Classical philosophy in Novosibirsk Scientific Center. The pages of history

Novosibirsk school of Classics is the most eastern Russian center for the study of the intellectual heritage of the Ancient civilization. At the same time, classical scholars of the Novosibirsk scientific center is well known beyond its borders. The interest of Novosibirsk philosophers covers many areas of classical problems, mainly focusing on their philosophical aspects as well as on ancient history, culture, and science. Among the topics and directions of research are ancient mythopoetic tradition, sophistic movement, Socrates, Plato and the Academy, Platonism in general, Aristotle and the Peripatetic tradition, Hellenistic philosophy, and Late Antiquity. Among the interests characteristic of the Novosibirsk community of classical scholars is the analytical approach to the study of Antiquity, as well as the exceptional attention to such rare for the Russian science topics as ancient music, navigation, and medicine

THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIO-HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT ON GREEK PHILOSOPHY IN THE PERIOD OF EARLY HELLENISM: STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND BASIC APPROACHES TO ITS SOLUTION

The article deals with the problem of the influence of the political development of Greece on the early Hellenistic philosophy. The main approaches to solving this problem are shown. The traditional approach goes back to G. W. F. Hegel and E. Zeller. This approach is based on the idea of changing the nature of Greek philosophy in the conditions of the formation of Hellenistic monarchies and the decline of the polis in the period of early Hellenism. The tendency to alienation of the individual from society comes to the fore in the philosophical teachings of Hellenism. Another approach, presented in the works of P. Hadot and E. Brown, is based on the position on the preservation of the polis in the period of early Hellenism and, as a result, the tendency to political activity in Greek philosophy. The one- sidedness of these approaches is shown.

The place of Philo of Alexandria in the history of philosophy

Philo of Alexandria (ca. 20 B.C.E. -50 C.E.), or Philo Judaeus as he is also called, was a Jewish scholar, philosopher, politician, and author who lived in Alexandria and who has had a tremendous influence through his works (mostly on the Christian exegesis and theology). Today hardly any scholar of Second Temple Judaism, early Christianity, or Hellenistic philosophy sees any great imperative in arguing for his relevance. After the research (contribution) of V. Nikiprowetzky in the field of philonic studies, it seems that the prevailing view is that Philo should be regarded above all as an “exegete “. Such an opinion in one way or another seems to neglect to some extent Philo's place in the History of philosophy. This article defends the position that Philo should be considered primarily as a “hermeneut”. Emphasizing that the concept of hermeneutics has a broader meaning (especially in the context of antiquity) than the narrower and more specialized concept of exegesis.

Cicero’s Philosophical Works

Cicero (106–43 bce) was a Roman statesman, orator, and philosopher. As well as speeches, letters, and rhetorical treatises, Cicero wrote numerous philosophical works. These can be divided into two periods—those written before the civil war between Julius Caesar and Pompey the Great (pre-49 bce), and those written during and after it (46 bce onward). Those written before are in dialogue form and the central topics are political: the ideal orator (De Oratore), the best citizen and the best state (De Re Publica), the best laws (De Legibus). Those following are predominately part of an ambitious project to bring philosophy to Rome in a systematic fashion; they are also mainly in dialogue form. Cicero composed an exhortation to philosophy (Hortensius), followed by books on epistemology (Academica, Lucullus) and works on broadly ethical concerns—the nature of good and evil (De Finibus); honor and glory (De Gloria); old age and friendship (De Senectute, De Amicitia); the soul, death, and suffering (Tusculans); consolation (Consolatio); the nature of the gods, divination, and providence (De Natura Deorum, De Divinatione, De Fato). Cicero’s final philosophical work is the De Officiis, presented as a letter to his son. Philosophy also figures prominently throughout Cicero’s letters, speeches, and rhetorical works. Indeed, it should be noted that Cicero felt his rhetorical works Orator and Brutus should be included in his philosophical corpus (Div. 2.4). There are two schools of thought on the novelty and value of Cicero’s philosophical works: (1) he is essentially just repackaging Greek material in Latin, offering renditions of existing ideas that are invaluable for saving much of the lost tradition of Hellenistic philosophy; (2) he is doing something more than that, developing distinctive philosophical contributions of his own. Most recent studies stress the innovative elements of Cicero’s philosophical thinking. Cicero’s own philosophical convictions are varied. Stoicism figures largely, as does his sympathy with Plato, Aristotle, and the Academic and Peripatetic traditions that follow them. He is strongly anti-Epicurean in both periods of his philosophical activity. Most scholars maintain that he is a pragmatic and flexible Academic skeptic, who weighs both sides of every argument and gives his assent to whatever he finds most compelling given the particular circumstances. Ostensibly a lack of political opportunity motivated Cicero to write philosophy. In the prefaces to his philosophical works he insists that it is not an escape from politics, but an intervention in it by other means.

