DECISION-MAKING IN THE EU COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AFTER BREXIT

The EU Council of Ministers is different from other EU institutions because it is both an intergovernmental and supranational authority. This hybrid nature has motivated many authors to focus their research on it. The Council is an intergovernmental institution if we look at who is part of it (representatives of the Member States) while the elements of supranationality are most visible in the deci-sion-making area. The central decision-making institutions, the Council of Ministers can take decisions by qualified majority to be applied even to those countries that have not voted for decision. This decision-making procedure is what makes the Council recognizable, and at the same time this is an area that will be significantly affected by the UK's departure from the Union. Therefore, the subject of this paper is the analysis of decision-making in the Council after Brexit. The aim is to present future changes in this area, bearing in mind the current Lisbon model of qualified decision-making by a double majority. In addition, the paper provides projections on what coalitions in the Council might look like after the departure of one of the larg-est and most influential states.

Qualified laws as actors of the separation of powers

Over the last few decades, several countries have entrenched a special subcategory of law, which is adopted by stricter procedural rules than the requirements of the ordinary legislative process. These laws are enacted by qualified majority, by the consent of the two chambers of the legislation, and are subject to mandatory constitutional review before their promulgation, or additional safeguards are implemented in the ordinary legislative process. It is beyond doubt that this legal instrument influences the prevalence of the separation of powers and the constitutional principle of democracy in a remarkable way; therefore, it might be an important tool for populist politicians to concrete their preferences for the long term. In this study, my aim is to conceptualize the most highly contested issues regarding the legal nature of qualified laws, and to provide a deeper understanding of the interdependence between qualified laws and the separation of powers. This analysis might also clarify how qualified laws may serve the ambitions of populist political groups in certain specific circumstances. My contribution provides general theoretic considerations, and does not outline the particular constitutional frameworks in detail. I would rather just use the specific examples to demonstrate how the mechanism of qualified law works in practice as an instrument of constitutional law.

Various Forms of Differentiation and Majority Voting as an Alternative

This chapter sets out the different forms of differentiation and asks whether qualified majority voting in the field of taxation would be a practical and suitable alternative to differentiated law-making. The first sections show that enhanced cooperation is not the only flexibility mechanism within the European Union. Member States can also establish differentiation through primary EU law, secondary EU law, or by using partial international agreements. Partial international agreements may be a real alternative to enhanced cooperation law-making as they grant Member States the possibility to introduce rules which are only binding between some Member States. However, these sections reveal the clear differences between enhanced cooperation laws and partial international agreements which allow a protection of enhanced cooperation laws within the EU’s legal framework. Based on constitutional legal theory, in particular consociational democracy, the second part of this chapter argues that qualified majority voting should not be pursued in the field of taxation because it may lead to a European Union plagued by internal frustration and conflicts. The people of Europe are too heterogeneous, and unlike many other subject areas, taxation is a vehicle to pursue sensitive national policy objectives. Taxation is not only a revenue raiser, it is also a nuanced tool to steer taxpayers’ behaviour, achieve justice and equal opportunities through redistribution, and address economic needs.

Legislation and Legislative Process in Eastern Europe

The study describes and systemises the constitutional requirements on legislation in Eastern Europe. The comparison reveals that the basic structures of the legislative process live up to the standards of the rule of law. The details, however, are quite frequently deficient or problematic. Laws requiring a qualified majority often cause structural problems, based on poor political culture, and the vague and contradictory regulatory framework. Other problems are a legacy of socialism, e.g. the instrumental perception of the law, or the immature separation of powers. However, the apparent homogeneity of the region and its structural problems that was typical of the socialist era, has given way to a stronger differentiation which often reflects differences that existed prior to the socialist dictatorship. This stronger differentiation concerns, i.a. the extent of executive law-making, the structure of parliament (mono- or bicameral), the majority requirement for the decisions in parliament, and the participation of the people in legislation. In the states that have joined the EU, the European criteria of the rule of law have had their effect, whereas the candidate states on the Wester Balkans are on the way of consolidating their legislative system. Further to the East, the rule of law becomes weaker and weaker.

Informing reform: The views of legal professionals on the unique aspects of Scottish Law

The unique Scottish legal system stands apart from the better-known Anglo-American legal system, with variations relating to jury size (15 vs. 12), the number of verdicts available (3 vs. 2) and majority size (simple majority vs. unanimous). At present, only a handful of investigations have explored the effects of the Scottish ‘not proven’ verdict on jurors, and only a single study has explored the combined impact of the unique elements of the Scottish legal system on juror and jury decision making. The current study is the first to investigate the views of Scottish legal professionals on the three-verdict system, 15-person jury and simple majority verdict system. The aim of the study is to inform public and political debate, involve legal stakeholders in policy changes and decision making and compare legal professionals’ views with findings from previously conducted juror studies. Seventy-eight legal professionals took part in an online survey which asked for ratings and open responses on their attitudes to the Scottish (a) three-verdict system, (b) 15-person jury and (c) simple majority system. The results highlighted strong positive attitudes towards the ‘not proven’ verdict (particularly in a binary-verdict system of proven and not proven), 15-person juries and both the simple and qualified majority verdict systems. There was minimal support for reform towards an Anglo-American system. Instead, the reforms preferred by the legal professionals would be to require a qualified majority of 12/15 jurors, and to use a binary-verdict system of proven and not proven.

The Ordinary Legislative Procedure in a Post-Brexit EU: The Case of Social Europe

This article assesses the political and power dynamics of the Ordinarily Legislative Procedure (OLP) in social Europe and the likely impact of the UK’s departure in the field for future integration. It provides a detailed analysis of the OLP in social Europe during two recent periods of integration in the field—the first Barroso Commission (2004–2009) and the Juncker Commission (2014–2019). It finds the dynamics of the OLP have shifted from intergovernmental deadlock during the Barroso Commission to the characteristics of a new intergovernmental core state power during the Juncker Commission, even though the policy area is not a core state power <em>per se</em>. Despite the use of qualified majority voting policy agreements can only be achieved when there is near unanimity support in the Council, the Commission remains a neutral broker, and the Parliament shifts its position to that of the Council. As a result, continued opposition to integration in social Europe by Northern and Eastern Members means the removal of UK political agency will have only a marginal impact on the slow and piecemeal approach to integration in the field.

Aktuelle Entwicklungen in der EU-Sozialpolitik: effizientere Entscheidungsfindung durch Mehrheitsentscheidungen und differenzierte Integration?

Design and adoption of common social policy is conditional. Limited competencies, institutional and organizational heterogeneity among member states, and ideological-programmatic majorities in the institutions of the European Union (EU) have led to far fewer new legal instruments in recent decades. One of the key challenges is the unanimity requirement in the Council, enshrined in the Treaties in areas of great member state sovereignty. In 2019 the Commission proposed to allow a transition to qualified majority voting. This paper discusses what the transition entails in legal and procedural terms and highlights three key advantages it holds. To this aim it provides an overview of the policy areas and instruments that the Commission would like to transfer to qualified majority voting. It outlines how the potential that majority voting offers for EU social policy could be exploited better with more ambitious initiatives and discusses differentiated integration as an alternative.