Formal Verification of CHAP PPP authentication Protocol for Smart City/Safe City Applications.

A smart city is a technologically advanced metropolitan region with several connected devices that collects data using various electronic technologies, voice activation methods, and sensors. The information obtained from the data is utilised to efficiently manage assets, resources, and services; in turn, the data is used to enhance operations throughout the city. Achieving security for smart cities is one of the major challenges as the number of connected devices increases the vulnerability also increases. The security of a smart city system depends on the reliability of the security protocols used by the security systems. To design and develop a highly secure system for a smart city the security protocols used must be highly reliable. To prove the reliability of a security protocol the validation technique is not desirable because of its several drawbacks, these drawbacks can be overcome using the formal verification technique which provides the mathematical proof for its correctness. In this work, The Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol Point-to-Point (CHAP PPP) which is more commonly used in PPP authentication of smart cities is formally verified using the well-known verification technique known as the model checking technique. The Scyther model checker is the tool used to build the abstract security protocol model.

Model Checking M2M and Centralised IOT authentication Protocols.

It is very difficult to develop a perfect security protocol for communication over the IoT network and developing a reliable authentication protocol requires a detailed understanding of cryptography. To ensure the reliability of security protocols of IoT, the validation method is not a good choice because of its several disadvantages and limitations. To prove the high reliability of Cryptographic Security Protocols(CSP) for IoT networks, the functional correctness of security protocols must be proved secure mathematically. Using the Formal Verification technique we can prove the functional correctness of IoT security protocols by providing the proofs mathematically. In this work, The CoAP Machine to Machine authentication protocol and centralied IoT network Authentication Protocol RADIUS is formally verified using the well-known verification technique known as model checking technique and we have used the Scyther model checker for the verification of security properties of the respective protocols. The abstract protocol models of the IoT authentication protocols were specified in the security protocol description language and the security requirements of the authentication protocols were specified as claim events.

Secure Information Transfer Using Two Keyless Cryptography Methods

In the current paper, some methods of information security protocols based on physical layer security are considered. It is proved that well known Shamir’s protocol can be applied to RSA cryptosystem but not to Rabin, Mac-Ellice and trellis based cryptosystems.The main stream of this paper is a description of key sharing protocol on constant public and noiseless channels (like Internet). It is shown that it is able to provide a high reliability and control of security in terms of Shannon’s information providing nothing-additional requirements to communication channels and without any cryptographic assumptions.

THE TRANSPORT LAYER OF THE ISO/OSI MODEL IN COM­PUTER NETWORKS

Background. The transport layer is designed to deliver data without errors, losses and duplication in the order in which they were transmitted. It provides data transfer between two applications with the required level of reliability. Transport layer protocols, which guarantee reliable data delivery, establish a virtual connection before data exchange and resend segments in case of loss or damage. The aim of the study was to determine the role of transport security protocols in computer networks. Materials and methods. To achieve the goal, the study used statistical analysis and a systematic approach. Results. TCP provides reliable message transmission through the formation of logical connections, while allowing peers on the sending computer and the receiving computer to support data exchange in duplex mode. It also has the ability to seamlessly send a byte stream generated on one of the computers to any other computer connected to the network.In addition, TCP controls the connection load, UDP does not control anything but the integrity of the received datagrams. Conclusion. The difference between TCP and UDP is the so-called "delivery guarantee". TCP requires a response from the client to whom the data packet is delivered, confirmation of delivery, and for this he needs a pre-established connection. TCP is also considered reliable, unlike UDP, which is called "unreliable datagram protocol". TCP eliminates data loss, duplication and shuffling of packets, delays, UDP allows all this, and it does not need a connection to work., as a result of which the data is transferred on UDP, should manage received, even with losses.

Flying with Covid: The visual presence of the pandemic in airports

Since the beginning of 2020, with the eclosion of the Covid-19 pandemic, airports have been included among the main hotspots for the diffusion of the disease. Several limitations affected the possibility for people to travel, with diverse approaches between the countries, and with differences among who was authorized to travel and who was not. This caused a contraction on the number of passengers transiting in the airports in all the countries. However the commercial international aviation has never stopped, and despite the reduction of passengers the airports managed to implement health security protocols for the Covid-19 diffusion control. Before the pandemic, other challenges already affected airports’ security protocols, such as the “terrorist threat”, making of these places “nervous systems” (as defined by Maguire and Pétercsak). After one year and half from the beginning of the pandemic, with the vaccination campaigns accelerating in various countries (with the clear differences due to governments’ political choices and countries’ access to vaccines) the air travels have returned to a condition similar to previous one. An increasing number of planes flying and an increasing number of passengers can be registered everywhere. Meanwhile, the sanitary attention to the Covid-19 diffusion contention continues to be a concern in the space organization of airports.This ethnographic photoessay aims at describing the visual presence of the Covid in the airports. The work focuses on four airports in three countries the author passed through in June 2021. They are the airports of Salvador da Bahia (Brazil), Lisbon (Portugal), Rome and Venice (Italy). Despite the differences between the countries in the approached adopted to contain the diffusion of the pandemic, airports are subjected to standardized international protocols. These are intended to (re)produce similar safety measures in the diverse airports. Meanwhile, airports are designed not to be identitarian, historical and relational, but yes to be experienced as “non places” (as Augé defined these places). However, each airport introduces several dimensions of its specific location, of its specific local health politics, of its specific passengers’ flow, and so on, making of them a peculiar place to observe the space design for Covid diffusion control. Despite the definition of the Covid as an “invisible enemy”, used in general media in diverse countries, the thesis is that the presence of the virus is highly visible to everyone passing in some airport, independently from the specific country. Meanwhile, the diverse airports introduce their own local and specific visual modalities to achieve passengers. Pictures included in this ethnographic photoessay focus on some of these modalities, such as the hand gel dispensers, instructions and prohibitions for preventing Covid dissemination, among other. Covid’s aesthetics in airports highlights how the pandemic affected people visual and sensorial experiences of these places and of their designs.

