Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of Agent Veto in Two-Level Games

1995 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 914-924 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jongryn Mo

Putnam's (1988) conjecture that negotiators can benefit from their domestic constraints implies that they may want to impose domestic constraints on themselves by granting veto power to an agent. I show that a negotiator's decision to employ an agent as veto player depends on the kinds of information available to the foreign country and the alignment of preferences between the negotiator and the agent. When the foreign country has incomplete information about the negotiator's preferences and the negotiator has preferences too divergent from those of the agent, the negotiator will not give veto power to the agent. However, this applies only to an agent with extreme preferences, and a surprisingly large number of agent types will receive veto power. The attractiveness of the agent veto to the negotiator is in part due to its informational effect. By granting veto power to an agent, the negotiator can transmit more information to the foreign country and capture informational gains that would be lost in the absence of the agent veto.

Author(s):  
Samantha Besson

As a companion to the five regional reports in this volume, this chapter’s aim is a double one: first, to bring the comparison up to the regional level, and second, to analyse the international and domestic institutions, procedures, and mechanisms that affect how international human rights instruments influence domestic law. The chapter is therefore both a study in comparative international human rights law and a contribution to its methodology. Its structure is four-pronged. The first section clarifies the aim, object, and method of the comparison. The second section presents a comparative assessment of the Covenants’ domestic influence across regions and develops a grid of comparative analysis. The third section addresses the authority of the Committees’ interpretations of the Covenants, relying on a bottom-up comparative law argument. The fourth section discusses the role of human rights comparison and of regional human rights law in enhancing the legitimacy of the Committees’ future interpretations.


Author(s):  
Donald Bloxham

Against majority opinion within his profession, Donald Bloxham argues that it is legitimate, often unavoidable, and frequently important for historians to make value judgements about the past. History and Morality draws on a wide range of historical examples, and its author’s insights as a practising historian. Examining concepts like impartiality, neutrality, contextualization, and the use and abuse of the idea of the past as a foreign country, Bloxham’s book investigates how the discipline has got to the point where what is preached can be so inconsistent with what is practised. It illuminates how far tacit moral judgements infuse works of history, and how strange those histories would look if the judgements were removed. Bloxham argues that rather than trying to eradicate all judgemental elements from their work historians need to think more consistently about how, and with what justification, they make the judgements that they do. The importance of all this lies not just in the responsibilities that historians bear towards the past—responsibilities to take historical actors on those actors’ own terms and to portray the impact of those actors’ deeds—but also in the role of history as a source of identity, pride, and shame in the present. The account of moral thought in History and Morality has ramifications far beyond the activities of vocational historians.


1990 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 391-416 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ellen M. Immergut

ABSTRACTThe medical profession is reputed to control decision-making in medical care to such an extent that one can speak of professional dominance. Yet West European health policies have radically changed the working conditions and incomes of doctors in many countries. Why have some governments been able to ‘socialize’ medicine? This article seeks to refute the view that the medical profession exercises a universal veto power. In contrast to scholars who explain medical influence in terms of singular characteristics of the medical profession or through the historical process of professionalization, this essay focuses on the properties of distinct political systems that make them vulnerable to medical influence. It argues that we have veto points within political systems and not veto groups within societies. By comparing the lobbying efforts of medical associations in Switzerland, France, and Sweden, the article analyses the role of political institutions in accounting for different patterns of medical association influence on health policy.


1958 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 31-33
Author(s):  
Simon Messing

In the initial phase of his field work in a foreign country, especially an "underdeveloped" one, the anthropologist may find that he cannot carry out his research unless he is able to relate himself effectively to government officials in that country. This fact, however, can present not only problems, but also opportunities. The purpose of this article is to relate such experiences in Ethiopia.


2020 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 359-393
Author(s):  
Andŕe Albuquerque Sant' Anna ◽  
Leonardo Weller

Did the threat of communism influence income distribution in developed capitalist economies during the Cold War? This article addresses this question by testing whether income inequality in OECD countries was related to events linked to the spread of communism—revolutions and Soviet interventions—around the world. We argue that the threat of the spread of communism acted as an incentive for the elites and governments to keep economic inequality low. This article provides an empirical contribution to the recent literature on inequality, which highlights the role of domestic institutions but ignores the role of the Cold War in redistributing income. We find a robust relationship between income inequality and the distance to communist events. The results, reinforced by cases studied, suggest that the spread of communism fostered income redistribution deals between domestic elites and workers. Finally, we show that these effects were reinforced by strong unions and the presence of strong communist parties.


Author(s):  
Esther Gal-Or

This chapter describes how methodologies developed in the field of game and information theory can assist in understanding the interaction of competitors in markets, and the study of managerial economics, in general. The chapter highlights, in particular, the role of incomplete information in generating market failures, and provides examples of mechanisms that can alleviate such failures. Some examples of topics addressed are: first- and second-mover advantages, long term strategic commitments versus short term tactical choices made by competitors, erection of entry barriers to secure market power, choices of product-mix, special pricing mechanisms to enhance profitability, and issues related to vertical control and the internal organization of the firm.


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