited claim. Realists will have to show that moral terms are highly stable, but that it is possible to use a term such as ‘right’ with a moral role without referring to moral rightness.

Conclusion

Eklund’s Bad Guy raises questions that are related to the semantic stability of practical terms, but highlights some important consequences of stability that go beyond mere facts about disagreement. Bad Guy applies his normative ‘ought’ systematically to actions we would say are not obligatory. If Bad Guy should be interpreted as using his ‘ought’ to refer to obligation—the same property we refer to—then it follows that there is a measure of semantic stability for ‘ought.’ If not, then Bad Guy can say things like, “One ought not give money to the poor,” using an ‘ought’ with a normative role, and say something that is ...

Reference Magnets: How Do They Work?

Reference magnetism is a promising and easily motivated thesis in meta-semantics. It has a metaphysical component: that some properties are elite, or metaphysically privileged. And it has a linguistic component: that elite properties are easier to refer to than non-elite properties. This chapter clarifies the notions of “use” and “eliteness” that characterize the elements of reference-determination, according to reference magnetism. Reference is determined, on this view, not only by our linguistic dispositions, but also by metaphysical facts, which concern the significant parts of reality. The chapter closes with a development and defense of the thesis in light of recent criticisms. This sets the stage for explaining some central features of practical language which were outlined in Chapters 1 and 2.

Disagreement and Convergence

The main problem in the first five chapters is that of explaining why it is that many possible users of moral language disagree with one other, rather than talk past each other. There are other problems about moral disagreement which relate to the core claims of the realist view that I have defended. These problems center on the notion of convergence: many users of moral terms do not appear to be disposed to agree, or converge, on moral matters, even after extensive reflection. Some argue that non-converging users of moral language cannot refer to the same property. Others claim that if convergence does not obtain, then moral knowledge is not possible. This chapter shows how the realist view developed in the previous chapters should reject these claims. It should hold that reference magnetism allows for non-converging speakers to co-refer, and that the possibility of a non-converging speaker does not show that moral beliefs are at risk of being false, and so not knowledge.

Magnetism and Practical Terms

Reference magnetism is an appealing meta-semantic theory for moral realists, since it applies to properties that are metaphysically elite, and the idea that moral properties are among the elite properties is an attractive one for realists. They can also appeal to it to explain both the scope and limits of the stability of moral terms. Moral terms are highly stable, because users of moral language who don’t apply their word ‘right’ to moral rightness will still refer to it, rather than non-elite properties that fit their use better. However, this does not imply that all users of moral language refer to moral rightness. If there are other morally relevant properties besides rightness that are also primitively elite, then it is possible for some users to refer to these. Realists can use reference magnetism to explain why moral terms are highly stable, without committing themselves to the Universal Disagreement thesis. These insights can also be implemented within a contextualist semantics for practical language.

Knowledge, Eliteness, and Alternative Theories

This chapter argues that we should expect that there are multiple highly elite, morally relevant properties. This follows from an epistemological thesis about how we can know that a property is elite. The thesis is that the elite properties are those that feature in the generalizations of true theories. Since ethical theorizing involves theorizing not only about what is morally right, but also about what the best way for the world to be is, and what the best principles for limited agents to reason with are, we should expect that there are multiple joints in moral reality. This claim underwrites the metaphysical thesis about eliteness that the realist needs to explain stability without committing to the Universal Disagreement thesis. Moreover, if knowledge of elite properties requires true belief about them with absence of epistemic risk, such knowledge is possible even if we (or some possible community) are not capable of arriving at the relevant true beliefs.

Introduction

Reality favors certain ways of acting over others. This is Matti Eklund’s illuminating characterization of a certain kind of view about the nature of morality,1 which I will call a realist view.2 It is a fact that I morally should pay my taxes and not lie to my friends for no reason. According to the realist, these are facts because of how things are in reality—reality favors paying taxes over not paying, and it favors not lying over lying....