Early Stoic Determinism

This chapter pursues the question how teleological elements and efficient causation were merged in early Stoic cosmology. Stoic determinism is originally introduced in teleological terms, built on a distinction between a global and an inner-worldly perspective on events, in which Nature is the global active principle that determines all inner-worldly events. Additionally, Chrysippus’ efficient causality connects inner-worldly causes and their effects and is used to construct a contemporary-style universal causal determinism. The teleological and seemingly mechanical elements are combined in the early Stoic concept of fate (heimarmenē). The Stoics present details of this combination in biological and psychological analogies. It emerges that the early Stoic theories of Nature as world seed and world soul and world agent offer a fascinating solution to the question how science and theology, in particular predetermination, can be joined consistently within cosmology: theological and scientific explanation of the world are two complementary explanations of the same thing.

Walter Chatton’s Rejection of Final Causality

The paper examines Walter Chatton’s rejection of final causality. At the core of Chatton’s theory lies the claim that there are four kinds of cause (material, formal, efficient, and final), but only three kinds of causality, because final causality should in a sense be reduced to efficient causality. The author begins by situating Chatton’s theory in the context of the fourteenth-century discussions concerning the problematic status of ends as causes. After that, the paper reconstructs Chatton’s rejection of the opinio communis of his time, according to which both final causes and final causality must be posited. The author claims that Chatton’s objections employ three main arguments, based on (1) ontological parsimony, (2) possible non-existence of ends, and (3) the efficient character of love and desire. Then, Chatton’s own theory is presented. The author’s exposition is focused on Chatton’s thesis that final causes are said to be causes only in a metaphorical sense. The final part of the article examines William of Ockham’s reaction to Chatton’s theory. Arguing against Chatton’s teleology, Ockham wants to prove that we have good reasons to retain both final causes (as real causes) and final causality.

Recuperando la causa formal sin abandonar la causa eficiente

Resumen: En la primera parte; celebramos la recuperación de la causa formal en la obra de J. Arana Los sótanos del universo como exigencia cada vez mayor de una actualizada filosofía de la naturaleza. En la segunda parte; urgimos a una defensa de la causalidad eficiente; no desaparecida sino aún más interesante en el actual estado de la ciencia.Palabras clave: causa formal; causa eficiente; filosofía de la naturalezaAbstract: First; we celebrate the way J. Arana recovers the formal cause in his work Los sótanos del universo; something increasingly demanded by an updated philosophy of nature. Second; we urge a defense today of the efficient causality; not vanished away but even more relevant in the present state of science.Keywords: Formal Cause; Philosophy of Nature; Efficient Causality.Recibido: 16 de marzo de 2013. Aprobado: 12 de diciembre de 2013.

Efficient Causality in the Actual Intellectual Knowledge According to John Duns Scotus

The subject of causality appears in many of the solutions proposed by Duns Scotus on various philosophical problems, such as voluntary act, and theological problems, as the divine dispensation of grace in the sacraments. This paper shows the kinds of causes and causality which are involved in the actual act of intellection. It focuses on the concept of essential order as the source of the different kinds of causal concurrence, and applies this concept to the act of actual intellection, interpreting it according to the idea of unitas ordinis.

Dispositive Causality and the Art of Medicine

For many philosophers, the relation of medicine to health is exemplary for understanding the relation of human power to nature in general. Drawing on Heidegger and Aquinas, this paper examines the relation of art to nature as it emerges in the second book of Aristotle’s Physics, and it does so by articulating the duality of efficient causality. The art of medicine operates as a dispositive cause rather than as a perfective cause; it removes obstacles to the achievement of health, but it does not impose health. Medicine, on this conception, aids the efficient causality of the natural body rather than substituting for it. The loss of dispositive causality makes efficient causality an imposition of force that bypasses the natural power to achieve natural goods. The paper concludes, with Plato, by arguing that dispositive causality offers a way to understand not only medicine but also governing, teaching, and parenting.

On the Significance of Formal Causes in Spinoza’s Metaphysics

The paper argues for a formal-causal account of Spinoza’s metaphysics. Its basic claim is that neither relations of ideas alone nor efficient causality – especially if interpreted “mechanistically” – articulate the basic sense of the Spinozistic ‘cause’. Instead it is formal causality, as understood by Descartes and other 17

A CAUSALIDADE DO DEUS ARISTOTÉLICO: A PROPÓSITO DA INTERPRETAÇÃO DE ENRICO BERTI A RESPEITO DO PRIMEIRO MOTOR IMÓVEL

Em contraposição a Enrico Berti, este artigo defende a interpretação tradicional de que o primeiro motor imóvel é a causa final da primeira esfera celeste. O artigo está dividido em 6 partes: (i) Apresentamos uma síntese da posição de Enrico Berti, tomando-se por base seus artigos a respeito do assunto em 1997 e 2002. (ii) Traz-se à discussão a compreensão que Aristóteles tem a respeito do movimento circular, a partir de duas passagens da física. Para Berti, o movimento da primeira esfera dificulta a compreensão a respeito dela e do primeiro motor imóvel, (iii) Tomamos em consideração Ética Eudêmia I, 8 enquanto afirmação aristotélica de que nenhuma coisa imóvel pode ser "prática", (iv) Enfocando Metafísica XII, 7, observaremos que Berti não levou em conta uma passagem de De sensu et sensibilibus para interpretar este texto da Metafísica, (v) Ao contrário de Berti, veremos que De caelo II 12 se contrapõe à sua posição, (vi) Apresentaremos por fim a conexão entre a causalidade final e causalidade eficiente do primeiro motor imóvel. Com o apêndice, trazemos uma tradução das listas paralelas de De caelo II 12.ABSTRACT: In contraposition to Enrico Berti, this article defends the traditional interpretation of the first unmoved mover is the ultimate cause of the first celestial sphere. The article is divided into 6 parts: (i) present a summary of the Enrico Berti position, taking as a basis Articles on the subject in 1997 and 2002. (ii) brings to the discussion understanding that Aristotle has about the circular motion, from two physical passages. To Berti, the first ball movement difficult to understand about it and the first unmoved mover, (iii) We consider Ethics Eudêmia I, 8 while Aristotelian claim that no immovable object can be "practical", (iv) Focusing on Metaphysics XII, 7, observe that Berti did not take into account a sensu de passing et sensibilibus to interpret this text of Metaphysics, (v) Unlike Berti, we see that de caelo II 12 is opposed to their position, (vi) will present by end to end connection between causality and efficient causality of the first unmoved mover. With the appendix, we present a translation of parallel lists of De caelo II 12.