AbstractLocal norms and shared beliefs in cohesive social groups regulate individual behavior in everyday economic life. I use a door-to-door field experiment where a hundred and twenty villagers recruited from twenty-three communities in a Japanese rural mountainous village play a simultaneous prisoner’s dilemma game. To examine whether a set of experiences shared through interactions among community members affect experimental behavior, I compare villagers’ behavior under in-community and out-community random matching protocols. I also report a counterpart laboratory experiment with seventy-two university student subjects to address the external validity of laboratory experiments. The findings are three-fold. First, almost full cooperation is achieved when villagers play a prisoner’s dilemma game with their anonymous community members. Second, cooperation is significantly higher within the in-group compared to the out-group treatment in both the laboratory and field experiments. Third, although a significant treatment effect of social group membership is preserved, a big difference in the average cooperation rates is observed between the laboratory and field.
Purpose
The aim of the paper is to analyze the impact of cooperativeness of managers who occupy central positions in interaction networks on the performance and stress levels of a whole organization.
Design/methodology/approach
To explore this relationship, a multi-parameter agent-based model is proposed which implements the prisoner’s dilemma game approach on a scale-free network in the NetLogo environment. A description of the socioeconomic aspects and the key concepts implemented in the model is provided. Stability and correctness have been tested through a series of validation experiments, including sensitivity analysis. The source code is available for further exploration and testing.
Findings
The simulations revealed that improving the stress resistance of all employees moderately increases organizational performance. Analyzing managers’ roles showed that increasing only the stress resistance of managers does not account for significantly higher overall performance. However, a substantial increase in organizational performance and a decrease in stress levels are achieved when managers are unconditionally cooperative. This effect is stronger for the lowered stress resistance of employees. Therefore, the willingness of managers to cooperate under all circumstances can be a key factor in achieving better performance and building a more pleasant, stress-free working environment.
Originality/value
This paper aims to present a model for analyzing cooperation, specifically in the organizational context, extending the prisoner’s dilemma with novel concepts and mechanisms. Although the results confirm the existing theories about the importance of central nodes in complex networks, they also provide further details on how the cooperative behavior of central nodes (i.e. the managers) might benefit the organization.
Two studies examined how envy influences prosocial and antisocial behavior. In Experiment 1, participants in an envious state (relative to a neutral state) were less helpful: They picked up fewer dropped pencils in their immediate vicinity. We expanded upon these findings by examining how envy affected both helping and harming behavior in a competitive scenario. In Experiment 2, individuals in envious or neutral states assigned puzzle tasks to another student in a prisoner’s dilemma style scenario. Prosocial and antisocial behaviors were assessed via the difficulty of the assigned puzzles (easy puzzles were considered helpful and difficult puzzles were harmful). We hypothesized that experiencing envy would result in greater motive to harm as well as greater likelihood of engaging in harmful behavior. The hypothesis was supported, suggesting that envy has detrimental ramifications that go beyond the individual and extend to interpersonal relationships.
In this paper we explore the impact of imitation rules on players' long-run behaviors in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games. All players sit sequentially and equally spaced around a circle. Players are assumed to interact only with their neighbors, and to imitate either their successful neighbors and/or themselves or the successful actions taken by their neighbors and/or themselves. In the imitating-successful-player dynamics, full defection is the unique long-run equilibrium as the probability of players' experimentations (or mutations) tend to 0. By contrast, full cooperation could emerge in the long run under the imitating-successful-action dynamics. Moreover, it is discovered that the convergence rate to equilibrium under local interaction could be slower than that under global interaction.
The outcome of centralized equilibrium, prisoner's dilemma equilibrium, and decentralized equilibrium under different decision models has been provided with regards to bilateral competing supply chain system, either side of which is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. Theoretical analysis indicates a positive correlation between price and one's own advertising investment level and a negative correlation between price and the opponent's advertising investment level. Through analysis of numerical examples, the results reveal a first mover advantage that leads to prisoner's dilemma in the system as well as the impact that price and advertising competition intensity has on the supply chain's choice of decision model.
Is a PD game still a dilemma for Japanese rural villagers? A field and laboratory comparison of the impact of social group membership on cooperation
