Symbolic Semantics for the Verification of Security Properties of Mobile Petri Nets

Author(s):  
Fernando Rosa-Velardo ◽  
David de Frutos-Escrig
2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 50-65
Author(s):  
Yujian Fu ◽  
Jeffery Kulick ◽  
Lok K. Yan ◽  
Steven Drager

Multi-million gate system-on-chip (SoC) designs easily fit into today’s Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). As FPGAs become more common in safety-critical and mission-critical systems, researchers and designers require information flow guarantees for the FPGAs. Tools for designing a secure system of chips (SOCs) using FPGAs and new techniques to manage and analyze the security properties precisely are desirable. In this work we propose a formal approach to model, analyze and verify a typical set of security properties – noninterference – of Handel C programs using Petri Nets and model checking. This paper presents a method to model Handel C programs using Predicate Transition Nets, a type of Petri Net, and define security properties on the model, plus a verification approach where security properties are checked. Three steps are used. First, a formal specification on the Handel C description using Petri Nets is extracted. Second, the dynamic noninterference properties with respect to the Handel C program statements are defined on the model. To assist in verification, a translation rule from the Petri Nets specification to the Maude programming language is also defined. Thus, the formal specification can be verified against the system properties using model checking. A case study of the pipeline multiplier is discussed to illustrate the concept and validate the approach.


2001 ◽  
Vol 8 (13) ◽  
Author(s):  
Federico Crazzolara ◽  
Glynn Winskel

<p>The events of a security protocol and their causal dependency<br />can play an important role in the analysis of security properties.<br /> This insight underlies both strand spaces and the inductive<br />method. But neither of these approaches builds up the events of<br />a protocol in a compositional way, so that there is an informal<br />spring from the protocol to its model. By broadening the models<br />to certain kinds of Petri nets, a restricted form of contextual nets,<br />a compositional event-based semantics is given to an economical,<br />but expressive, language for describing security protocols; so the<br />events and dependency of a wide range of protocols are determined<br /> once and for all. The net semantics is formally related to a<br />transition semantics, strand spaces and inductive rules, as well as<br />trace languages and event structures, so unifying a range of <br />approaches, as well as providing conditions under which particular,<br />more limited, models are adequate for the analysis of protocols.<br />The net semantics allows the derivation of general properties and<br />proof principles which are demonstrated in establishing an <br />authentication property, following a diagrammatic style of proof.</p>


Author(s):  
Rosemarie Yagoda ◽  
Michael D. Coovert

1988 ◽  
Vol 135 (4) ◽  
pp. 239 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Duggan ◽  
J. Browne
Keyword(s):  

1995 ◽  
Vol 115 (7) ◽  
pp. 914-919
Author(s):  
Kazuyuki Mori ◽  
Makoto Tsukiyama ◽  
Toyoo Fukuda

2009 ◽  
Vol 129 (5) ◽  
pp. 455-461 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xinhong Hei ◽  
Sei Takahashi ◽  
Hideo Nakamura
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Д.Э.Я. Окаи ◽  
D.E.Ya. Okai ◽  
А.Ю. Клюшин ◽  
A.Yu. Klyushin ◽  
В.Н. Богатиков ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Satoru OCHIIWA ◽  
Satoshi TAOKA ◽  
Masahiro YAMAUCHI ◽  
Toshimasa WATANABE

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