Research on Security Protocol Analysis Tool SmartVerif

Security protocols have been designed to protect the security of the network. However, many security protocols cannot guarantee absolute security in real applications. Therefore, security tests of the network protocol become particularly important. In this paper, firstly, we introduce SmartVerif, which is the first formal analysis tool to automatically verify the security of protocols through dynamic strategies. And then, we use SmartVerif to verify the pseudo-randomness of the encapsulated key of the Two-Pass AKE protocol, which was proposed by Liu’s in ASIACRYPT in 2020. Finally, we summary our work and show some limitations of SmartVerif. At the same time, we also point out the direction for future improvement of SmartVerif.

Implementation and Evaluation of Security Protocols in E-Commerce Applications

<p>There are a large amount of programs in the development process in todays technology environment, and many of these involve some type of security needs. These needs are usually not dealt with in a sensible way and some even don’t bother with any analysis. This thesis describes a solution of implementing a secure protocol, and gives an evaluation of the process along with the techniques and tools to aid a secure design and implementation process. This allows others to take this knowledge into account when building other applications which have a need for security development.</p>

Implementation and Evaluation of Security Protocols in E-Commerce Applications

<p>There are a large amount of programs in the development process in todays technology environment, and many of these involve some type of security needs. These needs are usually not dealt with in a sensible way and some even don’t bother with any analysis. This thesis describes a solution of implementing a secure protocol, and gives an evaluation of the process along with the techniques and tools to aid a secure design and implementation process. This allows others to take this knowledge into account when building other applications which have a need for security development.</p>

A Survey on Layer-Wise Security Attacks in IoT: Attacks, Countermeasures, and Open-Issues

Security is a mandatory issue in any network, where sensitive data are transferred safely in the required direction. Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are the networks formed in hostile areas for different applications. Whatever the application, the WSNs must gather a large amount of sensitive data and send them to an authorized body, generally a sink. WSN has integrated with Internet-of-Things (IoT) via internet access in sensor nodes along with internet-connected devices. The data gathered with IoT are enormous, which are eventually collected by WSN over the Internet. Due to several resource constraints, it is challenging to design a secure sensor network, and for a secure IoT it is essential to have a secure WSN. Most of the traditional security techniques do not work well for WSN. The merger of IoT and WSN has opened new challenges in designing a secure network. In this paper, we have discussed the challenges of creating a secure WSN. This research reviews the layer-wise security protocols for WSN and IoT in the literature. There are several issues and challenges for a secure WSN and IoT, which we have addressed in this research. This research pinpoints the new research opportunities in the security issues of both WSN and IoT. This survey climaxes in abstruse psychoanalysis of the network layer attacks. Finally, various attacks on the network using Cooja, a simulator of ContikiOS, are simulated.

Automated State-Machine-Based Analysis of Hostname Verification in IPsec Implementations

Owing to the advent and rapid development of Internet communication technology, network security protocols with cryptography as their core have gradually become an important means of ensuring secure communications. Among numerous security protocols, certificate authentication is a common method of identity authentication, and hostname verification is a critical but easily neglected process in certificate authentication. Hostname verification validates the identity of a remote target by checking whether the hostname of the communication partner matches any name in the X.509 certificate. Notably, errors in hostname verification may cause security problems with regard to identity authentication. In this study, we use a model-learning method to conduct security testing for hostname verification in internet protocol security (IPsec). This method can analyze the problems entailed in implementing hostname verification in IPsec by effectively inferring the deterministic finite automaton model that can describe the matching situation between the certificate subject name and the hostname for different rules. We analyze two popular IPsec implementations, Strongswan and Libreswan, and find five violations. We use some of these violations to conduct actual attack tests on the IPsec implementation. The results show that under certain conditions, attackers can use these flaws to carry out identity impersonation attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks.