The relationship between political relations with audit quality and auditor industry expertise

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jalil Khaksar ◽  
Mahdi Salehi ◽  
Mahmoud Lari Dashtbayaz
2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hsin-Yi Chi ◽  
Chen-Lung Chin

SUMMARY This paper first examines whether the Big 4 audit quality is associated with auditor industry expertise, measured as both individual partner- and audit firm-level leadership. We focus on a sample of listed firms in Taiwan, where audit reports must be audited and signed by the two signing auditors as well as by an audit firm. For accruals analyses, we find that differential discretionary accruals due to industry expertise are driven by a combination of firm and partner expertise. For audit opinion analyses, we find that differential likelihood of a modified audit opinion (hereafter, MAO) is primarily attributable to signing auditor specialists. We also find that firm-level specialists alone are not associated with a higher likelihood of issuing a MAO. However, firm-level specialists, in combination with signing auditor specialists, can add something over and above the effects of the signing auditor specialists alone. Second, we further examine whether there is differential audit quality between signing auditors (i.e., lead and concurring auditors). We find that clients of lead signing auditor specialists, either alone or in conjunction with concurring auditor specialists, have smaller accruals and are more likely to receive a MAO compared to those of nonspecialists. However, concurring auditor specialists alone are not associated with higher audit quality, in terms of either smaller accruals or a higher MAO likelihood. Thus, we conclude that industry expertise is not homogeneous across individual auditors within the same audit firm in Taiwan. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources identified in the text.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jalil Khaksar ◽  
Mahdi Salehi ◽  
Mahmoud Lari DashtBayaz

Purpose This study aims to assess the relationship between political connections, auditor characteristics (audit quality and industry specialization) and auditors’ intrinsic characteristics (narcissism) in listed firms on the Tehran Stock Exchange. In other words, this paper attempts to answer the question “whether political connections, audit quality and industry specialization contribute to the growth of narcissism and overconfidence of auditors of listed firms on the Tehran Stock Exchange or not.” Design/methodology/approach A multivariate regression model is used for hypothesis testing. The study’s hypotheses were also examined using a sample of 768-year firm listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2013–2018 and by using the multiple regression pattern. Findings The obtained results indicate a negative and significant association between political relations, narcissism and overconfidence. The auditor’s overconfidence will go down by increasing political relations. Moreover, the results show a positive and significant relationship between audit quality, industry specialization and narcissism. On the other hand, to the best of authors’ knowledge, this study measured, for the first time, the severity of political connections by using the exploratory factor analysis of eight variables (long-term liabilities, firm size, financial leverage, export, human resources, major governmental shareholders, board members affiliated to the government and institutional ownership). Originality/value The authors figured out that few studies carried out, so far, in the emergent markets on political connections and their impacts on narcissism and overconfidence of auditors, so this paper aims to assess the effect of such a phenomenon in the emergent markets and contributes to the development of knowledge and science in this field.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Sansaloni Butar-Butar ◽  
Stefani Lily Indarto Lily Indarto

This study examines the role of specialist auditors in enhancing the quality of financial statements by taking into account industry complexity. The test of hypotheses are conducted in two steps. The first step is to provide evidence that earnings quality, measured by earnings persistent, of firms operating in the complex and non-complex industry are different. The second step is to compare the absolute abnormal accruals of companies engaged in the complex industry with those from non-complex industry audited by non-specialist and specialists auditors. Results show: 1) earnings persistence of firms in complex industries are lower than those in non-complex industries. 2) absolute abnormal accruals of firms operating in complex industries are higher than those in non-complex industries regardless industry specialization. Overall, the results suggest that auditor industry expertise does not play a significant role in improving the quality of audited earnings in complex business environ­ment.


Author(s):  
Arifur Khan ◽  
Dessalegn Getie Mihret ◽  
Mohammad Badrul Muttakin

Purpose The effect of political connections of agency costs has attracted considerable research attention due to the increasing recognition of the fact that political connection influences corporate decisions and outcomes. This paper aims to explore the association between corporate political connections and agency cost and examine whether audit quality moderates this association. Design/methodology/approach A data set of Bangladeshi listed non-financial companies is used. A usable sample of 968 firm-year observations was drawn for the period from 2005 to 2013. Asset utilisation ratio, the interaction of Tobin’s Q and free cash flow and expense ratio are used as alternative proxies for agency costs; membership to Big 4 audit firms or local associates of Big 4 firms is used as a proxy for audit quality. Findings Results show that politically connected firms exhibit higher agency costs than their unconnected counterparts, and audit quality moderates the relationship between political connection and agency costs. The results of this paper suggest the importance of audit quality to mitigate agency problem in an emerging economic setting. Research limitations/implications The findings of this paper could be of interest to regulators wishing to focus regulatory effort on significant issues influencing stock market efficiency. The findings could also inform auditors in directing audit effort through a more complete assessment of risk and determining reasonable levels of audit fees. Finally, results could inform financial statement users to direct investments to firms with lower agency costs. Originality/value To the knowledge of the authors, this study is one of the first to explore the relationship between political connection and agency costs, and the moderating effect of audit quality of this relationship.


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