Moving from the conceptual to the substantive, this chapter refines our account of jurisdiction based on a concept of power and argues that it is best understood as political power in particular, as opposed to coercion. I argue that political power in this context should be conceptualised to denote the ability of public institutions to determine how individual powers are transformed. That is, political power is the ability of public institutions to mediate the abilities of individuals into a different set of abilities. As such, it is constitutive of and necessary for public institutions, it affects individuals because it provides the very framework for them to pursue their lives in equality, and it is virtually unavoidable. The exercise of political power results in non-exclusive control on particular states of affairs in the area of the rights outlined in any given treaty. The vehicle through which this power is manifested is the choice and application of rules. Political power so understood is the best approximation of a factual position to guarantee equality, which, as we have seen in Chapter 2, is what justifies human rights obligations of public institutions in the first place.
The Best Approximation of an Objective State With a Given Set of Quantum States
