Knowledge, Eliteness, and Alternative Theories

2020 ◽  
pp. 166-192
Author(s):  
Billy Dunaway
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Epistemic Risk ◽  
Moral Reality ◽  
The World ◽  
Alternative Theories

This chapter argues that we should expect that there are multiple highly elite, morally relevant properties. This follows from an epistemological thesis about how we can know that a property is elite. The thesis is that the elite properties are those that feature in the generalizations of true theories. Since ethical theorizing involves theorizing not only about what is morally right, but also about what the best way for the world to be is, and what the best principles for limited agents to reason with are, we should expect that there are multiple joints in moral reality. This claim underwrites the metaphysical thesis about eliteness that the realist needs to explain stability without committing to the Universal Disagreement thesis. Moreover, if knowledge of elite properties requires true belief about them with absence of epistemic risk, such knowledge is possible even if we (or some possible community) are not capable of arriving at the relevant true beliefs.

scholarly journals Accuracy and epistemic conservatism

Analysis ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 79 (4) ◽  
pp. 658-669 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Steinberger
Keyword(s):  
Utility Theory ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Epistemic Rationality ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Methodological Principle ◽  
Epistemic Risk ◽  
Epistemic Utility ◽  
Epistemic Conservatism

Abstract Epistemic utility theory (EUT) is generally coupled with veritism. Veritism is the view that truth is the sole fundamental epistemic value. Veritism, when paired with EUT, entails a methodological commitment: norms of epistemic rationality are justified only if they can be derived from considerations of accuracy alone. According to EUT, then, believing truly has epistemic value, while believing falsely has epistemic disvalue. This raises the question as to how the rational believer should balance the prospect of true belief against the risk of error. A strong intuitive case can be made for a kind of epistemic conservatism – that we should disvalue error more than we value true belief. I argue that none of the ways in which advocates of veritist EUT have sought to motivate conservatism can be squared with their methodological commitments. Short of any such justification, they must therefore either abandon their most central methodological principle or else adopt a permissive line with respect to epistemic risk.

Closure and Skepticism

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Foley
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
The World

This chapter considers a different puzzle to the luck issue. It discusses another story and stresses that not only is knowledge not incompatible with luck, it actually requires it. It requires, in effect, the world to be kind. The inclination to think otherwise derives from a failure to distinguish global from local luck. When one has a true belief as a result of local luck, one usually does lack knowledge, but this is so because the luck is accompanied by local ignorance. The chapter then turns to address questions on closure and skepticism, which in turn are more in line with questions about justified belief rather than knowledge.

Entering the World

2020 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 307-322
Author(s):  
K. Lauriston Smith ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Direct Contact ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Active Process ◽  
Critical Realist ◽  
The World ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Realist View

There is a significant lack of clarity among critical realists in the language they use to discuss perception. In this paper I illustrate this lack of clarity and then argue that a critical realist view of perception is best understood as conceiving of perception as an active process in direct contact with the world. I connect this view with the thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s views of perception and embodiment and argue that seeing this point has implications for our understanding of perception by offering a path through the direct/indirect debate. It suggests challenges both to the definition of knowledge as justified true belief and to the reduction of knowledge to effectiveness. It bears on the question of truth insofar as it challenges the view that truth can be reduced to propositions.

Anamorphosis and Subjectivity in the Space of Reasons

2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-136
Author(s):  
Dominik Finkelde ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Jacques Lacan ◽  
True Belief ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Space Of Reasons ◽  
The Mind

Jacques Lacan comments repeatedly on anamorphic art as it exemplifies for him how the mind from a certain angle perceives through law-like patterns the world that would otherwise be nothing but a chaos of arbitrary multiplicities. The angle, though, has a certain effect on what is perceived; an effect that, as such, cannot be perceived within the realm of experience. The article tries to make the link between diffraction laws of perception more explicit in the subject-object dichotomy and refers for that purpose to the work of both Hegel and Lacan. A reference to Hegel is necessary, as Hegel was not only one of Lacan’s own most important sources of insights, but the author who first focused on justified true belief through a theory of a missed encounter between truth and knowledge.

Syllables and morpheme integrity in Kinande reduplication

Phonology ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ngessimo Mutaka ◽  
Larry M. Hyman
Keyword(s):  
Major Part ◽  
African Continent ◽  
Linguistic Group ◽  
Bantu Language ◽  
Testing Ground ◽  
The World ◽  
Growing Body ◽  
Non Linear ◽  
Innovative Work ◽  
Alternative Theories

Within the expanding framework of non-linear morphology, no wordformation process has sparked more interest than reduplication. Once relegated to a secondary status with a few examples, reduplication has now arrived centre stage as a testing ground for alternative theories of multitiered morphology and phonology. The innovative work of McCarthy (1981) and Marantz (1982) on this subject has laid the groundwork for subsequent formal treatments of reduplication, including Levin (1983), Broselow & McCarthy (1984), Clements (1985), Odden & Odden (1985), Schlindwein (1986, 1988), McCarthy & Prince (forthcoming), Kiparsky (1986), Mester (1986) and Steriade (1988), among others. These varying accounts of reduplication have been tested against a large and growing body of data from most parts of the world. Surprising to us, however, since every Bantu language we are familiar with has one or more reduplicative processes, relatively little attention has been focused on this rather large linguistic group of several hundred languages coverin a major part of the African continent.

