Firm versus Partner Measures of Auditor Industry Expertise and Effects on Auditor Quality

2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hsin-Yi Chi ◽  
Chen-Lung Chin

SUMMARY This paper first examines whether the Big 4 audit quality is associated with auditor industry expertise, measured as both individual partner- and audit firm-level leadership. We focus on a sample of listed firms in Taiwan, where audit reports must be audited and signed by the two signing auditors as well as by an audit firm. For accruals analyses, we find that differential discretionary accruals due to industry expertise are driven by a combination of firm and partner expertise. For audit opinion analyses, we find that differential likelihood of a modified audit opinion (hereafter, MAO) is primarily attributable to signing auditor specialists. We also find that firm-level specialists alone are not associated with a higher likelihood of issuing a MAO. However, firm-level specialists, in combination with signing auditor specialists, can add something over and above the effects of the signing auditor specialists alone. Second, we further examine whether there is differential audit quality between signing auditors (i.e., lead and concurring auditors). We find that clients of lead signing auditor specialists, either alone or in conjunction with concurring auditor specialists, have smaller accruals and are more likely to receive a MAO compared to those of nonspecialists. However, concurring auditor specialists alone are not associated with higher audit quality, in terms of either smaller accruals or a higher MAO likelihood. Thus, we conclude that industry expertise is not homogeneous across individual auditors within the same audit firm in Taiwan. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources identified in the text.

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (12) ◽  
pp. 6924
Author(s):  
Mihai Carp ◽  
Costel Istrate

We have estimated the impact of some characteristics of the auditors and of the audited companies on audit quality for the Romanian listed firms (943 observations for the 2007–2019 period), using as a proxy for the audit quality the level of discretionary accruals, measured following the Jones (1991) model, and the accruals quality, estimated through the Dechow and Dichey (2002) model. These dependent variables have been related to variables that reflect both the characteristics of the audit firm (for example, Big 4 membership) and the characteristics of the audited firms (dimension, financial leverage, accounting standards applied, growth and profitability). Our results show that the auditor’s Big 4 membership contributes to an increase in discretionary accruals, decreasing the quality of the audit. The transition to IFRS did not have a significant influence on the quality of the audit. The audit opinion may have an effect on the discretionary accruals and the accruals quality in the sense that a modified opinion leads to an increase in the quality of the audit in the following financial year(s).


2016 ◽  
Vol 92 (1) ◽  
pp. 183-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lauren C. Reid ◽  
Joseph V. Carcello

ABSTRACT The PCAOB recently considered implementing mandatory audit firm rotation in hopes of better aligning auditors' interests with investors' interests, suggesting that the PCAOB views long auditor tenure as problematic. However, the accounting profession argues that long tenure actually improves audit quality. This study provides insight into investors' views by evaluating the market's reaction to events related to the potential adoption of rotation that occurred between 2011 and 2013. The results provide some evidence that the market reacts negatively (positively) to events that increased (decreased) the likelihood of rotation, although these results are sensitive to the market index used to calculate abnormal returns. More importantly, particularly given the lack of a U.S.-specific control group, cross-sectional tests provide strong evidence that the market reaction is more negative (positive) on dates that increased (decreased) the likelihood of rotation given longer auditor tenure. Moreover, we also find that the market reaction is more negative (positive) on dates that increased (decreased) the likelihood of rotation given a Big 4 auditor. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the text.


2015 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 97-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu-Ting Hsieh ◽  
Chan-Jane Lin

SUMMARY This study examines whether auditor industry expertise affects firms' client acceptance decisions. Analyzing listed firms in Taiwan, where audit partners' signatures are disclosed on the audit report, we find that partner-level industry specialists, rather than firm-level industry specialists, are less likely to accept clients with higher audit risk. We also provide weak evidence that partner-level industry specialists are less likely to accept clients with higher financial risk. This is consistent with the notion that partner-level industry specialists have an incentive to protect their reputation when making client acceptance decisions. In 2002, following the spirit of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), the Securities and Futures Commission in Taiwan adopted a series of new rules to improve audit quality. We examine the effect of SOX on client acceptance decisions and the results indicate that partner-level industry specialists manage risk by accepting clients with less audit risk since litigation risk increased after SOX.


Accounting ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 951-964 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonius Herusetya ◽  
Meiliana Jaunanda

This study investigates the association of industry specialization at the engagement partner level and audit firm level with aggressive earnings management and modified audit opinion. The study employs a sample of 570 firm-year observations of manufacturing industries on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2014 to 2018 using a binary logistic regression model. First, this study finds no evidence of a relationship between industry specialization at the engagement partner level and audit firm level with aggressive discretionary accruals. Furthermore, the author finds evidence of a positive association between industry specialization at the audit firm level and aggressive real earnings management due to high audit quality. Finally, the study finds evidence that industry specialization at audit firm level is likely to issue modified audit opinion. This study contributes to the study of industry specialization at the engagement partner level and audit firm level, which is rarely performed in Indonesia. Policy makers and capital market players might learn some lessons from the audit quality of external auditors with industry specialists as the gatekeeper of the capital market. Moreover, this study has provided a valuable perspective to practitioners, researchers, and policy makers in other emerging markets regarding the quality of industry specialization at the partner and audit firm level.