Introduction

The cluster of problems around freedom, determinism, and moral responsibility is one of those themes in philosophy that are fascinating in both their complexity and their seemingly direct relevance to human life. Historians of ideas often assume that in Western philosophy this cluster of problems was the subject of an ongoing discourse from antiquity to the present day. This is, however, an illusion. Much of my research on ancient theories of determinism and freedom is devoted to showing that what commonly counts as this problem cluster today (often labelled as ‘the problem of free will and determinism’) is noticeably distinct from the issues that the ancients discussed—at least prior to the second century CE. It is true that one main component of the ancient discussion concerned the question of how moral accountability can be consistently combined with certain causal factors that impact human behaviour. However, it is not true that the ancient problems involved the questions of the compatibility of causal determinism with either our ability to do otherwise or a human faculty of a free will. Instead, we encounter questions about human autonomous agency and its compatibility with preceding causes, external or internal; with external impediments; with divine predetermination and theological questions; with physical theories like atomism and continuum theory, and with sciences more generally; with elements that determine character development from childhood—nature and nurture; with epistemic features such as ignorance of circumstances; with necessity and modal theories generally; with folk theories of fatalism; and also with questions of how human autonomous agency is related to moral development, to virtue and wisdom, to blame and praise. All these questions were discussed without reference to freedom to do otherwise or a faculty of the will—at least in Classical and Hellenistic philosophy. This volume of essays considers all of these questions to some extent....

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

This volume assembles nine of the author’s essays on determinism, freedom, and moral responsibility in Western antiquity, ranging from Aristotle via the Epicureans and Stoics to the third century. It is representative of the author’s overall scholarship on the topic, much of which emphasizes that what commonly counts as ‘the problem of free will and determinism’ is noticeably distinct from the issues the ancients discussed. It is true that one main component of the ancient discourse concerned the question how moral accountability can be consistently combined with certain causal factors that impact human behaviour. However, it is not true that the ancient problems involved the questions of the compatibility of causal determinism with our ability to do otherwise or with free will. Instead, we encounter questions about human rational and autonomous agency and their compatibility with preceding causes, external or internal; with external impediments; with divine predetermination and theological questions; with physical theories like atomism and continuum theory, and with sciences more generally; with elements that determine character development from childhood, such as nature and nurture; with epistemic features such as ignorance of circumstances; with necessity and modal theories generally; with folk theories of fatalism; and also with questions of how human autonomous agency is related to moral development, to virtue and wisdom, to blame and praise. In Classical and Hellenistic philosophy, these questions were all debated without reference to freedom to do otherwise or free will—. This volume considers all of these questions to some extent.

Epicurus on Justice ‘In Itself’ (καθ᾽ ἑαυτό) (Kuria Doxa 33)

This paper is a commentary on Epicurus’ Kuria Doxa (KD) 33, according to which “justice is not anything in itself [τι καθ᾽ ἑαυτό].” It explores what it means for something to exist ‘in itself’ in Hellenistic philosophy, speculating on the sources of Epicurean technical vocabulary and suggesting an ontological reading of KD 33.