Partial Mental Simulation Explains Fallacies in Physical Reasoning

People can reason intuitively, efficiently, and accurately about everyday physical events. Recent accounts suggest that people use mental simulation to make such intuitive physical judgments. But mental simulation models are computationally expensive; how is physical reasoning relatively accurate, while maintaining computational tractability? We suggest that people make use of partial simulation, mentally moving forward in time only parts of the world deemed relevant. We propose a novel partial simulation model, and test it on the physical conjunction fallacy, a recently observed phenomenon (Ludwin-Peery, Bramley, Davis, & Gureckis, 2020) that poses a challenge for full simulation models. We find an excellent fit between our model's predictions and human performance on a set of scenarios that build on and extend those used by Ludwin-Peery et al. (2020), quantitatively and qualitatively accounting for a deviation from optimal performance. Our results suggest more generally how we allocate cognitive resources to efficiently represent and simulate physical scenes.

What Can the Conjunction Fallacy Tell Us about Human Reasoning?

This chapter briefly summarizes some the main results obtained from more than three decades of studies on the conjunction fallacy. It shows that this striking and widely discussed reasoning error is a robust phenomenon that can systematically affect the probabilistic inferences of both laypeople and experts, and it introduces an explanation based on the notion of evidential impact in terms of contemporary Bayesian confirmation theory. Finally, the chapter tackles the open issue of the greater accuracy and reliability of impact assessments over posterior probability judgments and outlines how further research on the role of evidential reasoning in the acceptability of explanations might contribute to the development of effective human-like computing.

Free ranking vs. rank-choosing: New insights on the conjunction fallacy

It has been consistently shown that when asked to rank options, people often make fallacious judgements. Furthermore, such fallacies can be sensitive to presentation mode. In the first study, we explored a novel type of ranking presentation, namely, choosing between two rank orders of options. To enable a direct comparison of fallacy rates between free ranking and the new presentation mode, we calculated the frequencies of the two presented rank orders in a free ranking condition. Our analysis shows that people choose the non-fallacious rank order significantly more when asked to choose between two rank orders as compared to freely ranking the possible options. In a second study, we explored whether an agent presenting the rankings to choose from has an effect. To alleviate social biases we used videos of social robots as the presenting agents. We show that rank orders presented by social agents significantly reduce the fallacy rates, compared to rank orders presented without an agent. We discuss the results in view of social decision making theories, wherein a ranking presentation by a social agent is comparable to a consultation with another person regarding free ranking. Our results suggest that fallacious decision making can be mitigated by a social agent presenting rankings to choose from.

Coherent lower and upper conditional previsions defined by Hausdorff inner and outer measures to represent the role of conscious and unconscious thought in human decision making

The model of coherent lower and upper conditional previsions, based on Hausdorff inner and outer measures, is proposed to represent the preference orderings and the equivalences, respectively assigned by the conscious and unconscious thought in human decision making under uncertainty. Complexity of partial information is represented by the Hausdorff dimension of the conditioning event. When the events, that describe the decision problem, are measurable is represented to the s-dimensional Hausdorff outer measure, where s is the Hausdorff dimension of the conditioning event, an optimal decision can be reached. The model is applied and discussed in Linda’s Problem and the conjunction fallacy is resolved.

The Linda who skipped the logic classes

The letter points to a logical mistake found in “The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment” published by Tversky and Kahneman. Currently, at least 5,100 research papers reference this work, and an entire field of associated studies has been created based on the paper. These works assume the correctness of the original publication and reproduce the error without due critical analysis.

Is There Anything Good About Atheists? Exploring Positive and Negative Stereotypes of the Religious and Nonreligious

Negative stereotypes about atheists are widespread, robust, rooted in distrust, and linked to discrimination. Here, we examine whether social perceivers in the United States might additionally hold any positive stereotypes about atheists (and corresponding negative stereotypes of the religious). Experiments 1 ( N = 401) and 2 ( N = 398, preregistered) used methods of intuitive stereotypes (the conjunction fallacy). People tended to stereotype atheists as fun, open-minded, and scientific—even as they harbor extreme intuitive anti-atheist prejudice in Experiment 2. Experiment 3 ( N = 382) used a quasi-behavioral partner-choice paradigm, finding that most people choose atheist (vs. religious) partners in stereotype-relevant domains. Overall, results suggest that people simultaneously possess negative and also positive stereotypes about atheists, but that corresponding negative stereotypes of the religious may be even stronger. These effects are robust among the nonreligious and somewhat religious, but evidence is mixed about whether the highly religious harbor these positive stereotypes.

Is there anything good about atheists? Exploring positive and negative stereotypes of the religious and nonreligious

Negative stereotypes about atheists are widespread, robust, rooted in distrust, and linked to discrimination. Here, we examine whether social perceivers in the US might additionally hold any positive stereotypes about atheists (and corresponding negative stereotypes of the religious). Experiments 1 (N = 401) and 2 (N = 398, preregistered) used methods of intuitive stereotypes (the conjunction fallacy). People tended to stereotype atheists as fun, open-minded, and scientific—even as they harbor extreme intuitive anti-atheist prejudice in Experiment 2. Experiment 3 (N = 382) used a quasi-behavioral partner-choice paradigm, finding that most people choose atheist (versus religious) partners in stereotype-relevant domains. Overall, results suggest that people simultaneously possess negative and also positive stereotypes about atheists, but that corresponding negative stereotypes of the religious may be even stronger. These effects are robust among the nonreligious and somewhat religious, but evidence is mixed about whether the highly religious harbor these positive stereotypes.

Broken Physics: A Conjunction-Fallacy Effect in Intuitive Physical Reasoning

One remarkable aspect of human cognition is our ability to reason about physical events. This article provides novel evidence that intuitive physics is subject to a peculiar error, the classic conjunction fallacy, in which people rate the probability of a conjunction of two events as more likely than one constituent (a logical impossibility). Participants viewed videos of physical scenarios and judged the probability that either a single event or a conjunction of two events would occur. In Experiment 1 ( n = 60), participants consistently rated conjunction events as more likely than single events for the same scenes. Experiment 2 ( n = 180) extended these results to rule out several alternative explanations. Experiment 3 ( n = 100) generalized the finding to different scenes. This demonstration of conjunction errors contradicts claims that such errors should not appear in intuitive physics and presents a serious challenge to current theories of mental simulation in physical reasoning.

Indirect illusory inferences from disjunction: a new bridge between deductive inference and representativeness

We provide a new link between deductive and probabilistic reasoning fallacies. Illusory inferences from disjunction are a broad class of deductive fallacies traditionally explained by recourse to a matching procedure that looks for content overlap between premises. In two behavioral experiments, we show that this phenomenon is instead sensitive to real-world causal dependencies and not to exact content overlap. A group of participants rated the strength of the causal dependence between pairs of sentences. This measure is a near perfect predictor of fallacious reasoning by an independent group of participants in illusory inference tasks with the same materials. In light of these results, we argue that all extant accounts of these deductive fallacies require non-trivial adjustments. Crucially, these novel indirect illusory inferences from disjunction bear a structural similarity to seemingly unrelated probabilistic reasoning problems, in particular the conjunction fallacy from the heuristics and biases literature. This structural connection was entirely obscure in previous work on these deductive problems, due to the theoretical and empirical focus on content overlap. We argue that this structural parallelism provides arguments against the need for rich descriptions and individuating information in the conjunction fallacy, and we outline a unified theory of deductive illusory inferences from disjunction and the conjunction fallacy, in terms of Bayesian confirmation theory.