Introduction

This chapter sketches the nature of contemplation. In the strict sense contemplation refers to the moment of insight after speculative reasoning. In the broad sense of the word, however, it refers to a receptivity to God that all Christians should cultivate. It is important to distinguish between these different meanings and the corresponding varied notions of wisdom (theoretical wisdom; as cognitive virtue; and as gift of the Holy Spirit) if we want to avoid attributing inconsistencies to Aquinas (who in ST I, q. 6, a. 6, ad 3 argues that the gifts are not necessary for contemplation but elsewhere (ST II-II, q. 45, a. 3) emphasizes their necessity for contemplation (in the broad sense)). Against the current of today’s scholarship the chapter also argues that Christian contemplation is included in Aquinas’s notion of ‘imperfect happiness’ on earth. The chapter concludes with an outline of the book.

Multiculturalism as a Cognitive Virtue of Scientific Practice

I argue that science will be better, by its own criteria, if it pursues multiculturalism, by which I mean an ethnic- and gender-diverse set of scientists. I argue that minority and women scientists will be more likely to recognize false, prejudiced assumptions about race and gender that infect theories. And the kinds of changes that society will undergo in pursuing multiculturalism will help reveal these faulty assumptions to scientists of all races and genders.

Virtues and Vices of Virtue Epistemology

In recent years, virtue epistemology has won the attention of a wide range of philosophers. A developed form of the position has been expounded forcefully by Ernest Sosa and represents the most plausible version of reliabilism to date. Through the person of Alvin Plantinga, virtue epistemology has taken philosophy of religion by storm, evoking objections and defenses in a wide variety of journals and volumes. Historically, virtue epistemology has its roots in the work of Thomas Reid, and the explosion of Reid scholarship in the last few years is perhaps both a cause and an effect of recent interest in the position.In this paper I want to examine the virtues and vices of virtue epistemology. My conclusion will be that the position is correct, when qualified appropriately. The central claim of virtue epistemology is that, Gettier problems aside, knowledge is true belief which results from a cognitive virtue. In section one I will clarify this claim with some brief remarks about the nature of virtues in general, and cognitive virtues in particular. In section two I will consider two objections to the theory of knowledge which results. In section three of the paper I will argue that virtue epistemology can be qualified so as to avoid the objections raised in section two. Finally, I will argue that the amendments which solve the objections of section two also allow us to solve a version of the dreaded generality problem.