Shaping Presidential Powers in Hungary: Convention, Tradition and Informal Constitutional Amendments

There was no tradition of a republican president in Hungary before the fall of communism, and the transitory constitution of 1989 was unclear about the exact role the President should play in the constitutional system of Hungary. Some provisions even resembled those of presidential or semi-presidential systems; some ambiguities were clarified during the first two decades after the transition. Conventions, however, were established to some extent and sometimes very quickly. This period gave rise to guidelines as to how the powers of the President should be exercised. Some other powers were concretized and interpreted foremost by the Constitutional Court. These conventions and judicial interpretations formed the character of the Presidency to the extent of informal constitutional change. Some of these elements have even been incorporated into and formalized by the new Fundamental Law of Hungary. The present contribution will point out how the originally broad competencies of the President have been narrowed in the practice, and what role the Constitutional Court and political actors played in this process.

Presidentialism with Parliamentary Characteristics

This chapter examines the characteristics of presidentialism in South Korea, equipped with several parliamentary institutional elements in the Constitution. Although the performance of these parliamentary elements have been actively disused, it has not been analysed in a systematic way. In redressing this weakness, this chapter aims to illustrate the conditions under and extent to which these elements distinguish South Korean presidentialism from other presidential systems. In so doing, it first reviews the historical development of these institutions and then explores their long-term performance, focusing both on the National Assembly’s involvement in the president’s appointment of personnel and on executive legislation. The analysis shows that constitutionally the South Korean political regime can be clearly identified as a presidential system. In addition, the parliamentary elements are unlikely to serve as a check on South Korean presidents to orient the political system into one which relies on a mutual dependence between the executive and the legislature.

Pre-electoral coalitions and cabinet stability in presidential systems

Previous research on coalition stability in presidential systems has relied to a substantial extent on the parliamentary literature. By focusing on the post-electoral bargaining environment, these approaches have neglected the key role played by pre-electoral agreements formed around the winning presidential candidate in the making and breaking of coalitions under presidentialism. We claim that cabinets derived from pre-electoral coalition should foster trust and reduce uncertainty regarding partners’ future behaviour. However, the positive effect of pre-electoral coalitions over cabinet duration is conditional on cabinet status, that is, the control of a legislative majority or near majority. Therefore, we argue that pre-electoral coalition cabinets holding a majority or near majority of seats will be more durable than purely post-electoral majority coalitions, whereas minority pre-electoral coalition cabinets congruent should endure less than minority post-electoral coalition cabinets. We test these hypotheses using a dataset of pre- and post-electoral coalitions in 11 Latin American countries.

Legislative Speech in Presidential Systems

This essay constitutes a sort of corrective to the considerable attention scholars of legislative speech have given to bodies in parliamentary regimes. I survey the study of legislative speech in presidential systems by categorizing it into two types. The first presents patterns of speech across memberships as indicative of other factors such as electoral institutions and the strength of legislative parties. Here, I use Proksch and Slapin’s theoretical framework for purchase and refer to a small but growing corpus of literature on Latin America. The subject of the second is the content of speech. The approach is normative and assumes words spoken are independent variables that can have important effects on policy, politics, and the health of the broader polity. I conclude by remarking upon the opportunities computer software and newly accessible data provide for researchers of speech in the legislatures of presidential systems. I also suggest avenues for future research.

Death of Turkish Democracy: The “Turkish-Style” Presidential System

Turkey has adopted the presidential system over parliamentarism in 2018 with the promise that the new system would bring more stability, democracy, and economic growth. As being the most recent country which changed its government system through a referendum to presidentialism, Turkey constitutes a very important example to be analyzed in order to see the effects of it after a long-adopted parliamentary period in the 21st century. This paper compares the basic features of democracy as well as the democratic presidential systems with the example of Turkey and aims at finding out if the presidentialism has performed well and if not, why, in the light of examples and chosen indicators. Findings of this study suggest that presidential system led to a “consolidation of power” which in its nature is anti-democratic. Analysis of certain indicators show that presidentialism did not perform well in Turkey on democratic, political as well as economic fronts.

