Introduction

The cluster of problems around freedom, determinism, and moral responsibility is one of those themes in philosophy that are fascinating in both their complexity and their seemingly direct relevance to human life. Historians of ideas often assume that in Western philosophy this cluster of problems was the subject of an ongoing discourse from antiquity to the present day. This is, however, an illusion. Much of my research on ancient theories of determinism and freedom is devoted to showing that what commonly counts as this problem cluster today (often labelled as ‘the problem of free will and determinism’) is noticeably distinct from the issues that the ancients discussed—at least prior to the second century CE. It is true that one main component of the ancient discussion concerned the question of how moral accountability can be consistently combined with certain causal factors that impact human behaviour. However, it is not true that the ancient problems involved the questions of the compatibility of causal determinism with either our ability to do otherwise or a human faculty of a free will. Instead, we encounter questions about human autonomous agency and its compatibility with preceding causes, external or internal; with external impediments; with divine predetermination and theological questions; with physical theories like atomism and continuum theory, and with sciences more generally; with elements that determine character development from childhood—nature and nurture; with epistemic features such as ignorance of circumstances; with necessity and modal theories generally; with folk theories of fatalism; and also with questions of how human autonomous agency is related to moral development, to virtue and wisdom, to blame and praise. All these questions were discussed without reference to freedom to do otherwise or a faculty of the will—at least in Classical and Hellenistic philosophy. This volume of essays considers all of these questions to some extent....

Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 1113b7–8 and Free Choice

This chapter examines with close textual analysis the philosophical question whether the two famous Aristotelian lines from the Nicomachean Ethics (EN 3.5 1113b7–8) on what is up to us (eph’shēmin) provide any evidence that Aristotle discussed free choice or freedom of the will—as is not infrequently assumed. The result is that they do not, and that the claim that they do tends to be based on a curious mistranslation of the Greek. Thus the sentence that is sometimes adduced as the main piece of evidence for the claim that Aristotle was an indeterminist with respect to choosing (prohairesis) and acting (praxeis, prattein) is no evidence for this claim at all. This chapter is a companion piece to the next one (‘Found in Translation’).

Did Epicurus Discover the Free-Will Problem?

This chapter shows, through painstaking analysis of the extant texts (Epicurus, Lucretius, Diogenes Laertius, et al.), that there is no evidence that Epicurus dealt with the kind of free-will problem with which he is traditionally associated, i.e. that he discussed free choice or moral responsibility grounded on free choice, or that the ‘swerve’ was involved in decision processes. Rather, for Epicurus, actions are fully determined by the agent’s mental disposition at the outset of the action. Moral responsibility presupposes not free choice but that the person is unforced and causally responsible for the action. This requires the agent’s ability to influence causally, more specifically on the basis of their beliefs, the development of their behavioural dispositions. The ‘swerve’ was intended to explain the non-necessity of agency without undermining Epicurus’ atomistic explanation of the order in the universe, viz. by making the mental dispositions of adults non-necessary.

Stoic Conceptions of Freedom and Their Relation to Ethics

This chapter introduces the various ancient Stoic theories of freedom. It investigates how, from the early Stoics via Epictetus to the Stoics of the late second century, freedom and responsibility are connected with ethics. In this context, the most important conceptual distinction is between what depends on us (eph’hēmin) and freedom (eleutheria). In Stoic philosophy the eph’hēmin is always associated with human action and intention and is located within Stoic psychology. For every human being, there are things that depend on them. Freedom, by contrast, is a notion contrasted with slavery, originating in political theory, and from there it enters Stoic ethics. For the Stoics, freedom is a character disposition—a virtue—and can be manifested only in sages. The confusion of these two quite distinct concepts and their roles in Stoic philosophy has wreaked much havoc in twentieth-century scholarship (which the essay untangles and invalidates in the process).

Choice and Moral Responsibility in Nicomachean Ethics 3.1–5

This chapter examines what the overall purpose of Nicomachean Ethics 3.1–5 is, and in doing so produces a unified interpretation of the passage, showing that Aristotle’s theory of responsibility is not based on notions of free decision or free will. The passage’s primary purpose is to explain how agents are responsible for their actions not just insofar as these are actions of this kind or that, but also insofar as they are noble or base: this is the step from responsibility generally to moral responsibility. Agents are responsible for their actions qua noble or base because, typically via choice (prohairesis), their character dispositions are a causal factor of those actions. An important second purpose of EN 3.1–5 is to explain how agents can be held responsible for certain consequences of their actions, in particular their character dispositions insofar as these are noble or base, that is, virtues or vices.