2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Baugh ◽  
Jeff P. Boone ◽  
Inder K. Khurana ◽  
K. K. Raman

SUMMARY We examine the consequences of misconduct in a Big 4 firm's nonaudit practice for its audit practice. Specifically, we examine whether KPMG's audit practice suffered a loss of audit fees and clients and/or a decline in factual audit quality following the 2005 deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) with the Department of Justice for marketing questionable tax shelters. We find little evidence that the DPA adversely impacted KPMG's audit practice by way of either audit fees or the likelihood of client gains/losses, suggesting little or no harm to KPMG's audit reputation. We also find that the DPA had no effect on the firm's factual audit quality, even for those audit clients that dropped KPMG as their tax service provider. Collectively, our findings suggest that there was no spillover effect from the DPA to KPMG's audit practice. Data Availability: All data are publicly available.


2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 131-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick J. Hurley ◽  
Brian W. Mayhew

SUMMARY We insert an automated high-quality (HQ) auditor into established experimental audit markets to test the impact of high-quality competition on other auditors' supply of and managers' demand for audit quality. Theory predicts that managers will demand high levels of audit quality to avoid investors' price-protecting behavior. This demand should result in the HQ auditor dominating the market and increase other auditors' audit quality provision to compete with the HQ auditor. However, we find that the HQ auditor does not dominate the market—despite holding audit costs constant and investors placing a premium on HQ auditor reports. We also find that adding an HQ auditor results in other auditors lowering audit quality. Additional analyses indicate some managers demand lower audit quality to avoid negative audit reports, consistent with loss aversion as a potential explanation. Our findings indicate a need to develop a more comprehensive theory of the demand for auditing. Data Availability: The laboratory market data used in this study are available from the authors upon request.


2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Joe ◽  
Arnold Wright, and ◽  
Sally Wright

SUMMARY We present evidence on the resolution of proposed audit adjustments during a unique time period, immediately following several U.S. financial scandals and surrounding calls for reforms in auditing and financial reporting, which culminated in the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). During this period, auditors and their clients faced increased scrutiny from investors and regulators. In addition, auditors had to contend with changed incentives, a new external regulator (i.e., the PCAOB), and upcoming annual PCAOB inspections. We extend prior studies by considering a broader range of factors potentially impacting the resolution of proposed adjustments, including the effect of client tenure, strength of internal controls, and repeat adjustments. Data on 458 proposed adjustments are obtained from the working papers of a sample of 163 audit engagements conducted during 2002 by a Big 4 firm. We find that 24.2 percent of proposed adjustments were subsequently waived. The results indicate audit adjustments are more likely to be waived for clients with whom the audit firm has had a longer relationship, although the pattern does not reflect favoring such clients. We also find that adjustments are more likely to be waived for repeat adjustments. Data Availability: Due to a confidentiality agreement with the participating audit firm the data are proprietary.


2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryan K. Church ◽  
Lori B. Shefchik

SYNOPSIS The purpose of this paper is to analyze the PCAOB's inspection reports of large, annually inspected accounting firms. The inspection reports identify audit deficiencies that have implications for audit quality. By examining the inspection reports in detail, we can identify the nature and severity of audit deficiencies; we can track the total number of deficiencies over time; and we can pinpoint common, recurring audit deficiencies. We focus on large accounting firms because they play a dominant role in the marketplace (i.e., they audit public companies that comprise approximately 99 percent of U.S.-based issuer market capitalization). We document a significant, downward linear trend in the number of deficiencies from 2004 to 2009. We also identify common, recurring audit deficiencies, determine the financial statement accounts most often impacted by audit deficiencies, and isolate the primary emphasis of the financial statement impacted. Our findings generally are consistent comparing Big 4 and second-tier accounting firms, though a few differences emerge. In addition, we make comparisons with findings that have been documented for small, triennially inspected firms. Data Availability: The data are available from public sources.


2021 ◽  
Vol 36 (8) ◽  
pp. 1068-1091
Author(s):  
Yun Cheng ◽  
Christine M. Haynes ◽  
Michael D. Yu

Purpose Auditing studies have shifted the research focus from the audit firm level to the individual audit partner level in recent years. Motivated by the call from Lennox and Wu (2018) to explore the effect of audit partners’ characteristics on audit quality in the US, this study aims to develop a new measure of engagement partner workload (EPW), which includes both the size and number of clients audited to test the effect of EPW on audit quality. This study also examines the moderating effect of the partner firm size on audit quality. Design/methodology/approach To test the effect of the EPW on audit quality, this study runs multivariate regressions of EPW on each specific client’s discretionary accruals and audit report delays. This study also runs a logistic regression of EPW on clients’ probability of having small profit increases to meet performance benchmarks. Findings Results of the hypotheses show that partner workload is positively related to audit quality. The results indicate that partners with larger, but fewer, clients conduct higher quality audits. Further analysis indicates that the relationship between partner workload and audit quality only holds for partners from the non-Big 4 firms. Originality/value This study contributes to the literatures of both audit quality and audit partner characteristics, and the results complement initial research aimed at identifying US partner-related characteristics that influence audit quality.


2014 ◽  
Vol 90 (2) ◽  
pp. 405-441 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff P. Boone ◽  
Inder K. Khurana ◽  
K. K. Raman

ABSTRACT We examine whether the December 2007 PCAOB disciplinary order against Deloitte affected Deloitte's switching risk, audit fees, and audit quality relative to the other Big 4 firms over a three-year period following the censure. Our findings suggest that the PCAOB censure was associated with a decrease in Deloitte's ability to retain clients and attract new clients, and a decrease in Deloitte's audit fee growth rates. However, methodologies used in extant archival studies yield little or no evidence to suggest that Deloitte's audit quality was different from that of the other Big 4 firms during a three-year window either before or after the censure. Overall, our results suggest that the PCAOB censure imposed actual costs on Deloitte. Data Availability: All data are publicly available.


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