Telaah Efektivitas Mekanisme Pemberhentian Presiden Indonesia: Perbandingan Praktik Amerika Serikat dan Korea Selatan

Impeachment is a part of the control mechanism in the constitutional system to allege the President's violation of the constitution. Impeachment characterizes presidential systems as implemented in various countries, such as the United States, South Korea, and Indonesia. This study aimed to examine the rule and practice on the impeachment of the President and/or Vice President in Indonesia, with reference to the United States and South Korea. Then, it analyzed how this mechanism is effective to be implemented in Indonesia. This study used a juridical research method with a comparative law approach. This study indicated differences in impeachment in the United States, South Korea, and Indonesia. The impeachment mechanism in the United States only involved representative institutions, but that in Indonesia and South Korea required judicial intervention. In particular, Indonesia's impeachment dealt with the decision that remained in the hands of the political institution, the People's Consultative Assembly. In South Korea, the final decision ended in the judicial institution. Through this comparison, Indonesia should reformulate the impeachment mechanism of the President and/or Vice President in Indonesia with the following suggestions. First, regarding allegations of serious violations, the final impeachment decision must be in the Constitutional Court. Second, concerning allegations of misconduct, the decision on impeachment must rest with the People's Consultative Assembly. KEYWORDS: Impeachment, Indonesia, South Korea, United States.

The Presidency in Latin American Politics

Presidents derive support from electoral endorsement at the polls, but once in office, how they exercise power is also determined by the checks other actors impose on the presidency. By design, the presidential system was intended to function within a carefully conceived structure of checks and balances. As the executive branch in a system of separation of powers, the presidency was granted veto power over the lawmaking process. Congress and the judiciary were in turn granted prerogatives to check the executive in its own realm of action. Latin American presidential systems, however, have equipped presidents with extraordinary capacities, setting incentives in a different direction, where presidents often take the place of the most determinative decision maker within the political system. Juan Linz came to believe that presidentialism was not conducive to stable democracy (Linz, 1990), and his influential work spearheaded an era of studies that ultimately contradicted his arguments and led research in a new direction, while the third wave of democracy brought about stable yet unbalanced presidential systems. In order to understand the incentives that underlie this newfound stability, a deeper understanding of the institutional arrangements that govern it is necessary, and key among these, those structured around the legislative process. The institutions that make up the Latin American presidency as it stands in the early 21st century define incentives that lay out its unique character and distinct form of concentration of power. These can be organized into three sets: (a) elections, (b) lawmaking, and (c) cabinet management. Considering the institutions, and practices, that govern these three areas and how they vary across countries provides the building blocks to understanding the complexity of the presidency in Latin America. Whether presidents are elected indirectly via an electoral college or through direct votes by citizens, the specification of the type of majority required to win the presidency, the length of terms, and whether reelection is allowed are details that, when combined in diverse ways, present politicians and citizens with different sets of incentives to govern their behavior. These arrangements underwent different reforms over the turn of the 21st century. The institutions surrounding the lawmaking process are chief in lending the Latin American presidency its reputation of centralizing power, as constitutions are packed with arrangements that blur the separation of powers. Presidential legislative proposal power, presidential control of the legislative agenda through constitutional urgency authority (fast-track), variations in the veto prerogative, variations in override requirements, the delimitation of areas to exclusive presidential proposal rights, restrictions on congress to increase spending, and constitutional decree authority; all of these work to extend the legislative capacities of presidents, enabling them to counter the will of congress in ways unthinkable to the Founding Fathers when they first created this system. Latin American presidents also face challenges in managing cabinets, which in some cases are a fundamental component to articulate coalitions in the legislature—much like in parliamentary systems. Partisan dynamics come to life in the cabinet, and cabinets may work as important tools to manage otherwise fragmented party systems. Finally, understanding the influence of gender on presidential systems presents a promising avenue of research.