Prepositions and Spatial Relations in Natural Languages According to Leibniz

In his 1677 Dialogue, Leibniz answers the question of how it is possible that speakers of different languages agree on the same truths by postulating “a certain correspondence between characters and things”. In the mid-1680s, he arguably attempts to specify this “correspondence” by explaining how linguistic particles are connected to our perception of spatial relations among things in the world. Firstly, this paper focuses on the role that, according to Leibniz, signs and characters play in our knowledge. Secondly, it introduces the solution that can be found in the Dialogue to the problem of how the same truth can be expressed in different languages. After briefly expounding Leibniz’s theory of natural languages, the paper gives an account of Leibniz’s analysis of the nature of prepositions and of how they contribute, in a natural language, to determine the correspondence between characters and things that is mentioned in the Dialogue.

Conceivability Errors and the Role of Imagination in Symbolization

n the years 1675-84, Leibniz sought to disprove Descartes’s account of clear and distinct perception by implementing a three-step argumentative strategy. The first part of the paper reconstructs the argument and highlights what aspects of Descartes’s epistemology it addresses. The reconstruction shows that the argument is based on conceivability errors. These are a kind of symbolic cognition that prove Descartes’s clear and distinct perception as introspectively indistinguishable from Leibniz’s symbolic cognition. The second part of the paper explores the epistemic implication of the indistinguishability between clear and distinct perception and symbolic cognition: the mind constitutively depends on products of the imagination. My conclusion addresses the role of the imagination in symbolization. Symbolization does not exceed imagination; it rather is an idealized use of cognitive surrogates, like characters, to submit to the imagination what is not subject to it.

Leibniz’s Last Letter on Linguistic Matters

We reproduce in what follows the last writing published in life by G.W. Leibniz (1646-1716) on linguistic topics. Together with other works by scholars of the time, Leibniz’s essay served as an introduction to an important collection of versions of the Pater noster in many different languages (Chamberlayne ed. 1715). In his critical remarks, the philosopher not only summarises his main ideas about the importance and method of linguistic comparison, but also integrates them with interpretative insights from neighbouring fields, such as numismatics, archaeology, and the history of writing systems. The editor’s commentary gives information on the historical and theoretical context in which Leibniz writes and on the numerous authors and works mentioned in the text.

Leibniz on the Empty Term ‘Nothing’

This paper discusses Leibniz’s treatment of the term ‘nihil’ that appears in some logical papers about the notion of Real Addition. First, the paper argues that the term should be understood as an empty (singular) term and that sentences with empty terms can be true (§2). Second, it sketches a positive free logic to describe the logical behaviour of empty terms (§3). After explaining how this approach avoids a contradiction that threatens the introduction of the term ‘nihil’ in the Real Addition calculus (§4), and how this approach should be understood within Leibniz’s philosophy (§5), the paper assesses the prospects of such an approach with regard to two fundamental issues in Leibniz’s thought: the fictional nature of infinitesimals (§6), and the occurrence of the term ‘nothing’ in the proof of the existence of God that we find in the New Essays (§7).

The ‘I’ in the Monad: Leibniz and the Essential Indexical

Some modern and contemporary philosophers argue that the first-person indexical plays an essential role in the explanation of individual actions. As such it cannot be explained away or replaced by a co-referring term without destroying the cognitive force that its use conveys. There are important aspects of Leibniz’s work that anticipate the view of the essential indexical. The activity in the monad, such as the petites perceptions and appetitions, plays the cognitive role of grounding indexical reference and uses of the first-person pronoun to explain an agent’s perspective and behaviour.

Leibniz on the Frege Point

In the debate on the Frege Point, the ‘Spinoza thesis’ is often mentioned. But Leibniz is kept out. Yet, on this topic, Spinoza and Leibniz shared a fairly similar goal. They sought to root the assertive force in the conceptual activity of the subject. But Leibniz, unlike Spinoza, wanted also to build a coherent theory of propositions. Propositions are for him always provided with assertive force. But what is affirmed by the propositions of logic is only a possibility – the possibility of the conceptual link they express. Stronger assertions require something more: a mark of actuality, a modal symbol in logic or the use of notae or particulae which belong to natural languages. Leibniz does not modify his conception of propositions in his “analysis particularum”. He tries to understand what we do when we use them in various contexts. The Leibnizian proposition is neutral, but it is not forceless. Since it is not forceless, there is no need to appeal to an external act or to a judgment. Leibniz thinks, like most of the authors of the Aristotelian tradition, that the proposition contains the act of judging. Since it is neutral, there is no need to venture into the many difficulties raised by cancellation to account for the force/content relation in the conditional, disjunctive or fictional contexts.

The Treachery of Images: Why Images Do not Exist and There Are Only Flat Objects

Do images exist? In this paper I argue that the notion of an image is ontologically empty – i.e., images are no more than a cultural invention akin to epicycles in astronomy. There are only flat objects engaged in various causal roles. In this paper I will defend the thesis that in visual culture, in the neurosciences, and in philosophy of mind, there is no convincing evidence in favor of their existence. Moreover, I will outline a series of arguments aiming at showing that images do not exist. I will discuss briefly discuss why many authors – from the iconic turn to the neurosciences – use the notion of image as though it were something real. I will conclude suggesting to drop the subject-object divide and to consider a completely flat ontology made only of (relative) objects.