Neurointerventions as Punishment

This chapter addresses the question whether a properly imposed neurointervention can in itself function as a type of punishment. This question opens up a discussion concerning the definition of punishment and, furthermore, a broader discussion as to which requirements should be satisfied for a punishment to be morally justified. Finally, it is considered whether a punishment qua neurointervention, as has been suggested by several theorists, would constitute a way of dealing with offenders which is cruel and unusual, or which should, for other reasons, be banned in principle. As such, this chapter is primarily devoted to penal theoretical considerations.

Neurointerventions and Crime Prevention

This chapter explains what motivates an ethical discussion of the use of neurointerventions as an instrument of crime prevention. Moreover, it critically discusses a number of possible objections to the ethical discussion of the use of neurointerventions on offenders. For instance: Are considerations of neurointerventions unacceptably hypothetical? Do they derail the discussion of what really matters in crime prevention? Finally, it provides an overview of the various topics that are considered in the ensuing chapters.

Neurointerventions and the Lesson from History

This chapter takes its point of departure from the fact that the idea of using neurointervention as an instrument of crime prevention carries a very dark prehistory. However, the history of the use of various types of treatment methods over the last century plays a somewhat unclarified role in the modern neuroethical debate. Some theorists seem almost to believe that the use of neurointerventions constitutes an entire novel ethical issue. Other theorists are much more explicit about the historical precedent but direct attention to how such treatment has previously been administered without devoting much effort to clarify the present relevance of past experiences. Both approaches are unsatisfactory. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to consider the moral significance of the sordid prehistory of neurointerventions for the present ethical discussion of the use of such treatment in crime preventive.

Neurointerventions and Penal Reductions

This chapter considers the possibility of offering reduced prison terms to offenders who accept undergoing some sort of neurointervention. The standard objection has been that such treatment is basically coercive. This objection is discussed. Furthermore, the chapter examines other potential objections; to wit, that treatment-conditioned penal reductions constitute either exploitation of the offender or a sort of morally inappropriate offer. The final part of the chapter deals with an aspect of the discussion which has been almost entirely absent in the controversy on ‘coercive’ treatment, namely, the way in which the ethical assessment of such treatment is contingent on penal theoretical considerations.

Neurointerventions and Physician Participation

This chapter takes up an issue that more narrowly relates to the question who should administer the use of neurointerventions if such treatment were to be put into practice. That such treatment would usually require at least some degree of involvement by personnel with medical skills is beyond doubt. However, this raises the question whether physicians should be involved in the treatment of offenders. The purpose of this chapter is to consider whether the combination of the fact that the treatment presupposes medical involvement, and the view that physicians should not be involved in such treatment, is sufficient to block the whole discussion of the morally legitimate use of neurointerventions in crime prevention. It is examined whether any of the arguments that have been advanced in the discussion of physician involvement in the use of lethal injection in relation to capital punishment manage to establish that physicians have a moral duty to abstain from criminal justice use of treatment by neurointerventions.

Compulsory Neurointerventions on Offenders

This chapter concerns the controversial question whether compulsory use of neurointerventions in the treatment of offenders can ever be morally justified. That there are strong reasons against such use is hard to reject. But does this imply that such treatment is wrong everything considered? And if so, why is this the case? A number of objections are discussed concerning respectively, the lack of a proper moral yardstick, the freedom of the offender, and the personal identify of the offender. Subsequently, it is considered whether—as several theorists have suggested—it is plausible to hold that compulsory use of neurointerventions violates an offender’s moral right to either physical integrity or mental self-determination.

Neurointerventions and Criminal Justice Practice

This chapter takes the step from traditional abstract ethical considerations to the more practical question as to what should be expected if one imagines that treatment in the form of neurointerventions is further developed and were to be implemented within a framework such as the one we know from current criminal justice practice. The discussion in the chapter is based on the widely accepted view among penal theorists, namely, that current penal practice in the United States, and also in many other Western countries, deviates significantly from what is ideally desirable. But if this is the case, what does it mean for the idea of applying neurointerventions within such a practice? This question is examined by reconsidering many of the conclusions that have been drawn in preceding chapters in the light of non-ideal real-life penal practice.