Draft Constitution of the European Union: the new division of competences

2006 ◽  
pp. 297-307
Author(s):  
Joachim Wuermeling
2004 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Anthony Arnull

The purpose of this article is to consider the effect of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe on the European Court of Justice (ECJ). At the time of writing, the future of the draft Constitution is somewhat uncertain. Having been finalised by the Convention on the Future of Europe in the summer of 2003 and submitted to the then President of the European Council, it formed the basis for discussion at an intergovernmental conference (IGC) which opened in October 2003. Hopes that the text might be finalised by the end of the year were dashed when a meeting of the IGC in Brussels in December 2003 ended prematurely amid disagreement over the weighting of votes in the Council. However, it seems likely that a treaty equipping the European Union with a Constitution based on the Convention’s draft will in due course be adopted and that the provisions of the draft dealing with the ECJ will not be changed significantly. Even if either assumption proves misplaced, those provisions will remain of interest as reflecting one view of the position the ECJ might occupy in a constitutional order of the Union.


2006 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 37-58
Author(s):  
NW Barber

Is the european Union a state? Does it possess a constitution? And, accompanying these conundrums, if the Union lacks these characteristics, should we seek to confer them on it? There are some questions which are easier to answer than to understand, and questions about the statehood and constitution of the Union are of this nature. Pragmatic scholars have tended to dispose of such matters briskly; confident that their answers were correct, even if unsure of the basis for their confidence. The decision to entitle the product of the European Convention a ‘constitution’ has given these questions new significance. A small portion, at the very least, of the confused debate surrounding the Draft Constitution has been caused by the murky relationship between constitutions and states, and the implications that flow from statehood.


2004 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 1-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Arnull

The purpose of this article is to consider the effect of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe on the European Court of Justice (ECJ). At the time of writing, the future of the draft Constitution is somewhat uncertain. Having been finalised by the Convention on the Future of Europe in the summer of 2003 and submitted to the then President of the European Council, it formed the basis for discussion at an intergovernmental conference (IGC) which opened in October 2003. Hopes that the text might be finalised by the end of the year were dashed when a meeting of the IGC in Brussels in December 2003 ended prematurely amid disagreement over the weighting of votes in the Council. However, it seems likely that a treaty equipping the European Union with a Constitution based on the Convention’s draft will in due course be adopted and that the provisions of the draft dealing with the ECJ will not be changed significantly. Even if either assumption proves misplaced, those provisions will remain of interest as reflecting one view of the position the ECJ might occupy in a constitutional order of the Union.


2006 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 37-58
Author(s):  
NW Barber

Is the european Union a state? Does it possess a constitution? And, accompanying these conundrums, if the Union lacks these characteristics, should we seek to confer them on it? There are some questions which are easier to answer than to understand, and questions about the statehood and constitution of the Union are of this nature. Pragmatic scholars have tended to dispose of such matters briskly; confident that their answers were correct, even if unsure of the basis for their confidence. The decision to entitle the product of the European Convention a ‘constitution’ has given these questions new significance. A small portion, at the very least, of the confused debate surrounding the Draft Constitution has been caused by the murky relationship between constitutions and states, and the implications that flow from statehood.


2004 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 407-428 ◽  
Author(s):  
J Friel Raymond

After almost 50 years in existence in a variety of different forms, the EU finally has an express proposal on the table dealing with the potential withdrawal of a Member State. Article 59 of the draft Constitution states that any Member State may now ‘decide to withdraw from the European Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements’.1 The Member State would have to formally notify the European Council of this decision. The Council and the Member State would then enter into negotiations on a mutually agreeable basis for withdrawal, including a framework for the future relationship between the EU and the Member State. The results of this negotiation would require approval by a qualified majority of the Council after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.2 In any event, withdrawal would occur not later than two years following the notification unless extended by agreement between the Member State and the European Council.3


2004 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 465-479
Author(s):  
WALTER VAN GERVEN

This paper deals with the Institutions of the European Union in the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (hereinafter: ‘the draft Constitution’) submitted to the European Council meeting in Thessaloniki on 20 June 2003. It describes these institutions and their task from a perspective of the Union's democratic legitimacy. The paper is based on a book entitled The European Union: a Polity of States and Peoples, which will be published by Stanford University Press and Hart Publishing, Oxford. In this book, I examine the democratic legitimacy of the European Union as a whole. The book parts from the proposition that the Union is a ‘body politic’ which develops into a federal system, however not a State, with a parliamentary consensual (non-majoritarian) form of government. In the meantime, the draft Treaty has been amended by the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) held in Brussels on 17/18 June 2004. In so far as the amendments relate to the subject of this paper, they are mentioned below in the text or the endnotes.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document