Introduction

This chapter sketches the nature of contemplation. In the strict sense contemplation refers to the moment of insight after speculative reasoning. In the broad sense of the word, however, it refers to a receptivity to God that all Christians should cultivate. It is important to distinguish between these different meanings and the corresponding varied notions of wisdom (theoretical wisdom; as cognitive virtue; and as gift of the Holy Spirit) if we want to avoid attributing inconsistencies to Aquinas (who in ST I, q. 6, a. 6, ad 3 argues that the gifts are not necessary for contemplation but elsewhere (ST II-II, q. 45, a. 3) emphasizes their necessity for contemplation (in the broad sense)). Against the current of today’s scholarship the chapter also argues that Christian contemplation is included in Aquinas’s notion of ‘imperfect happiness’ on earth. The chapter concludes with an outline of the book.

Charity, Contemplation, and Participation in the Trinity

Whereas the contemplative act consists essentially in the operation of the intellect, the will and charity are also involved insofar as charity moves us to contemplation, and delight naturally accompanies it. Insofar as love moves us towards contemplation, which then ensues in delight when the intellect apprehends truth, a trinitarian dimension is implied in contemplation, that is, a participation in the generation of the Word and the procession of the Holy Spirit as Love. The chapter also considers how charity redirects our entire affectivity towards God, thereby creating a radical theocentric disposition of gratuity, which is key to the leisurely nature of contemplation.

Gifts of the Holy Spirit, Prayer, and a ‘Sapiential’ Notion of Wisdom

This chapter refutes a charismatic or sapiential reading of Aquinas’s theology. This sapiential interpretation has almost become a new orthodoxy amongst scholars today. Three topics are considered. First, it examines the rather tenuous relation between theological contemplation and prayer and finds that prayer is mainly petitionary and therefore an act of the practical intellect, whereas theological contemplation relies on the theoretical intellect. Secondly, it considers in detail the evolution of Aquinas’s spirituality of the gifts of the Holy Spirit (from his Commentary on the Sentences to the Secunda Secundae), and argues that these became increasingly less central to his notion of theological contemplation (but remained utterly central to contemplation ‘broadly conceived’). Finally, it discusses the notion of so-called ‘sapiential theology’ itself and demonstrates that Aquinas was altogether rather sceptical of ‘sapiential’ (as sapida) notions of wisdom.

Epistemological Issues

Epistemological issues addressed in this chapter include: How do we know? Can we know God? Which three operations of the intellect does Aquinas identify and what do they mean (apprehension, judgement, reasoning)? How does Aquinas conceive of contemplation in the strictly speculative sense and how does it relate to these three operations? It argues that Aquinas draws an emphatic distinction between discursive reason (ratio) and simple understanding (intellectus), describing the acme of the contemplative act in terms of intuitus simplex, a simple, non-discursive insight into truth. Aquinas draws on Christian Neoplatonic authors, not Aristotle, to explain this. It is argued that Aquinas wanted to give scope to a non-apodeictic notion of contemplation, which could accommodate the phenomenon of insight after speculative reasoning, as well as the connatural, intuitive insight of the ordinary Christian.

Metaphysics

This chapter considers the metaphysical foundations of contemplation. Aquinas generally describes contemplation as ‘the consideration of truth’. Hence, in this chapter we consider the nature of truth, which Aquinas understands in terms of a convergence of mind and reality, thereby pre-empting some of the modern philosophical problems of dualism and solipsism. Other transcendentals, which can be defined as fundamental properties that accompany being as such (and not just a limited class of things), such as oneness, being itself (which is what the intellect first grasps), and goodness, are also discussed. Aquinas’s approach is contrasted with the trinitarian metaphysics of the Summa Halensis and Bonaventure’s illuminist account.

Faith, Theology, and Contemplation

How does Aquinas conceive of the connections between faith and theological contemplation? How does he defend the scientific nature of theology? What is the role of the assent of faith, and is Aquinas guilty of voluntarism? Aquinas’s espousal of the notion of theology as a science sub-alternated to divine scientia allowed him to defend a non-charismatic notion of theology (i.e. one that does not depend on the cognitive gifts of the Holy Spirit to assist us in grasping the articles of faith). The chapter further argues that all rational disciplines (with the exception of those that operate with principles that are known per se) rely on first principles that cannot be argued for within the relevant discipline itself. Finally, the chapter argues that Aquinas’s view that we cannot both know and believe something at the same time actually softens the boundary between theology and philosophy, which is of considerable importance when we address the perennial question as to how Aquinas conceives of the relation between theology and other disciplines.

The Dominican Calling and the Relation between the Active and Contemplative Lives

This chapter discusses how Aquinas conceives of the relation between the active and contemplative lives in light of the mendicant controversy. Aquinas distinguishes between the two lives on the basis of the distinction between the practical and theoretical intellect. Hence, he does not explicitly adopt the terminology of the mixed life. From the beginning of his career Aquinas argued that the contemplative life is inherently more meaningful; but at times, given the needs of the present life, the active life deserves priority and may prove more useful. Aquinas proved unwavering on this issue but his argumentation subtly shifts: increasingly, he will appeal to the role of charity to argue that greatest love is manifested when, at times, we relinquish the delights of contemplation to engage in activities of the active life, especially those closely associated with, and nourished by, contemplation: contemplata aliis tradere.

Conclusion

This chapter summarizes the main points of the book: contemplation covers a broad semantic range but in the strict sense it is to be understood as intuitus simplex (chapter 2); while contemplation is inherently more meaningful than the active life, Aquinas, as a Dominican, defends a version of the mixed life in which contemplation informs activities such as teaching and preaching (chapter 4); the nature of theology (as a science sub-alternated to divine Scientia) and the relation between theology and other sciences, including philosophy, are revisited (chapter 5); although the role of the gifts in theology evolves throughout Aquinas’s career, his thought should not be characterized as ‘charismatic’ or ‘sapiential’ (chapter 7); the role of charity in contemplation is also dealt with (chapter 6). Finally, while Aquinas’s discussion of the beatific vision (chapter 8) appears to be in tension with his overall epistemological account, there is, nevertheless, an important element of continuity, namely the non-discursive nature that characterizes both intuitus simplex on earth and the beatific vision.

Happiness and the Vision of God

After an outline of the views on happiness of Aristotle and some of Aquinas’s immediate predecessors his theology of human fulfilment is outlined. Aquinas rejects both Albert’s view that philosophical contemplation on earth could possibly constitute real happiness and Bonaventure’s more affective notion of prayerful, meditative union with God. Some scholars have pointed to the tension between Aquinas’s accounts of knowing on earth and the vision of God in the afterlife. The former hinges on an Aristotelian empirical stance; the latter appears more illuminist, if not Averroist (in terms of the divine intellect becoming united with the human intellect). This chapter argues that the intuitus simplex (the climax of our intellectual contemplation on earth) resembles, and points towards, the intuitive, non-discursive beatific vision of God. This means that the acme of our mode of knowing on earth, i.e. the moment of intellective insight, has an eschatological dimension. It is one more instance of grace perfecting nature.