Additional Aspects of the Stackelberg Strategy in Nonzero-Sum Games

1976 ◽  
pp. 197-210
Author(s):  
M. Simaan ◽  
J. B. Cruz
Keyword(s):  
Stackelberg Strategy

scholarly journals Composite Stackelberg Strategy for Singularly Perturbed Bilinear Quadratic Systems

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 154-163
Author(s):  
Ning Bin ◽  
Chengke Zhang ◽  
Huainian Zhu ◽  
Zan Mo
Keyword(s):  
Singularly Perturbed ◽  
Stackelberg Equilibrium ◽  
Order System ◽  
Fast Time ◽  
Slow Time ◽  
Stackelberg Strategy ◽  
Fast Time Scale ◽  
Equilibrium Strategies ◽  
Numerical Result ◽  
Coupled Algebraic Riccati Equations

AbstractBased on singularly perturbed bilinear quadratic problems, this paper proposes to decompose the full-order system into two subsystems of a slow-time and fast-time scale. Utilizing the fixed point iterative algorithm to solve cross-coupled algebraic Riccati equations, equilibrium strategies of the two subsystems can be obtained, and further the composite strategy of the original full-order system. It was proved that such a composite strategy formed ano(ε) (near) Stackelberg equilibrium, and a numerical result of the algorithm was presented in the end.

scholarly journals Endogenous Stackelberg leadership within a team. The coalition effect

2021 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-79
Author(s):  
E.M. Skarzhinskaya ◽  
◽  
V.I. Tsurikov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Theoretical Investigation ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Stackelberg Strategy ◽  
Team Members ◽  
Leadership Formation ◽  
Stackelberg Leadership ◽  
Diminishing Returns ◽  
Stackelberg Model ◽  
Specific Individual

The article engages in a theoretical investigation of the possibility of implementing the Stackelberg strategy within a team. It is assumed that the team gene-rates aggregate income that increases as the efforts invested by each agent intensify, subject to the law of diminishing returns. The goal of each agent in a team is to maximize his own individual gain. In order to achieve an outcome that is Paretopreferable over Nash equilibrium, two approaches may be used: identifying a leader or forming a smaller group (coalition) within the team whose members, in pursuance of increased individual gains, choose the route that maximizes coalition gains. It is shown that the advent of a coalition in a team results in Pareto-improvement in a simultaneous game. We analyse the possibility of endogenous leadership forming according to the Stackelberg model when using the mechanism of timing decisions. It is established that under autonomy of all team members, leadership formation can only be confidently predicted in specific individual cases. In a significantly more general case, all of the prerequisites for the formation of leadership are created by the presence of a single coalition interested in implementing the Stackelberg strategy.

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