Empirical Applications of Veto Player Analysis and Institutional Effectiveness

2010 ◽  
pp. 21-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Hallerberg
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Effectiveness ◽  
Veto Player

Organizational learning: A tool for diversity and institutional effectiveness

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (131) ◽  
pp. 113-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daryl G. Smith ◽  
Sharon Parker
Keyword(s):  
Organizational Learning ◽  
Institutional Effectiveness

Why Should We Be Beggars with the Ballot in Our Hand? Veto Players and the Failure of Land Value Taxation in the United Kingdom, 1909–14

2006 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 575-591 ◽  
Author(s):  
IAIN McLEAN ◽  
JENNIFER NOU
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
Welfare States ◽  
Veto Players ◽  
Temporary Increase ◽  
British Politics ◽  
Land Value ◽  
Fiscal Discipline ◽  
Veto Player ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Entire History

Recent veto player work argues that majoritarian regimes such as the United Kingdom have better fiscal discipline and smaller welfare states than proportional regimes with more veto players. An analytic narrative of the failure of land value taxation in the United Kingdom between 1909 and 1914 shows, however, that it failed not because of previously advanced reasons, but because the number of veto players in British politics was sharply increased. This increase in veto player numbers prevented a tax increase. All seven of the conventional reasons for characterizing the United Kingdom as a low-n veto player regime failed to hold between 1906 and 1914. Observable implications discussed include the need to review the entire history of British politics in this period in the light of the temporary increase in veto players; and the ambiguous implications of number of veto players for fiscal discipline.

scholarly journals Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism

1995 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 289-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Tsebelis
Keyword(s):  
Policy Change ◽  
Comparative Politics ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Veto Players ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
Veto Player ◽  
Collective Actors ◽  
Parliamentary Systems ◽  
Presidential Systems

The article compares different political systems with respect to one property: their capacity to produce policy change. I define the basic concept of the article, the ‘veto player’: veto players are individual or collective actors whose agreement (by majority rule for collective actors) is required for a change of the status quo. Two categories of veto players are identified in the article: institutional and partisan. Institutional veto players (president, chambers) exist in presidential systems while partisan veto players (parties) exist at least in parliamentary systems. Westminster systems, dominant party systems and single-party minority governments have only one veto player, while coalitions in parliamentary systems, presidential or federal systems have multiple veto players. The potential for policy change decreases with the number of veto players, the lack of congruence (dissimilarity of policy positions among veto players) and the cohesion (similarity of policy positions among the constituent units of each veto player) of these players. The veto player framework produces results different from existing theories in comparative politics, but congruent with existing empirical studies. In addition, it permits comparisons across different political and party systems. Finally, the veto player framework enables predictions about government instability (in parliamentary systems) or regime instability (in presidential systems); these predictions are supported by available evidence.

College Rankings: Creating an Equitable Model of Transformation and Institutional Effectiveness

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-97
Author(s):  
Allison Hurst
Keyword(s):  
Social Mobility ◽  
Alternative Model ◽  
Institutional Effectiveness ◽  
Economic Returns ◽  
Sat Scores ◽  
Relative Lack ◽  
Ranking Systems ◽  
Working Class Students ◽  
Effectiveness Data

Colleges that serve working-class students show up poorly in traditional rankings of US colleges. Without appropriate outcome measures, measures of ‘quality’ of inputs drive most current ranking systems. The trouble is that quality is often just a measure of pre-existing privilege (e.g., selectivity, average SAT scores). In this article, I demonstrate the viability of a model that uses economic returns data while factoring in the relative lack of privilege of students attending any particular institution as a way of ranking that institution’s transformative efficacy and institutional effectiveness. The model was then tested on a diverse sample of 655 US colleges and universities for whom reliable economic returns and institutional effectiveness data are available. Unlike widely used rankings models, this proposed alternative model can distinguish between reproducing privilege (high economic returns as expected, low defaults, timely year to degree and fewer incompleters) and facilitating social mobility (higher returns and persistence than would be expected given the incoming characteristics of students). The article concludes with a discussion of the uses to which such a model could be best put.

Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of Agent Veto in Two-Level Games

1995 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 914-924 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jongryn Mo
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Foreign Country ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Domestic Institutions ◽  
Veto Player ◽  
Domestic Constraints ◽  
International Bargaining ◽  
Informational Effect

Putnam's (1988) conjecture that negotiators can benefit from their domestic constraints implies that they may want to impose domestic constraints on themselves by granting veto power to an agent. I show that a negotiator's decision to employ an agent as veto player depends on the kinds of information available to the foreign country and the alignment of preferences between the negotiator and the agent. When the foreign country has incomplete information about the negotiator's preferences and the negotiator has preferences too divergent from those of the agent, the negotiator will not give veto power to the agent. However, this applies only to an agent with extreme preferences, and a surprisingly large number of agent types will receive veto power. The attractiveness of the agent veto to the negotiator is in part due to its informational effect. By granting veto power to an agent, the negotiator can transmit more information to the foreign country and capture informational gains that would be lost in the absence of the agent veto.

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