2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ethan Ludwin-Peery ◽  
Neil R Bramley ◽  
Ernest Davis ◽  
Todd Matthew Gureckis

In this paper, we describe three experiments involving simple physical judgments and predictions, and argue their results are generally inconsistent with three core commitments of probabilistic mental simulation theory (PMST). The first experiment shows that people routinely fail to track the spatio-temporal identity of objects. The second experiment shows that people often incorrectly reverse the order of consequential physical events when making physical predictions. Finally, we demonstrate a physical version of the conjunction fallacy where participants rate the probability of two joint events as more likely to occur than a constituent event of that set. These results highlight the limitations or boundary conditions of simulation theory.


Author(s):  
Martin Davis ◽  
Tony Stone

Mental simulation is the simulation, replication or re-enactment, usually in imagination, of the thinking, decision-making, emotional responses or other aspects of the mental life of another person. According to simulation theory, mental simulation in imagination plays a key role in our everyday psychological understanding of other people. The same mental resources that are used in our own thinking, decision-making or emotional responses are redeployed in imagination to provide an understanding of the thoughts, decisions or emotions of another. Simulation theory stands opposed to the ’ theory theory’ of folk psychology. According to the theory theory, everyday psychological understanding depends on deployment of an empirical theory or body of information about psychological matters, such as how people normally think, make decisions or respond emotionally. Simulation theory does not altogether deny that third-personal psychological knowledge is implicated in our folk psychological practice, prediction, interpretation and explanation. But it maintains that, over a range of cases, the first-personal methodology of mental simulation allows us to avoid the need for detailed antecedent knowledge about how psychological processes typically operate.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ethan Ludwin-Peery ◽  
Neil R Bramley ◽  
Ernest Davis ◽  
Todd Matthew Gureckis

In this paper, we describe three experiments involving simple physical judgments and predictions, and argue their results are generally inconsistent with three core commitments of probabilistic mental simulation theory (PMST). The first experiment shows that people routinely fail to track the spatio-temporal identity of objects. The second experiment shows that people often incorrectly reverse the order of consequential physical events when making physical predictions. Finally, we demonstrate a physical version of the conjunction fallacy where participants rate the probability of two joint events as more likely to occur than a constituent event of that set. These results highlight the limitations or boundary conditions of simulation theory.


Author(s):  
Kumju Hwang ◽  
Jinsook Choi

Entrepreneurial failure is prevalent, and particularly when the COVID−19 crisis exacerbates the economic recession, it becomes even more prevalent. Entrepreneurs experience an intensive emotional crisis when their ventures fail, and this deleterious impact, including stress and emotional pain, may prevent failed entrepreneurs (FEs) from restarting; hence, how they cope with failure has received increased attention in recent years. However, most of the extant literature focuses on success rather than failure, and there is very limited literature on how FEs cope with the psychological and emotional crisis caused by failure. This study focuses on FEs’ use of optimism and defensive pessimism as coping strategies within the mental simulation theory with respect to their re-entry intentions. It examines the impact of career ambition and public self-awareness on optimism, of the fear of failure (FoF) and self-doubt, on defensive pessimism, and of coping humor as a moderator. We used structural equation modeling to analyze the data of 277 Korean FEs who have actual entrepreneurial failure experiences and actively prepared for their re-entry. The results show that career ambitions and public self-awareness have an impact on optimism, and FoF and self-doubt lead to defensive pessimism. Coping humor also has a moderating effect on the path from defensive pessimism to the intention to re-enter. This study advances the literature on coping mechanisms that FEs employ to manage the negative impact of failure and prepare for their subsequent re-entry. Its theoretical model, based on the mental simulation theory combined with social comparison theory, provides a possible integrative framework that includes both the pervasively held view of entrepreneurs’ optimism related to overconfidence and their defensive pessimism related to their vulnerability due to their ventures’ failure. Thus, this study makes theoretical contributions to the literature of entrepreneurial failure, as well as practical implications for policymakers and educators who assist FEs in successfully coping with entrepreneurial failure and re-entry.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kellen Mrkva ◽  
Luca Cian ◽  
Leaf Van Boven

Abstract Gilead et al. present a rich account of abstraction. Though the account describes several elements which influence mental representation, it is worth also delineating how feelings, such as fluency and emotion, influence mental simulation. Additionally, though past experience can sometimes make simulations more accurate and worthwhile (as Gilead et al. suggest), many systematic prediction errors persist despite substantial experience.


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