Logical Competence in Infancy: Object Percept or Object Concept?

1981 ◽  
pp. 237-245
Author(s):  
George Butterworth
Keyword(s):  
Object Concept ◽  
Logical Competence

An Alternative Explanation of the Infant's Difficulty in the Stage III, IV, and V Object-Concept Tasks

Perception ◽  
1982 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 577-588 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irene Neilson
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Stage Iii ◽  
Object Concept

Traditional explanations of the infant's difficulty in the stage III, IV, and V object-concept tasks have centred on the fact that the object is made to disappear. It is argued that this emphasis is mistaken. Two experiments are reported which demonstrate that infants continue to have difficulty in these tasks when tested with transparent occluders. The implications of these findings for alternative explanations of the infant's difficulty in the stage III, IV, and V tasks are considered.

Acquisition and generalization of novel object concepts by young language learners

1986 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gail Ross ◽  
Katherine Nelson ◽  
Harriet Wetstone ◽  
Ellen Tanouye
Keyword(s):  
Language Learners ◽  
Object Type ◽  
Novel Object ◽  
Object Concept

ABSTRACTTwenty-month-old children learned to recognize nonsense labels for five novel object concepts and were tested on generalization to variants of these concepts. Children were presented with either one or three examples of each object type during learning sessions. Results showed that receptive learning of names for object concepts was significantly related to a number of possible manipulations specific to each object type and to labelling by children. Children's generalization choices were consistent with adults' ranking of similarity of variants to concept prototypes. Children who learned less well were more likely to generalize to new instances of an object concept and to a greater number of variants if they had been exposed to three rather than one example during training sessions. Results also support the hypothesis that differentiation of objects in interaction is important to the formation of an object concept at this age.

Plus ça change . . . : Jost, Piaget, and the dynamics of embodiment

2001 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. E. R. Staddon ◽  
A. Machado ◽  
O. Lourenço
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Model ◽  
Memory Errors ◽  
Object Concept ◽  
Quantitative Properties

The “A-not-B” error is consistent with an old memory principle, Jost's Law. Quantitative properties of the effect can be explained by a dynamic model for habituation that is also consistent with Jost. Piaget was well aware of the resemblance between adult memory errors and the “A-not-B” effect and, contrary to their assertions, Thelen et al.'s analysis of the object concept is much the same as his, though couched in different language.

scholarly journals Bridging Theories and Practices: Boundary Objects and Constellation Analysis as Vehicles for Interdisciplinary Knowledge Integration

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (19) ◽  
pp. 5357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Feldhoff ◽  
Stockmann ◽  
Fanderl ◽  
Gahle ◽  
Graf ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Urban Areas ◽  
Knowledge Integration ◽  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Research Process ◽  
Boundary Object ◽  
Object Concept ◽  
Knowledge Based ◽  
Constellation Analysis ◽  
Interdisciplinary Knowledge ◽  
Core Concepts

Knowledge integration is a major challenge of interdisciplinary research. Substantially different stocks of knowledge based on different scientific backgrounds, uses of language, methodologies, and epistemologies must be integrated into the research process. Addressing this challenge, this paper exemplifies the process of interdisciplinary knowledge integration drawing on the example of the junior research group DynaMo—Mobility-Energy Dynamics in Urban Areas that deals with the sustainable transformation of urban mobility systems. This paper shows how we apply the boundary object concept in combination with the method of Constellation Analysis as vehicles for interdisciplinary knowledge integration. By innovatively combining the boundary object concept with Constellation Analysis we a) suggest a self-reflective tool for structuring the process of knowledge integration and b) further operationalize the boundary object with the help of core concepts. The approach is illustrated with the boundary object sustainable transformation of urban passenger mobility used by DynaMo. In doing so, the paper aims to add an instrument to the toolkit of inter- and transdisciplinary research and offers practical knowledge for its application.

Précis ofDeduction

1993 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip N. Johnson-Laird ◽  
Ruth M. J. Byrne
Keyword(s):  
Model Theory ◽  
Semantic Information ◽  
Nonmonotonic Reasoning ◽  
Linguistic Knowledge ◽  
Deduction System ◽  
Formal Rule ◽  
Natural Deduction System ◽  
Logical Competence ◽  
Orthodox View ◽  
Formal Rules

AbstractHow do people make deductions? The orthodox view in psychology is that they use formal rules of inference like those of a “natural deduction” system.Deductionargues that their logical competence depends, not on formal rules, but on mental models. They construct models of the situation described by the premises, using their linguistic knowledge and their general knowledge. They try to formulate a conclusion based on these models that maintains semantic information, that expresses it parsimoniously, and that makes explicit something not directly stated by any premise. They then test the validity of the conclusion by searching for alternative models that might refute the conclusion. The theory also resolves long-standing puzzles about reasoning, including how nonmonotonic reasoning occurs in daily life. The book reports experiments on all the main domains of deduction, including inferences based on prepositional connectives such as “if” and “or,” inferences based on relations such as “in the same place as,” inferences based on quantifiers such as “none,” “any,” and “only,” and metalogical inferences based on assertions about the true and the false. Where the two theories make opposite predictions, the results confirm the model theory and run counter to the formal rule theories. Without exception, all of the experiments corroborate the two main predictions of the model theory: inferences requiring only one model are easier than those requiring multiple models, and erroneous conclusions are usually the result of constructing only one of the possible models of the premises.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document