Above and beyond the content: Feelings influence mental simulations

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kellen Mrkva ◽  
Luca Cian ◽  
Leaf Van Boven
Keyword(s):  
Mental Representation ◽  
Mental Simulation ◽  
Past Experience ◽  
Prediction Errors

Abstract Gilead et al. present a rich account of abstraction. Though the account describes several elements which influence mental representation, it is worth also delineating how feelings, such as fluency and emotion, influence mental simulation. Additionally, though past experience can sometimes make simulations more accurate and worthwhile (as Gilead et al. suggest), many systematic prediction errors persist despite substantial experience.

scholarly journals Much ado about nothing: The mental representation of omissive relations

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sangeet Khemlani ◽  
Paul Bello ◽  
Gordon Briggs ◽  
Hillary Harner ◽  
Christina Wasylyshyn
Keyword(s):  
Mental Models ◽  
Mental Representation ◽  
Model Theory ◽  
Mental Simulation ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Temporal Relations ◽  
Causal Relations ◽  
Much Ado About Nothing ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Force Vectors

When the absence of an event causes some outcome, it is an instance of omissive causation. For instance, not eating lunch may cause you to be hungry. Recent psychological proposals concur that the mind represents causal relations, including omissive causal relations, through mental simulation, but they disagree on the form of that simulation. One theory states that people represent omissive causes as force vectors; another states that omissions are representations of contrasting counterfactual simulations; a third argues that people think about omissions by representing sets of iconic possibilities – mental models – in a piecemeal fashion. In this paper, we tease apart the empirical predictions of the three theories and describe experiments that run counter to two of them. Experiments 1 and 2 show that reasoners can infer temporal relations from omissive causes – a pattern that contravenes the force theory. Experiment 3 asked participants to list the possibilities consistent with an omissive cause – it found that they tended to list particular privileged possibilities first, most often, and faster than alternative possibilities. The pattern is consistent with the model theory, but inconsistent with the contrast hypothesis. We marshal the evidence and explain why it helps to solve a long-standing debate about how the mind represents omissions.

scholarly journals Oversampled and undersolved: Depressive rumination from a predictive coding perspective

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Berg ◽  
Matthias Feldmann ◽  
Tobias Kube
Keyword(s):  
Problem Solving ◽  
Predictive Coding ◽  
Instrumental Learning ◽  
Mental Simulation ◽  
Clinical Findings ◽  
Predictive Processing ◽  
Prediction Errors ◽  
Depressive Rumination ◽  
Bayesian Sampling ◽  
Integrative View

Rumination is a widely recognized cognitive deviation in depression. An integrative view that combines clinical findings on rumination with theories of mental simulation and cognitive problem-solving could help explain the development and maintenance of rumination in a computationally and biologically plausible framework. In this review, we connect insights from neuroscience and computational psychiatry to elucidate rumination as repetitive but unsuccessful attempts at mental problem-solving. Appealing to a predictive processing account, we suggest that problem-solving is based on an algorithm that generates candidate behavior (policy primitives for problem solutions) using a Bayesian sampling approach, evaluates resulting policies for action, and then engages in instrumental learning to reduce prediction errors. We present evidence suggesting that this problem-solving algorithm is distorted in depression: Specifically, depressive rumination is regarded as excessive Bayesian sampling of candidates that is associated with high prediction errors without activation of the successive steps (policy evaluation, instrumental learning) of the algorithm. Thus, prediction errors cannot be decreased, and excessive resampling of the same problems occur. This then leads to reduced precision weighting attributed to external, “online” stimuli, low behavioral output and high opportunity costs due to the time-consuming nature of the sampling process itself. We review different computational reasons that make the proposed Bayesian sampling algorithm vulnerable to a ruminative „halting problem”. We also identify neurophysiological correlates of these deviations in pathological connectivity patterns of different brain networks. We conclude by suggesting future directions for research into behavioral and neurophysiological features of the model and point to clinical implications.

scholarly journals “Virus and Epidemic”: Causal Knowledge Activates Prediction Error Circuitry

2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (10) ◽  
pp. 2151-2163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniela B. Fenker ◽  
Mircea A. Schoenfeld ◽  
Michael R. Waldmann ◽  
Hartmut Schuetze ◽  
Hans-Jochen Heinze ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Substantia Nigra ◽  
Ventral Tegmental Area ◽  
Semantic Memory ◽  
Mental Representation ◽  
Prediction Error ◽  
Error Processing ◽  
Prediction Errors ◽  
Causal Knowledge ◽  
Fmri Study ◽  
Study Participants