Quine’s Physicalist Epistemology

1998 ◽  
pp. 77-83
Author(s):  
Kristin K. DeKam
Keyword(s):  
Life Form ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Causal Explanation ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Unresolved Issue ◽  
Naturalized Epistemology ◽  
World Picture ◽  
False Dichotomy ◽  
The World ◽  
Human Understanding

Quine, in his article "In Praise of the Observational Sentence," claims to establish naturalized epistemology and the work of science as a realist mapping of the world. Invoking Rorty's criticisms of foundationalism from Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, this paper analyzes Quine's observational sentence by discussing the unresolved issue of justification. It discusses whether a causal explanation can be a justified true belief and adequate "grounding" of knowledge. I suggest that the criticisms of Quine bypass similarities between Rorty's position and Quine's. Such polemic positions - characteristic of the postmodern/modern debate - imply a false dichotomy. These criticisms of justification and grounding are best understood as a means to argue for eclectic viewpoints of human understanding. I conclude that Wittgenstein's idea of "human life form," or world-picture, provides further context for insisting upon interdisciplinary dialogue in lieu of an assumed hierarchy of specialized sciences.

scholarly journals Negative existentials

Pragmatics ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 599-616
Author(s):  
Zoltán Vecsey
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Approach ◽  
The World ◽  
Truth Conditional ◽  
Negative Existentials ◽  
Static Semantic ◽  
Alternative Theories

Abstract Negative existentials containing empty NPs are understood colloquially as representing how things stand in the world. Moreover, utterances of such sentences seem to express propositions or thoughts that are informative and true. Standard static semantic theories cannot provide a straightforward account of these intuitive phenomena. In such frameworks, sentences with empty NPs are considered as being unable to express truth-evaluable contents. This paper investigates two alternative theories of negative existentials. A common feature of these theories is that they adopt a dynamic approach to meaning. I will argue that neither of these alternatives provides a reassuring solution to the apparent truth-conditional problem generated by the utterances of negative existentials.

scholarly journals Epistemic Diversity and the Question of Lingua Franca in Science and Philosophy

2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-207 ◽  
Author(s):  
Federico Gobbo ◽  
Federica Russo
Keyword(s):  
Embodied Cognition ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Lingua Franca ◽  
The World ◽  
Epistemic Diversity

Abstract Epistemic diversity is the ability or possibility of producing diverse and rich epistemic apparati to make sense of the world around us. In this paper we discuss whether, and to what extent, different conceptions of knowledge—notably as ‘justified true belief’ and as ‘distributed and embodied cognition’—hinder or foster epistemic diversity. We then link this discussion to the widespread move in science and philosophy towards monolingual disciplinary environments. We argue that English, despite all appearance, is no Lingua Franca, and we give reasons why epistemic diversity is also deeply hindered is monolingual contexts. Finally, we sketch a proposal for multilingual academia where epistemic diversity is thereby fostered.

scholarly journals The classical cosmopolitanian idea: Arguments for the world government

2008 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-189
Author(s):  
Dusko Prelevic
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
International Relations ◽  
International Politics ◽  
The Other ◽  
Global Politics ◽  
World Government ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The World ◽  
Decent Peoples ◽  
Alternative Theories

The Cosmopolitan idea of the World Government is quite rarely proposed in theory of international relations. Kant already claimed that this idea oscillates between anarchy and brute despotism. This is the reason why he described this standpoint as naive. The author tries to show that alternative theories, such as realism, Kantian and Rawlsian versions of statism and the conception of multilayered scheme of sovereignty, lead to more serious problems. The first one is rejected for the reason of the 'prisoner's dilemma' it implies. It is also argued that the Kantian version of statism is either inconsistent, or allows for totalitarian states if they have peaceful international politics. Many liberals reject Rawls's position because of his tolerant attitude towards 'decent peoples'. On the other hand, the conception of multilayered scheme of sovereignty is dismissed because of the non-existence of a unified decision-making procedure in global politics. At the end of the paper, the author defends Classical Cosmopolitanism theory from Kant's objections and indicates the main obstacles to its realization.

Control vertical o vacío de sentido: relevancia del concepto de mundo para la definición de la ética política. La polémica de Strauss y Voegelin con Max Webe

2007 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Javier Franzé
Keyword(s):  
Max Weber ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Leo Strauss ◽  
Classical Concept ◽  
Political Ethics ◽  
Moral Reality ◽  
The World ◽  
Eric Voegelin

RESUMENEste artículo busca abordar una cuestión que parece cobrar relevancia política en sociedades postmodernas y secularizadas: las implicaciones que para la ética política puede tener el considerar el mundo como un lugar vacío de sentido inherente o, por el contrario, como una realidad moral. Para ello se recupera la crítica que autores como Leo Strauss y Eric Voegelin, apoyados en una visión clásica de la política que reunía verdad y política, hicieron de Max Weber, cuya reflexión partía de la imposibilidad de fundamentar objetivamente los valores y, por tanto, de conciliar verdad y política. La cuestión que se abre es si una perspectiva que, como la clásica, busca reunir verdad y política, no puede resultar paradójicamente menos consistente para dar cuenta de la especificidad de la ética política que otra que, como la weberiana, da por sentado la imposibilidad de tal reunión.PALABRAS CLAVEPOLÍTICA, VERDAD, ÉTICA, VALORES, VIOLENCIA, WEBER, STRAUSS, VOEGELINABSTRACTThis article deals with an issue that seems to become relevant in postmodern and secularized societies: the implications for political ethics of considering the world as a place without any essential and inherent meaning or, on the contrary, as a moral reality. In order to do this, we recover the criticism made by authors like Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin –based on a classical concept of politics, joining truth and politics together–of Max Weber’s point of view, starting from the impossibility of objectively founding values and thus, of reconciling truth and politics. The question that arises is, if one perspective looks to join truth and politics together, as does the classical one, it cannot be paradoxically less able to portray the particularity of political ethics than another, like the Weberian one, which supposes the impossibility of the union of truth and politics.KEY WORDSPOLITICS, TRUTH, ETHICS, VALUES, VIOLENCE, WEBER, STRAUSS, VOEGELIN.

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