Optimal Parameter Selection for Constraint-Following Control for Mechanical Systems Based on Stackelberg Game

This paper proposes an optimal parameter design of control scheme for mechanical systems by adopting the Stackelberg game theory. The goal of the control is to drive the mechanical system to follow the prescribed constraints. The system uncertainty is (possibly fast) time-varying and bounded. A β-measure is defined to gauge the performance. A robust control is proposed to render the β-measure uniformly ultimately bounded. This control scheme is based on feasible design parameters (i.e., parameters within prescribed range), whose choice may not be unique. For optimal (unique) parameter selection, a Stackelberg game is formulated. By taking the control design parameters as the players, for each player, a cost function is built with the consideration of the performance cost, the time cost and the control cost. To follow, the Stackelberg strategy is then carried out via backward induction, which results in the choice of the optimal parameters.

Endogenous Stackelberg leadership within a team. The coalition effect

The article engages in a theoretical investigation of the possibility of implementing the Stackelberg strategy within a team. It is assumed that the team gene-rates aggregate income that increases as the efforts invested by each agent intensify, subject to the law of diminishing returns. The goal of each agent in a team is to maximize his own individual gain. In order to achieve an outcome that is Paretopreferable over Nash equilibrium, two approaches may be used: identifying a leader or forming a smaller group (coalition) within the team whose members, in pursuance of increased individual gains, choose the route that maximizes coalition gains. It is shown that the advent of a coalition in a team results in Pareto-improvement in a simultaneous game. We analyse the possibility of endogenous leadership forming according to the Stackelberg model when using the mechanism of timing decisions. It is established that under autonomy of all team members, leadership formation can only be confidently predicted in specific individual cases. In a significantly more general case, all of the prerequisites for the formation of leadership are created by the presence of a single coalition interested in implementing the Stackelberg strategy.