Knowledge about cause and effect relationships (e.g., virus–epidemic) is essential for predicting changes in the environment and for anticipating the consequences of events and one's own actions. Although there is evidence that predictions and learning from prediction errors are instrumental in acquiring causal knowledge, it is unclear whether prediction error circuitry remains involved in the mental representation and evaluation of causal knowledge already stored in semantic memory. In an fMRI study, participants assessed whether pairs of words were causally related (e.g., virus–epidemic) or noncausally associated (e.g., emerald–ring). In a second fMRI study, a task cue prompted the participants to evaluate either the causal or the noncausal associative relationship between pairs of words. Causally related pairs elicited higher activity in OFC, amygdala, striatum, and substantia nigra/ventral tegmental area than noncausally associated pairs. These regions were also more activated by the causal than by the associative task cue. This network overlaps with the mesolimbic and mesocortical dopaminergic network known to code prediction errors, suggesting that prediction error processing might participate in assessments of causality even under conditions when it is not explicitly required to make predictions.

scholarly journals Much Ado About Nothing: The Mental Representation of Omissive Relations

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sangeet Khemlani ◽  
Paul Bello ◽  
Gordon Briggs ◽  
Hillary Harner ◽  
Christina Wasylyshyn
Keyword(s):  
Mental Models ◽  
Mental Representation ◽  
Model Theory ◽  
Mental Simulation ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Temporal Relations ◽  
Causal Relations ◽  
Much Ado About Nothing ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Force Vectors

When the absence of an event causes some outcome, it is an instance of omissive causation. For instance, not eating lunch may cause you to be hungry. Recent psychological proposals concur that the mind represents causal relations, including omissive causal relations, through mental simulation, but they disagree on the form of that simulation. One theory states that people represent omissive causes as force vectors; another states that omissions are representations of contrasting counterfactual simulations; a third argues that people think about omissions by representing sets of iconic possibilities – mental models – in a piecemeal fashion. In this paper, we tease apart the empirical predictions of the three theories and describe experiments that run counter to two of them. Experiments 1 and 2 show that reasoners can infer temporal relations from omissive causes – a pattern that contravenes the force theory. Experiment 3 asked participants to list the possibilities consistent with an omissive cause – it found that they tended to list particular privileged possibilities first, most often, and faster than alternative possibilities. The pattern is consistent with the model theory, but inconsistent with the contrast hypothesis. We marshal the evidence and explain why it helps to solve a long-standing debate about how the mind represents omissions.

Statistics and parallaxes

1978 ◽  
Vol 48 ◽  
pp. 7-29
Author(s):  
T. E. Lutz
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Design ◽  
Statistical Methods ◽  
Review Paper ◽  
Systematic Errors ◽  
Past Experience ◽  
Random Errors ◽  
Trigonometric Parallaxes ◽  
Systematic And Random Errors

This review paper deals with the use of statistical methods to evaluate systematic and random errors associated with trigonometric parallaxes. First, systematic errors which arise when using trigonometric parallaxes to calibrate luminosity systems are discussed. Next, determination of the external errors of parallax measurement are reviewed. Observatory corrections are discussed. Schilt’s point, that as the causes of these systematic differences between observatories are not known the computed corrections can not be applied appropriately, is emphasized. However, modern parallax work is sufficiently accurate that it is necessary to determine observatory corrections if full use is to be made of the potential precision of the data. To this end, it is suggested that a prior experimental design is required. Past experience has shown that accidental overlap of observing programs will not suffice to determine observatory corrections which are meaningful.

Life Beyond 1MeV

1980 ◽  
Vol 38 ◽  
pp. 30-33
Author(s):  
K.H. Westmacott
Keyword(s):  
Electron Microscopy ◽  
Past Experience ◽  
The Other ◽  
Good Case ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The U.S

Life beyond 1MeV – like life after 40 – is not too different unless one takes advantage of past experience and is receptive to new opportunities. At first glance, the returns on performing electron microscopy at voltages greater than 1MeV diminish rather rapidly as the curves which describe the well-known advantages of HVEM often tend towards saturation. However, in a country with a significant HVEM capability, a good case can be made for investing in instruments with a range of maximum accelerating voltages. In this regard, the 1.5MeV KRATOS HVEM being installed in Berkeley will complement the other 650KeV, 1MeV, and 1.2MeV instruments currently operating in the U.S. One other consideration suggests that 1.5MeV is an optimum voltage machine – Its additional advantages may be purchased for not much more than a 1MeV instrument. On the other hand, the 3MeV HVEM's which seem to be operated at 2MeV maximum, are much more expensive.