Early Stoic Determinism

This chapter pursues the question how teleological elements and efficient causation were merged in early Stoic cosmology. Stoic determinism is originally introduced in teleological terms, built on a distinction between a global and an inner-worldly perspective on events, in which Nature is the global active principle that determines all inner-worldly events. Additionally, Chrysippus’ efficient causality connects inner-worldly causes and their effects and is used to construct a contemporary-style universal causal determinism. The teleological and seemingly mechanical elements are combined in the early Stoic concept of fate (heimarmenē). The Stoics present details of this combination in biological and psychological analogies. It emerges that the early Stoic theories of Nature as world seed and world soul and world agent offer a fascinating solution to the question how science and theology, in particular predetermination, can be joined consistently within cosmology: theological and scientific explanation of the world are two complementary explanations of the same thing.

Moral Responsibility and Moral Development in Epicurus’ Philosophy

This chapter shows that Epicurus had a notion of moral responsibility based on the agents’ causal responsibility—as opposed to their ability to act or choose otherwise. Thus, the central question for responsibility was whether the agent was the cause of the action, or was forced to act by something else. Actions could be attributed to agents because it is in their actions that their character manifests itself. As a result, moral development becomes all-important. Thus the chapter discusses evidence for Epicurus’ views on how humans become moral beings and on how they morally improve. Epicurus envisaged a complex web of hereditary and environmental factors as shaping the moral aspects of humans. It results that Epicurean ethics does not have the function of developing or justifying a moral system that allows for the effective allocation of blame. Rather, its function is to give everyone a chance to morally improve.

Found in Translation

This chapter researches the reception of the crucial sentence in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 3.5, 1113b7–8 about that which is up to us (eph’hēmin), the philosophical significance of which is the topic of the previous chapter. This sentence has markedly shaped both scholarly and general opinion with regard to Aristotle’s theory of free will. In addition, it has taken on a curious life of its own. Part One of the chapter examines the text itself. Part Two explores its reception from antiquity to the present day, including present-day popular culture, later ancient, Byzantine, Arabic, Latin Medieval, Renaissance, Victorian, and contemporary scholarship, and how it influenced the interpretation of Aristotle’s view on free will. There are some surprises on the way. (The paper also serves as an introduction to the reception of the Nicomachean Ethics from its beginnings to the present.)

The Inadvertent Conception and Late Birth of the Free-Will Problem

This chapter presents evidence that the ‘discovery’ of the problem of causal determinism and freedom of decision in Greek philosophy is the result of a combination and mix-up of Aristotelian and Stoic thought in later antiquity; more precisely, a (mis-)interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy of deliberate choice and action in the light of the Stoic theory of determinism and moral responsibility. The (con-)fusion originates with the beginnings of Aristotle scholarship, at the latest in the early second century CE. It undergoes several developments, absorbing Epictetan, Middle Platonist, and Peripatetic ideas; and it leads eventually to a concept of freedom of decision and an exposition of the ‘free-will problem’ in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ On Fate and in the Mantissa ascribed to him. The notion of a will originates only with early Christians and in later ancient Platonist thought.

Chrysippus’ Theory of Causes

This chapter combines an in-depth analysis of Chrysippus’ defence of his determinism in Cicero’s On Fate with a systematic reconstruction of his theory of causes. It shows that our evidence does not support the standard view that Chrysippus’ distinction between proximate and auxiliary causes and perfect and principal causes corresponds to one between internal and external determining factors. Causes of the two types were not thought to cooperate, but were conceived as alternatives. The chapter suggests that Chrysippus neither developed a full taxonomy of causes nor had a set of technical terms for mutually exclusive classes of causes. Instead, the various adjectives he used functioned to describe or explain particular features of certain causes in particular philosophical contexts. Chrysippus’ basic theory of causes was grounded on the Stoic tenets that causes are bodies and relatives, and that all causation can ultimately be traced back to the ‘active principle’ which pervades everything.