Associations Between a New York City Paid Sick Leave Mandate and Health Care Utilization Among Medicaid Beneficiaries in New York City and New York State

AbstractNew York State, in particular the New York City metropolitan area, was the early epicenter of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic in the United States. Similar to initial pandemic dynamics in many metropolitan areas, multiple introductions from various locations appear to have contributed to the swell of positive cases. However, representation and analysis of samples from New York regions outside the greater New York City area were lacking, as were SARS-CoV-2 genomes from the earliest cases associated with the Westchester County outbreak, which represents the first outbreak recorded in New York State. The Wadsworth Center, the public health laboratory of New York State, sought to characterize the transmission dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 across the entire state of New York from March to September with the addition of over 600 genomes from under-sampled and previously unsampled New York counties and to more fully understand the breadth of the initial outbreak in Westchester County. Additional sequencing confirmed the dominance of B.1 and descendant lineages (collectively referred to as B.1.X) in New York State. Community structure, phylogenetic, and phylogeographic analyses suggested that the Westchester outbreak was associated with continued transmission of the virus throughout the state, even after travel restrictions and the on-pause measures of March, contributing to a substantial proportion of the B.1 transmission clusters as of September 30th, 2020.

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New York City’s Brownfield Redevelopment Program: Economic Catalyst or Taxpayer Giveaway?

Journal of Environment and Ecology ◽

10.5296/jee.v12i2.18663 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 12 (2) ◽

pp. 1

Author(s):

Tatyiana Gordon

Keyword(s):

New York ◽

New York City ◽

York City ◽

Financial Incentives ◽

New York State ◽

Property Values ◽

Environmental Conservation ◽

Hazardous Substances ◽

York State Department ◽

York State

The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) and the New York City Office of Environmental Remediation (OER) manage and coordinate brownfield cleanup programs. These are intended to promote environmental restoration and redevelopment of underutilized or abandoned properties that have been affected by the presence or discharges of oil or hazardous substances. This paper seeks to determine whether these programs have achieved the goals and objectives sought by decision makers and if the cost of those achievements in terms of public money subsidies and forgone tax revenue have been commensurate with the realized benefits.The DEC brownfield program offers financial incentives, such as tax credits, as well as regulatory benefits (limited liability protections) to promote alternatives to greenfield development. OER efforts are New York City centric with incentives divided into three sectors: procedural, legal, and financial with a major goal of reducing remedial (cleanup) timeframes. To evaluate the effectiveness of the New York City Brownfield program changes in property values over time were evaluated. The five New York City counties experiencing the two highest percent increases in property values also claimed the highest brownfield credits. Queens and Brooklyn received most brownfield credits during this period but also experienced the most redevelopment. These and other data illustrate a return on the brownfield investment (ROBI) credit of about one to six; or one dollar in brownfield credit stimulating six dollars in project spending. New York City counties’ ROBI is consistent with all other New York State County ROBI’s: roughly six dollars in redevelopment activity being stimulated by one dollar in brownfield credit. The roughly $6 ROBI presented here is similar to ROI’s for other public services such as disease prevention and incarceration intervention.

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Prescription opioid related deaths in New York City: a 2 year retrospective analysis prior to the introduction of the New York State I-STOP law

Forensic Science Medicine and Pathology ◽

10.1007/s12024-015-9699-z ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 11 (3) ◽

pp. 388-394 ◽

Cited By ~ 9

Author(s):

Anthony Sgarlato ◽

Stephen J. deRoux

Keyword(s):

New York ◽

New York City ◽

Retrospective Analysis ◽

York City ◽

New York State ◽

Prescription Opioid ◽

York State

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IMPACT OF TIMING OF PHYSICAL THERAPY ON HEALTH CARE UTILIZATION AND COSTS AMONG PATIENTS WITH ACUTE LOW BACK PAIN: EVIDENCE FROM NEW YORK STATE

Value in Health ◽

10.1016/j.jval.2016.03.1118 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 19 (3) ◽

pp. A240

Author(s):

X. Liu ◽

W. Hanney ◽

M. Masaracchio

Keyword(s):

Health Care ◽

New York ◽

Low Back Pain ◽

Back Pain ◽

Physical Therapy ◽

New York State ◽

Care Utilization ◽

Low Back ◽

York State ◽

Acute Low Back Pain

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The Borrower's Tale: A History of Poor Debtors inLochnerEra New York City

Law and History Review ◽

10.1017/s0738248012000533 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 30 (4) ◽

pp. 1053-1098 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Anne Fleming

Keyword(s):

New York ◽

New York City ◽

Interest Rate ◽

York City ◽

New York State ◽

York State ◽

Lower Manhattan ◽

History Of ◽

Office Manager

When asked why he did not read over the loan documents before signing them, John Doherty explained: “I was anxious to get the money, I didn't bother about it.” In February 1910, the twenty-three-year-old railroad clerk walked into the offices of the Chesterkirk Company, a loan-sharking operation with offices in lower Manhattan. He was looking to borrow some money. Repayment was guaranteed by the only security Doherty had to offer: his prospective wages and, in his words, his “reputation.” After a brief investigation of Doherty's creditworthiness, the loan was approved. The office manager placed a cross in lead pencil at the bottom of a lengthy form and Doherty signed where indicated. He received $34.85 in exchange for his promise to repay the loan principal plus $10.15 in combined fees and interest in three months. The interest charged was significantly greater than the 6 percent per year allowed in New York State. Doherty's effective annualized interest rate, including fees, was over 100 percent.

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