Mental representation of economic crisis in Italian and Swiss samples 1The authors would like to thank Maurizio Mistri for his help in the construction of items. This research was supported by a grant from the Italian Murst (ex 40%).

2001 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucia Savadori ◽  
Eraldo Nicotra ◽  
Rino Rumiati ◽  
Roberto Tamborini
Keyword(s):  
Economic Crisis ◽  
Mental Representation ◽  
Mental Representations ◽  
Social Contexts ◽  
Raw Material ◽  
National Context ◽  
Cluster Procedure ◽  
Total N ◽  
Two Samples ◽  
Important Symptom

The content and structure of mental representation of economic crises were studied and the flexibility of the structure in different social contexts was tested. Italian and Swiss samples (Total N = 98) were compared with respect to their judgments as to how a series of concrete examples of events representing abstract indicators were relevant symptoms of economic crisis. Mental representations were derived using a cluster procedure. Results showed that the relevance of the indicators varied as a function of national context. The growth of unemployment was judged to be by far the most important symptom of an economic crisis but the Swiss sample judged bankruptcies as more symptomatic than Italians who considered inflation, raw material prices and external accounts to be more relevant. A different clustering structure was found for the two samples: the locations of unemployment and gross domestic production indicators were the main differences in representations.

Reading About Persons: The Effects of Conjunctions on the Mental Representation of Person Descriptions

2008 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabine Krolak-Schwerdt ◽  
Margret Wintermantel ◽  
Nadine Junker ◽  
Julia Kneer
Keyword(s):  
Mental Representation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Person Memory ◽  
Causal Connections ◽  
Single Person ◽  
On Line

Three experiments investigated the processing of person descriptions that consisted of a number of statements about the characteristics of a person. In one condition, each statement referred to a single person attribute and in the other condition, causal and additive conjunctions to verbally link the statements were introduced. Evidence was found that the introduction of verbal links enhanced participants’ memory about the characteristics of the described person. On-line measures of processing showed that the comprehension of person information was strongly facilitated by the introduction of verbal links. Furthermore, the results were due to the introduction of causal connections between person attributes. These findings are discussed in terms of their implications for models of person memory and representation.

Temporal Prediction Errors Affect Short-Term Memory Scanning Response Time

2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (6) ◽  
pp. 333-342
Author(s):  
Roberto Limongi ◽  
Angélica M. Silva
Keyword(s):  
Response Time ◽  
Short Term Memory ◽  
Estimation Error ◽  
Predictive Coding ◽  
Time Estimation ◽  
Prediction Errors ◽  
Memory Scanning ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Term Memory ◽  
Temporal Prediction

Abstract. The Sternberg short-term memory scanning task has been used to unveil cognitive operations involved in time perception. Participants produce time intervals during the task, and the researcher explores how task performance affects interval production – where time estimation error is the dependent variable of interest. The perspective of predictive behavior regards time estimation error as a temporal prediction error (PE), an independent variable that controls cognition, behavior, and learning. Based on this perspective, we investigated whether temporal PEs affect short-term memory scanning. Participants performed temporal predictions while they maintained information in memory. Model inference revealed that PEs affected memory scanning response time independently of the memory-set size effect. We discuss the results within the context of formal and mechanistic models of short-term memory scanning and predictive coding, a Bayes-based theory of brain function. We state the hypothesis that our finding could be associated with weak frontostriatal connections and weak striatal activity.

Cognitive Components of Ingroup Projection

2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maya Machunsky ◽  
Thorsten Meiser
Keyword(s):  
Mental Representation ◽  
Cognitive Representation ◽  
Social Categories ◽  
Projection Model ◽  
Minimal Group ◽  
Model Experiments ◽  
Superordinate Category ◽  
Cognitive Components ◽  
Per Se

This research investigated whether relative ingroup prototypicality (i.e., the tendency to perceive one’s own ingroup as more prototypical of a superordinate category than the outgroup) can result from a prototype-based versus exemplar-based mental representation of social categories, rather than from ingroup membership per se as previously suggested by the ingroup projection model. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that a prototype-based group was perceived as more prototypical of a superordinate category than an exemplar-based group supporting the hypothesis that an intergroup context is not necessary for biased prototypicality judgments. Experiment 3 introduced an intergroup context in a minimal-group-like paradigm. The findings demonstrated that both the kind of cognitive representation and motivational processes contribute to biased prototypicality judgments in intergroup settings.

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