Harms to Future People and Procreative Intentions

2009 ◽  
pp. 265-285 ◽  
Author(s):  
David T. Wasserman
Keyword(s):  
Future People

Parfit and the Non-Identity Problem

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Boonin
Keyword(s):  
Identity Problem ◽  
Future People

In this chapter, the author explains what the non-identity problem is and why it matters, as well as Derek Parfit’s central role in the literature on the problem. The author explains the solution to the problem Parfit tentatively proposed in Reasons and Persons (1984) and the two reasons he gave for being dissatisfied with that solution. The author then explains the solution that Parfit later defended in his final (posthumous) publication (2017) and why he thought that solution overcame the two problems with his earlier solution. The author then identifies a third problem with Parfit’s earlier solution and shows that this third problem is also a problem with his later solution. The author concludes by suggesting that one lesson that might be drawn from the failure of Parfit’s last solution points in the direction of a very different kind of response to the problem, one defended in the author’s 2014 book, The Non-Identity Problem and the Ethics of Future People. And in doing so, the author responds to some of the criticisms of that response that Parfit himself makes early in his final publication.

The future of utilitarianism

2011 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-166
Author(s):  
Tim Mulgan
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Climate Change Impact ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Current Work ◽  
Ethical Challenges ◽  
Future People ◽  
Change Impact ◽  
Change Climate ◽  
Practical Implications

My recent work has focused on the demands of utilitarianism, and our obligations to future people. In my current work, I draw on that earlier work, and ask how utilitarians might deal with the ethical challenges of climate change. Climate change has obvious practical implications. It will kill millions of people, wipe out thousands of species, and so on. My question in this paper is much narrower. How might climate change impact on moral theory — and especially on the debate between utilitarians and their non-utilitarian rivals?

3. Future generations

2018 ◽  
pp. 29-43
Author(s):  
Robin Attfield
Keyword(s):  
Human Health ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Identity Problem ◽  
Future People ◽  
The Enlightenment ◽  
Ten Commandments ◽  
The Future ◽  
Fundamental Objection

Concern about future generations stretches as far back as the Ten Commandments, but the belief that present people can significantly change the future originated as recently as the Enlightenment, along with the belief that our generation may be judged by posterity. ‘Future generations’ considers the moral standing of future generations; the fundamental objection to that belief—‘the Non-Identity Problem’; and the discounting of future interests. If it is agreed that future people and their interests matter, it is still widely held that their interests count for less than current interests. Future preferences and needs are discussed with some of the harmful practices that are detrimental to human and non-human health.

Sacrificing the Patrol: Utilitarianism, Future Generations and Infinity

1997 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luc Van Liedekerke ◽  
Luc Lauwers
Keyword(s):  
Decision Criterion ◽  
Moral Community ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Distant Future ◽  
Ethical Foundation ◽  
Future People ◽  
Ranking Criterion ◽  
Average Utility

Many people believe that we have responsibility towards the distant future, but exactly how far this responsibility reaches and how we can find a reasonable ethical foundation for it has not been answered in any definitive manner. Future people have no power over us, they form no part of our moral community and it is unclear how we can represent them in a possible original position. All these problems can be circumvented when you take an impersonal decision criterion like maximizing total or average utility. Such a sum-ranking criterion is neutral with respect to distance in time or space: my utility, my neighbour's and that of our descendants all carry the same weight. This makes future people an integral part of present decisions. Time-neutrality was defended by, among others, Sidgwick, Pigou and Ramsey.

Future Generations in Environmental Ethics

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Nolt
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Ethics ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Human Population ◽  
Fossil Fuels ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
Temporal Perspective ◽  
Future People ◽  
Intergenerational Ethics

Intergenerational ethics is the study of our responsibilities to future individuals—individuals (human or not) who are not now alive but will be. The term “future” characterizes, not the kind of a thing, but rather the temporal perspective from which it is being described. Future people, as such, therefore differ from us neither intrinsically nor in moral status. Our responsibilities to them are best understood by attempts to see things from their perspective, not from ours. Though intergenerational ethics takes various forms, the credible forms in conjunction with known facts yield two great practical conclusions: we must reduce human population, and we must keep most fossil fuels in the ground. The demandingness of these conclusions is no objection against them, but rather an accurate measure of the moral burdens of our godlike knowledge and power.

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